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Gender Wage Differentials and Discrimination in the U K and Europe 
Abstract 
Gender wage differentials and discrimination are issues of primary significance both in 
terms of equity and efficiency. Current policy debate emphasises the importance of 
labour market efficiency with various H M Treasury reports highlighting productivity as 
the key determinant of economic growth. Consequently a deeper understanding of where 
the labour market allocates its scare human resource inefficiently, as a result of 
discrimination, is always desirable. 
The vast majority of the existing literature is based upon single country studies using 
cross-sectional data. This has led to weaknesses in our understanding of the inter­
temporal processes generating changes to the wage gap, as well as the impact of national 
differences to relative cross-country gender differentials. Using the UK as the major 
focus, and other European countries for comparison, this thesis improves upon both of 
these. Paying particular attention to the roles played by inequality and sample selection. 
Blau and Kahn (1992) initially highlighted the importance of wage inequality to cross­
country wage gaps. This is built upon by applying the techniques they pioneered and 
making use of the higher levels of comparability and compatibility inherent within the 
Panel Comparability Project (PACO) and European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) data sets. With the analysis revealing that the gender wage gap would be 
narrower in the UK if the level of inequality was reduced to those in the rest of Europe. 
Thus supporting the view that a compression of the overall wage distribution leads to 
smaller gender wage gaps. 
The issue of sample selection is always present when empirical work is based upon 
earnings functions. Since Heckman (1979) it has become the norm to correct for possible 
bias using his two-stage procedure. However this is generally treated as a technical 
exercise and rarely warrants any meaningful discussion. Unfortunately selectivity is not 
merely a source of potential bias it also reflects relationships that have a significant effect 
upon the gender wage gap, most importantly its inter-temporal path. Consequently there 
is a clear need for a deeper understanding of this issue. It is revealed to be important, 
especially in the UK, where changes to the skill levels of those employed, relative to the 
overall population, are shown to be crucial to the narrowing of the wage gap. With this 
improvement resulting from more favourable skill endowments for those women entering 
or re-entering paid employment. This indicates that policies addressing human capital 
accumulation prior to labour market entry have already been successful in narrowing the 
differential. However there is still evidence that women are receiving inequitable returns 







The issues of gender wage differentials and discrimination have been of concern for 
many years for economists and policy makers alike. Initially the focus of the debate 
related predominantly to equity with the policy response in the UK being the Equal 
Pay Act (1970) and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975), as well as their many 
subséquent amendments. However it has long since been established that wage 
discrimination is a potential source of market failure, as the economy will be failing to 
fully utilise its scarce human capital resource. So clearly, whenever the présence of 
discrimination can be detected, there is a rôle for policy makers to remove or at least 
reduce the extent of discrimination purely on efficiency grounds.Therefore it is not 
surprising that in more recent times the debate has changed its emphasis to address 
more specifically the issue of labour market efficiency. 
Labour productivité is the major déterminant of economie growth (HM Treasury 
1999), therefore future productivité gains are likely to have a major impact upon 
future wealth. Demographic changes, with decreased fertility rates and increased life 
expectancy, has forced employers to look to under utilised groups (Kingsmill 2003). 
Since women are an obviously under used resource within the labour market this is 
one potential source for future productivité gains. A number of researchers concur in 
the view that closing the gender wage gap will raise the value of work carried out 
predominantly by women. Generating higher levels of investment in training and 
éducation in these sectors, leading to the productivité gains required to drive economie 
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growth (Grimshaw and Rubery 2001, Walby and Olsen 2002, Kingsmill 2003). As a 
conséquence narrowing the gender wage gap is of primary importance from an 
economie policy perspective. 
The current policy debate has presented a range of measures likely to have a positive 
impact upon the gender wage differential, with ail of thèse falling into one of two 
broad catégories. Firstly, there are those that seek to promote female participation in 
the labour market, enabling women to close the skills and expérience gap. Government 
initiatives in this area are, the National Childcare Strategy to help mothers of young 
children remain in the labour market, the New Deal to give access to training for those 
returning to the labour market and finally promoting the Work-Life Balance campaign 
to encourage greater flexibility in the workplace. Secondly there are those policies 
seeking to reduce the extent of discrimination in the labour market, with the promotion 
of employment and pay reviews (Kingsmill 2003) to develop transparency in thèse 
processes at the forefront. 
In terms of discrimination it is unfortunate, as the subséquent chapters will reveal, that 
highlighting the existence of wage discrimination and estimating its true extent is 
fraught with many empirical difficultés. However, even if it is troublesome 
identifying the présence and impact of wage discrimination, there is stili suffïcient 
justification for policy makers to focus upon narrowing the gender wage gap as an 
objective, particularly as outlined above on the grounds of efficiency. According to 
Kingsmill (2003) the size of the UK gender wage gap and its persistence is largely due 
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to failures in human capital management, with the labour market failing to make the 
best use of the full range of available human capital. Suggesting that women either 
have insuffícient levéis of human capital or else they are unable to put their human 
capital to its most effícient use. If this is indeed the case any policies enabling women 
to acquire more human capital and/or make better use of their current endowment will 
have a positive effect upon economic growth. This link between labour market 
efficiency and economic growth being emphasised in recent years with the British 
government pinpointing productivity as the largest single componen! of economic 
growth (HM Treasury 1999). As a result the benefíts of making more effective use of 
the scarce labour resource are clear. 
The empirical analysis of these issues can be traced back to the seminal work by 
Becker (1957), where individuáis or employers have a taste for discrimination. 
However the real expansión of work in this área followed the introduction of the 
decomposition technique pioneered independently by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca 
(1973). This technique recognises that any wage differential is made up of a 
combination of differences in labour market characteristics, or skills, and the treatment 
received by different groups. With the decomposition separating the wage gap into that 
portion explained by relative characteristics and that remaining unexplained. 
The vast majority of gender differential studies in the UK have used this type of 
decomposition technique or some of its many subsequent derivations. With some of 
the earliest analysts, for example Chiplin and Sloane (1976) and Greenhalgh (1980), 
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using the same décompositions as originally prescribed by Blinder and Oaxaca. 
However as the study of wage differentials developed décomposition techniques 
evolved to take account of a number of additional factors. For example Cotton (1988), 
Neumark (1988) among others, highlighted that the original décomposition technique 
made unrealistic assumptions about the wage structure in the absence of 
discrimination. Consequently they recommended their own alternative décomposition 
techniques, thèse gave rise to a number of additional studies within the UK, Harkness 
(1996) and Joshi and Paci (1998) being the most notable ones. Similarly Juhn et al 
(1991 ) pointed out that comparisons of means was too simplistic, they argued that 
considération needed to be given to the overall wage distribution. Consequently they 
developed a further technique where the position of women within the male wage 
distribution was a key component of the décomposition, with Blau and Kahn (1992) 
making use of this advance and producing estimâtes for the UK and other countries. 
The body of literature for the UK is predominantly based upon décomposition 
techniques of varying forms and can be very loosely summarised as follows. Sloane 
(1990) estimated UK gender wage differentials for most of the 20* century, finding 
that the wage gap was remarkable static until the mid-1970's when there was a 
significant narrowing, largely due to the implementation of equal opportunities 
législation. The latter finding supporting the conclusions reached in an earlier work by 
Greènhalgh (1980). After this the gender wage gap was again fairly static throughout 
the remainder of the 1970's and the early 1980's, followed by a steady narrowing 
throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's (Harkness 1996 and Blackaby et al 1997). 
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One of the most recent studies, (Kingsmill 2003), estimated the average earnings of 
full-time women at 82% of the average male full-time wage. So although the gender 
wage gap has narrowed, it is clearly stili a concern in Britain. Especially as most of the 
remaining differential is unexplained by différences in characteristics, implying the 
continued présence of discrimination. 
There is now a vast literature world-wide relating to gender wage differentials and 
discrimination, thèse predominantly use décomposition techniques and are mainly 
derived from cross-sectional data, with the UK being no différent. The major 
shortcomings within the literature are that we possess only a limited understanding of, 
firstly, the causes of gender differential changes over time, and secondly, cross-
country wage gap différences. Both of these are of importance from a policy 
perspective, since the purpose of any policy initiative is to reduce the extent of 
discrimination in the future. Hence a deeper understanding of both of these issues will 
enable this to be done more effectively. Clearly knowing why the wage gap has 
changed over a certain period and the types of policy that are proven to be more, or 
less, successful in other countries will enable policy prescription to be carried out 
more effectively. 
Existing inter-temporal analysis relies upon compartng cross-sectional estimâtes at 
différent points in time. These techniques are limited in their ability to explain the 
causes of gender wage gap changes, since the cause of any observed change over time 
is subject to spéculation and sensitive to the assumptions made. Similarly existing 
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cross-country analysis is weakened by issues of comparability within the data. To date 
researchers have had to reach conclusions based upon different data sets for each of 
the countries considered. On occasions when the same data set has been available for a 
number of countries the analysis has suffered as a result of differing variable 
definitions across the countries. Consequently studies of this type potentially reveal 
more about differences in data collection, sampling methods and data recording than 
they do about actual events. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the debate relating to gender earnings in the UK, as 
well as other countries, by addressing two important research questions. Firstly, what 
are the major reasons behind changes to the UK gender wage gap over the period 
considered? And, secondly, what are the features within the UK labour market that 
cause its gender differential to be wider, or narrower, than other countries. With the 
thesis being able to make a major contribution by overcoming the shortcomings 
outlined in the previous paragraph. Firstly, undertaking more meaningful inter­
temporal analysis, by taking advantage of the panel structure of the Panel 
Comparability Project (PACO) data set. Then by being able to reach more meaningful 
cross-country conclusions as a result of using the standardised variables inherent 
within the PACO and European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data sets. 
The empirical analysis is undertaken using predominantly decomposition techniques. 
This type of approach lies firmly within the domain of neo-classical economics, since 
it assumes that wages respond to changes in labour supply and labour demand. Clearly 
it is relatively straightforward to question the validity of the neo-classical assumptions. 
Institutionalists point out that wages may not be as responsive, to supply and demand 
factors, as the neo-classical model would predict. The institutional arrangements 
within firms, as well as monopoly power in the product market and trade union power 
in the labour market, all act to reduce the level of flexibility below that predicted by 
the neo-classical competitive model. As a resuit this thesis makes use of 
décomposition analysis since it is the most appropriate currently available method of 
analysing gender wage diflferentials. Whilst at the same time using the institutional ist 
critique to qualify and analyse the outcomes of the empirical analysis, ensuring that 
they lead to more robust findings. These findings can then be used to more 
appropriately inform the continuing policy debate relating to gender wage differentials 
In order to add clarity to this continuing policy debate existing policy 
recommendations are placed into one of four broad catégories. Firstly, those 
influencing factors prior to entering the labour market, policies such as more équitable 
educational provision. Secondly those promoting female participation, for example 
subsidised childcare provision. Thirdly, attempts to ensure fairer treatment within the 
labour market, i.e. equal opportunstes in employment or equal pay législation. And 
finally, policies designed to narrow the wage distribution. Blau and Kahn (1992) 
identified an inverse relationship between the level of wage inequality and the gender 
wage gap, hence if the wage distribution is compacted the differential should fall. The 
empirical findings are then aligned to the différent policy catégories so that the most 
fruitful areas for future wage gap narrowing within the UK can be identified. 
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The remainder of the thesis is set out as follows. Firstly, the existing literature is 
reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. With the first focusing upon théories seeking to 
explain the présence of gender wage discrimination, the second reviewing the relevant 
décomposition techniques and the last the empirical évidence relating to gender 
differentials and discrimination. Thèse chapters confirming the aforementioned 
weaknesses of existing inter-temporal and cross-country analysis. 
The empirical analysis commences in Chapter 5 with the PACO data being used to 
estimate earnings functions and apply a number of différent décomposition techniques. 
The UK and Germany are analysed in isolation and in comparison with one another. 
Germany being chosen as the comparator country since it is identified within the 
literature as being distinctly différent from the UK in terms of its labour market 
institutions and practices (Traxler 1996). The two countries are compared to highlight 
the importance of firstly, différences in the relative endowments of labour market 
characteristics and, secondly, the level of wage inequality to their respective gender 
wage gaps. Inter-temporal décompositions are then applied to both countries, 
indicating the major déterminants of wage gap changes over the period considered. 
From a policy perspective this reveals the importance of gender skills gaps, as well as 
the impact of any inéquitable returns to those skills, to the wage differential. Thus 
indicating the major target for potential future législation. In addition the cross-country 
élément highlights the effects of différent bargaining régimes to the gender 
differential, pointing to the régime most conducive to gender equity. 
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One of the key findings of Chapter 5 is that when wage gaps are analysed inter-
temporally sample sélection changes become important. This can occur either as a 
resuit of those in employment becoming more highly skilled in comparison to the 
overall population, or else women have become more effective in trans la li their 
skills into higher earnings. In Chapter 6 this is explored in greater depth, with a 
combination of décomposition and earnings mobility analysis, separating the impact of 
those in employment throughout and those entering, or leaving, employment. This 
being crucial to policy makers since the policies targeted at existing participants, i.e. 
equality in promotion procédures, allocation of in-work training places, etc., are very 
différent from those targeted at labour market entrants, i.e. equity in educational 
provision, re-training schemes, etc. As a resuit the analysis of this chapter, revealing 
the types of policy most likely to assist future wage gap narrowing, is of particular 
signifi canee. 
Finally, the importance of wage inequality to the UK gender wage gap is a recurring 
conclusion from both Chapters 5 and 6. The last empirical chapter seeks to place this 
in a much broader context by including ten other EU countries, this being done by 
making use of the ECHP data set. This much broader analysis being important since it 
allows for more detailed analysis of the UK against a larger number of distinct labour 
markets. It also highlights the extent of the UK wage penalty, in comparison to other 
countries, for those with below average labour market skills. This is then used to 
indicate the possible impact of any wage inequality réduction policies upon the gender 
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2.1 Introduction 
The stated purpose of this thesis is to achieve a deeper understanding of why gender wage 
differentials differ across countries as well as changing over time, with this chapter 
explaining and reviewing the existing techniques that are able to assist in this process. At 
its most fundamental level the empirical challenge is to separate the wage gap into that 
portion resulting from discrimination and the portion resulting from justifiable factors. 
The critical importance of being able to identify the présence of wage discrimination, as 
well as being able to establish its extent, has been highlighted in the first chapter. Its 
présence being the resuit of market failure and the extent implying the potential costs of 
that failure. The most effective tool currently available for researchers seeking to 
establish both the présence and extent of wage discrimination is the widely used 
décomposition technique. The following sections outline the basic décomposition 
technique, as well as its major subséquent developments, highlighting the benefits and 
limitations of this type of analysis. 
As pointed out in the introduction the décomposition approach lies firmly within the neo-
classical school of économies. The technique being underpinned by the neo-classical 
view of market primacy, hence the only important institution is the market since this 
opérâtes to effectively allocate resources. Consequently within the labour market this 
implies that individuat wages are determined by demand relative to supply for any given 
type of labour. 
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On the contrary the institutionalist view is that the market is just one of a large number of 
institutions ail carrying o u t a rôle in the allocation of resources. With particular référence 
to the labour market this suggests that other institutions, such as firms, trade unions, the 
state and even informai institutions, such as the présence of social conventions, can have 
an influence upon an individual's wages, Furthermore the institutionalist critique makes 
more specific rejections of the neo-classical view in that it refuses to accept self-seeking 
as the only motivator for human behaviour. Thus suggesting that the labour market is not 
simply made up of firms seeking to maximise profit and individuals seeking to maximise 
their income and leisure opportunities. Similarly, it also rejects the individuai as the 
primary décision making unit, recognising that large numbers of décisions are arrived at 
on a household, or even larger basis. Clearly neither of the two conflicting viewpoints is 
entirely accurate, although there is merit in each. As a resuit the empirical analysis will 
adopt the convention and take the neo-classical décomposition analysis as the starting 
point and then use the institutionalist critique to inform and qualify the résultant findings. 
When comparing the average wages of two separate groups within any labour market, it 
is highly unlikely that their wages will be the same, hence a wage differential will always 
exist. The issue being that some of the differential will be justified by différences in 
characteristics or skills and some of which will not. Consequently it is impossible to 
separate the study of wage discrimination from the study of wage differenti al s. Any 
attempt to establish, firstly, the présence of any wage discrimination, and secondly, its 
extent, requires the identification of that portion of the differential that is justified by the 
groups' relative characteristics and that which is not. Since it seeks to do exactly this, the 
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standard tool for researchers undertaking this type of analysis has for the last 30 years 
been the décomposition technique pioneered by Blinder and Oaxaca (Blinder 1973 and 
Oaxaca 1973). In its simplest form the Blinder/Oaxaca technique estimâtes wage 
discrimination as outlined below. 
Firstly Mincerian earnings functions (Mincer 1974) of the following form are estimated 
separately for each of the two groups, in this case men and women; lnJ^ = Z,/3 + ui with 
the dépendent variable being the naturai log of the individuai wage, Z ' being the vector of 
labour market characteristics, |3 their estimated coefficients and u a normally distributed 
error term. The log wage differential can then be decomposed into the portion explained 
by the model and its unexplained part, which can be interpreted as the upper limit of 
discrimination (Oaxaca 1973), using the following methods: 
\nWm-\nÌVf=(Zm-Zf)f3m+Zf(f3m-pf) 
or In Wm -\nWf = (Zm - Zf )(3f + Zm (fim -f3f). 
The subscripts m and f are to represent males and females. There are two alternative 
methods, since it cannot be known if the existing male or female wage structure would 
prevail in the absence of discrimination. The first method assumes the male structure 
prevails and the second the female, in both cases the first term represents the explained 
portion, i.e. that which results from différences in the explanatory variables, with the 
second term being unexplained. 
The simple nature of the estimation process has undoubtedly been a factor in the 
popularity of the Blinder/Oaxaca method, however there are a number of problems or 
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limitations inhérent within the technique. Obviously the institutionalist critique, already 
mentioned, of ignoring the impact of institutions other than the market upon the 
individuai wage is valid. Also at the most fundamental level the entire décomposition 
technique is based upon the rather stringent assumption of symmetry across the genders. 
This being that men and women with the same labour market cha rader isti es should 
behave in the same fashion in terms of their labour market décisions. Even if the neo-
classica! assumptions are aeeepted in their entirety there still remains a number of 
limitations inhérent within the technique. These can be separated into issues relating to 
the earnings funetions and those relating to the décomposition. Any décomposition, 
however valid, would be rendered worthless if the earnings funetions from which it is 
extracted gave biased estimâtes or are poorly defined, consequently earnings funetion 
issues will be discussed first. 
2.2 Earnings Function Issues 
Clearly, as the earnings funetions are the basis upon which the décomposition results are 
extracted, any analysis of this type can only ever be as good as its estimated wage 
équations. There are a whole host of specific issues relating to chosen variables, model 
spécification and data in previous studies, but thèse are beyond the scope of this chapter, 
and will be dealt with in Chapter 4. However there is one common problem which is 
particularly relevant to the estimation of earnings funetions by gender, hence it warrants 
further discussion here. 
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The measurement of actual labour market expérience is often problematic, since data sets 
infrequently include information on actual expérience. As a resuit researchers are forced 
to use some kind of proxy, with the most common being a potential expérience variable 
based on the âge of the individual and their âge when they left éducation. For women 
especially potential expérience overstates actual expérience, since women are far more 
likely to take career breaks, consequently if this particular variable is biased upwards its 
estimated coefficient will be biased downwards. The authoritative work by Zabalza and 
Arrufat, (1985), sought to address this, by predicting actual expérience based upon 
estimâtes of the probability of labour market participation in différent years, this imputed 
estimate of expérience was shown to produce less biased estimâtes of women ' s 
expérience coefficients. This can be estimated using the following method: 
P i t = l - F ( Z i t ) 
Where Pu is the probability of the /th woman participating during year t. Z; t is the 
cumulative of a unit normal deviate defined on a linear function of a vector of économie 
variables and characteristics predicting participation, the independent variables taking on 
their values as at year t. The above function is then used to project backwards and predict 
the probability of participating in ail years back as far as the end of their formai 
éducation. The prédiction of accumulated labour market expérience Xj then becomes 
£ , - 1 
j=0 
where Ej is the number of years since the /th women left school, i.e. potential expérience. 
Additionally a variable for time outside the labour market Hj can be created from H; = Ej -
X; this allows for the possible dépréciation of labour market skill whilst not working. 
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A further problem exists with the possibility of selectivity bias being present, in its 
broadest sense this means that those included in the estimation of the earnings function 
are not a random sample of the overall population. More specifically it implies that there 
is some form of correlation between the process determining employment and the process 
determining wages, with failure to control for this link being likely to lead to biased 
coefficient estimates in the earnings function. The standard technique for dealing with 
this is to use what has become known as the Heckman 2-step procedure (Heckman 1979). 
This models the two processes by firstly estimating a univariate probit which can be 
applied as follows; 
The probit model of participation is; Y{ * = Z. ' y + si where Y ;* is a latent 
variable associated with being employed, Z\ is a vector of determinants of employment 
and y their associated parameters. 
The earnings function is of the usual form; Yi =Xi,p+ w, with Yj being the 
natural log of the observed wage, Xj f a vector of determinants and ft their estimated 
coefficients. The error terms, e, and uj, follow a bivariate normal distribution 
(0 ,0 ,cr e ,CT u ,p) . The probability of being employed is given by; 
?rob(Y* > 0) = Prob(e > -Z^y) 
= <D(Z i 'y) , 
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where is the standard normal cumulative density function with the variance of e 
normalised to 1. Wages are observed for those whom Yj f>0, so that the expected wage of 
any individuai in employment is given by; 
E(Yi\Y*>0) = Xttß + E(ui\si > - Z , ' y ) 
= X>ß + p<juXi 
= Xiiß+9Xi where B = pau> Xt = 0 ( Z , . » / O ( Z , » > and ^ ( . ) i s 
the standard normal density function. The estimating équation for those employed may 
now be presented in its more usuai form as; 
r. |r. * > 0 = Xi ' ß + Ol, + error 
where earnings for those employed are estimated as a function of their productive 
characteristics (X,) and (X) a measure of their likelihood of being employed, often 
referred to as the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). 
The model of participation originally suggested by Heckman is limited in that it assumes 
that the labour supply décision is entirely an individuai one. Clearly this fits in with the 
neo-classical view of the labour market, however there is a very strong argument that 
labour supply is determined on a household, rather than individuai basis. Wunderink-van 
Veen (1997) summarises the literature pertaining to this issue, highlighting that the 
individuai supply décision is, within a household, a function of the différent market wage 
rates availableto the two household members and their two différent productivités for 
work in the household. As an attempt to take at least the first of thèse on board it has 
become the norm to include household income as an explanatory variable in the 
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participation probit Thus controlling for the impact of a partner 's earnings upon the 
likelihood of being employed. This does represent an improvement since it does take 
account of an important household factor within the labour supply décision, however 
there are other important factors, such as the nature of a partner 's employment in terms of 
location, flexibility etc that are likely to impact upon labour supply. Unfortunately, in the 
vast majority of cases, this type of data is not available within large représentative 
surveys. 
Furthermore it also has to be accepted that there is stili the possibility that omitted 
variable misspecification is présent, even after the Heckman 2-step procedure is applied. 
Being employed results from two sequential décisions, firstly a participation décision by 
the individuai and secondly a hiring décision by the employer. A number of authors, 
(Sorensen 1989, Krishnan 1990 and Mohanty 2001), have extended the 2-step procedure 
to deal with hiring and participation décisions separately and derived wage équation 
estimâtes from this double sélection framework. Unfortunately the requirement for 
additional data relating to the demand for labour of spécifie types means that in many 
cases, this one included, it is impossible to construct meaningful estimâtes of the hiring 
function 
2.3 Décomposition Issues 
Turning now to the décompositions of thèse earnings functions, there are a number of 
limitations that need discussing here. The first one, mentioned in an earlier paragraph, is 
21 
the inability to know what the wage structure would be in the absence of discrimination. 
Oaxaca's original suggestion, presented above, was to simply assume that either the 
existing male or female structure would prevail, clearly this is a very simplistic 
assumption, as well as being largely unrealistic. The next chapter will highlight that the 
présence of discrimination is revealed through both male overpayment and female 
underpayment. Therefore suggesting that one wage structure would prevail implies 
overpayments to both men and women if the male structure applies and underpayments to 
both if it is the female structure. Neither of these being particularly likely as well as both 
being inefficient. 
As a resuit it is fairly clear that the absence of discrimination will not lead to the current 
male wage structure or current female structure prevailing, with the crudest prédiction 
being that the non-discriminatory wage structure will lie somewhere between the existing 
ones. In response to the limitations of the Blinder/Oaxaca method several improved 
methods have been developed, one of these being the technique proposed by Cotton 
(1988), where the log wage gap is decomposed as follows; 
In Wm - In Wf = Z•„ (J8m - ß*) + 1 ' f (ß * -ßf ) + ( Z m - Z> )' ß *. 
With ß* being the représentation of the estimated non-discriminatory wage structure, 
g ivenby; ß* = Q.ßm + (1 -Cl)ßf, with Q being the proportion of the sample made 
up by men. The first term of the décomposition is the male overpayment, the second terni 
is female underpayment and the final one is that which is explained by labour market 
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characteristics. This differs from the original method in that it assumes that the non­
discriminatory wage structure will be a weighted average of the existing male and female 
structures, rather than simply imposing one of them. It also enables the extent of male 
overpayment and female underpayment to be estimated. 
This is still open to criticism, the choice of the weighting factor (CI) is a fairly arbitrary 
process, the impossibility of knowing what the wage structure would be in the absence of 
discrimination is always unavoidable. However using a straightforward weighted average 
is fairly simplistic, since it ignores the processes that generate the unexplained differential 
in the first place. Neumark (1988) developed an alternative where p * is the vector of 
coefficients obtained by estimating an earnings function from the combined, male and 
female, sample. Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) negate the need to estimate the combined 
earnings function. They suggest an alternative method where the weighting factor (Q.) is 
based upon the observation matrices, and in this case is equal to the following; 
Q = (X* X)~x (X'mXm) where X is the observation matrix for the 
pooled sample of males and females and X m is the observation matrix for the male 
sample. They were also able to prove that setting Q. = (X,X)~l(Xm Xm) gave identical 
solutions to the Neumark (1988) method. 
Overall all of the techniques are very similar, the only difference boils down to the choice 
of weighting factor Q.. Oaxaca (1973) implies that Q = 0 or 1, depending upon whether 
men or women are chosen as the base group, although not mentioned previously, Reimers 
(1983) suggests that Q = 0.5 can be used to estimate the non-discriminatory wage 
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structure. Cotton ( 1988) has Q being equal to the proportion of mates in the overall 
sample, whilst for Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) 
Q = (X' X)~] (X'm Xm). Some attempt has been made to establish if the estimate of 
discrimination is sensitive to the chosen décomposition technique. Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994) as well as Silber and Weber (1999) both produce reviews of results when ail of 
thèse techniques are applied to the same eamings functions. The two studies are largely 
contradictory with the former finding, in ail cases, that discrimination was the major 
component of the earnings differential, whereas Silber and Weber find the explained or 
human capital component dominant in every case. Leading the latter work to conclude 
that the results obtained dépend more on the type of data than the chosen décomposition 
technique, therefore nothing robust can be revealed as to the relative merits of each 
method. 
One of the most serious criticisms of this type of décomposition analysis is that it does 
not reveal the full extent of discrimination, by définition decomposing a wage équation 
confines the analysis to the current earnings of those in employment. It is perfectly 
possible that women are discriminated against prior to joining the labour market, 
consequently it will only reveal the extent of discrimination after entering employment 
and will ignore any pre-entry factors. The implication is that if women are discriminated 
against in sélection processes rather than in wage bargaining, the crowding hypothesis 
will hold, with women being over-represented in those occupations where they are treated 
most favourably (Bergmann 1974). As a resuit the occupational ségrégation will reveal 
more about discrimination than simply decomposing the wage gap. 
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The most common approach to this problem is to base the décomposition upon two 
separate estimatore, firstly an estimate of the non-discriminatory occupational ségrégation 
followed by the usuai earnings functions. The method of estimation is outlined below and 
is based upon the work of Brown et al (1980), the initial proponents of this type of 
approach. The first stage is to estimate occupational attainment as a function of a 
collection of labour supply and labour demand variables within the following 
multinomial logit model; 
where N = sample size, J = number of occupational groups, X j = a vector of explanatory 
variables influencing supply and demand décisions, with the dépendent variable being a 
coded variable to dénote each occupational group. The model is estimated separately for 
men and women, which then enables the hypothetical occupational distribution of 
women, if they faced the same allocation mechanism as men, to be predicted. 
The second stage is to estimate standard gender earnings functions as outlined previously. 
Then the résultant wage differentia! can be decomposed as shown below, again following 
Brown et al (1980). 
e Pij = prob(yi = occj) = J i = l , . . . , N ; j = l , . . . , J 
k=\ 
\nWm-\nW' =X/ / 2 /W - / 3 / ) + X / y / ? ; ( Z ; - Z { ) 
+ 2 / > n ^ " ( ^ 7 - ^ + Z / n * F / ( P / - / y ) 
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Where the superscripts m and f denote maies and females, Pj is the observed proportion 
of women in occupation j , with Pj being the proportion of women who would be in 
occupation j if they faced the same occupational allocation as the men. 
The first term is interpreted as unexplained différences in intra-occupational wages, the 
second as explained différences in intra-occupational wages, the third the explained 
portion of the inter-occupational differential and the final term is the unexplained portion 
of the inter-occupational differential. A major difficulty with this décomposition 
technique is that each of the four terms are likely to be sensitive to the level at which 
occupations are separated. The most common method is to use the standard industriai 
classification system to separate each of the occupations, but is it correct to use one digit, 
two digit or three digit codes? Economie theory does not give any indication as to what 
the correct level should be. However it is clear that the broader the catégories the greater 
the importance of intra-occupational factors and narrowing the catégories magnifies the 
impact of inter-occupational factors (Miller 1987). As a conséquence the empirical 
chapters of this thesis do not make use of this method. 
Ali of the décomposition techniques outlined so far are predominantly used for 
straightforward cross-sectional analysis. However, remembering the inter-temporal and 
cross-country focus of this thesis, it is important to apply a technique that enables this to 
be carried out. This is not to say that thèse previous techniques are not important, since it 
still remains crucial to establish a cross-sectional benchmark in each case. Additionally, it 
has also been pointed out, initially by Juhn et al (1991), that décompositions of 
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differences between male and female mean wages are too simplistic. There needs to be a 
comparison of both the male and female wage distributions to achieve a deeper 
understanding of gender wage differences. As a consequence Juhn et al (1991) developed 
their own decomposition technique based upon the male wage and residuai distributions, 
this being of particular interest here since the technique lends itself well to both cross-
country and inter-temporal analysis. Using the cross-country model as the example, the 
decomposition can be carried out as follows; 
The wage equation for male worker i in country j is; 
Where lnW^. is the log of the hourly wage for worker /' in country j . 
Zy is the vector of explanatory variables. 
pj is the vector of estimated male coefficients in country j . 
<T . is the residuai standard deviation of male wages in j . 
xf/jj is a standardised residuai, with mean zero and variance 1. 
The male-female wage gap for country j is; 
The / and m subscripts refer to male and female averages, the 8 prefix signifies the 
average male-female difference for the immediately following variable. 
The pay gap différence between two countries j and k can then be decomposed as 
follows; 
Dj-Dk={ÔZj-ÔZk)pk +5ZJ.(PJ-Pk) + (ÔH,J-<5y/,)afr + ô > , ( o - y -ok) 
This reveals that the pay gap différence between two countries is the sum of four terms. 
The first term being the contribution of inter-country différences in productive 
characteristics. The second the impact of male-female price differentials for productivity 
characteristics in each country. The third compares the relative positions of women when 
their wage residuals are ranked in the distribution of maie wage residuals, this refîects 
différences in unmeasured characteristics. Finally the fourth term reveals inter-country 
différences in residual inequality, in effect it is the price of 
the unobserved characteristics from term 3. Since the mean maie wage residual equals 
zéro, 5y/ can be estimated for each country by estimating female wages with the maie 
coefficients imposed on their wage function. Then the résultant residuals are used to 
estimate the average female position in that country's distribution of maie residuals. 
(Blau 1996). 
This method of décomposition implies a grouping of the four separate terms intogender-
specific effects and wage structure effects (Kidd and Shannon 2001). Terms 1 and 3 of 
the décomposition are the gender-specific factors, capturing the impact of cross-country 
différences in the relative male-female levels of observed and unobserved productivity 
characteristics. Whilst terms 2 and 4 capture the wage structure effects in that they 
measure the returns from thèse observed and unobserved characteristics. However it has 
to be accepted that this technique is again based upon a rather stringent assumption. 
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Decompositions in general are based upon the belief that given the same labour market 
characteristics men and women will behave in the same way. This technique goes a step 
further and assumes that given the same unobserved characteristics, i.e. those not 
observed in the model, men and women will still act in the same fashion. 
More importantly a number of specific limitations of this technique are identified within 
the literature. Firstly, Blau and Kahn (1997) point out that the distinction between each of 
the four terms may not be that clear cut with wage discrimination potentially appearing 
within each one. Thus a change or a cross-country difference in the level of 
discrimination may present itself in the analysis as a change/difference in the gender 
specific factors or a change/difference in the wage structure. Secondly, changes in the 
distribution of male wage residuals is strictly interpreted as a change in the prices for 
unobserved characteristics, equally it could reflect measurement error, misspecification, 
sample composition and the distribution of unmeasured male productivity characteristics 
(Kunze 2000). Thirdly, the same source indicates that the decomposition assumes that 
prices derived from the male sample wage regression apply to women as well. Implying 
that the wage structure is measurable for women by the prices derived from the male 
sample and that inequality affects men and women equally. Fourthly, the decomposition 
of prices and quantities of unmeasured ability is subject to bias if percentile rankings are 
sensitive to changes in the standard deviation of the wage distribution. For any point 
approaching either tail of the wage distribution its percentile ranking in the residual 
distribution will change in response to any change in the dispersion of the wage 
distribution. Hence nothing has changed for this individual in terms of their observed 
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characteristics and what they are actually paid for them, but the proportions assigned to 
unobserved characteristics and their priées will have changed. Suggesting that the 
décomposition of price and quantity effects for unobserved characteristics may be fairly 
arbitrary (Suen 1997). Finally, Fortin and Lemieux (1998) argue that the wage structure 
effects can be sensitive to whether the maie, female or pooled sample distribution is used 
as the référence category. 
Virtually ail of thèse problems and limitations were either accepted or alluded to in their 
original work, (Juhn et al 1991). They pointed out that improvements in term 3, 
unobserved skills, could equally resuit from skill convergence across the two groups or a 
réduction in discrimination. With it being impossible to identify which of the two is the 
primary cause. They also highlight the limitations of term 4, the returns to unobserved 
skills. Arguing that in principle it compares the wage change for, in this case, a given 
man with a woman possessing the same observable characteristics. However in the 
présence of labour market discrimination a typical woman is compared to a less skilled 
man, hence the unobserved price effect is overstated. Since the wage gap décomposition 
is an identity any bias or overstatement in one term has to be offset by an equal and 
opposite change elsewhere in the décomposition. Therefore, as with most décomposition 
analysis, the point at which one component of the décomposition ends and the next one 
begins is somewhat blurred and arbitrary. 
Furthermore, the importance of adjusting for the potential sample sélection bias has 
already been outlined in the previous section. However in situations where the Heckman 
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two-step procédure has been applied two issues need to be resolved when decomposing 
the selectivity adj usted earnings functions. Firstly, how to measure the central tendency 
of the non-linear IMR function, and secondly, how to interpret the selectivity term. Both 
Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) and Madden (2000) conclude that measuring the central 
tendency of X as X = ^* Xi In is the most consistent method when the Heckman two-
step estimation procédure is being used. However interprétation of the selectivity term is 
less clear-cut. 
Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) decompose the gender différence in the conditional mean 
error terms for the wage équations as follows; 
£(»mK, >-z,JJ-Ë(t<f\sf >-z,fYf) = êmxm-êfxf 
=èm (X°f -xf)+êu âm - £>, ) + (êm - êf)xf, 
where X°f is the mean value of the IMR if females face the same sélection équation as the 
men. Within the overall décomposition it is simple to deduce that the first term is the 
resuit of discrimination, since it reflects the impact of gender différences in the estimated 
parameters from the participation probit on the gender wage gap, henee it should be 
included in the unexplained component. The second term is due to differential 
endowments of the characteristics that determine selectivity, so it should be deemed as 
explained. 
Unfortunately interprétation of the final term is less straightforward, it captures the wage 
differential effects of gender différences in the corrélation between unobservables in the 
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selection equation and unobservables in the wage equation. Therefore it is difficult to 
deduce whether the term should be allocated to endowment efTects or discrimination, 
Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) suggest a number of possibilities. Firstly, that all of the term 
should be deemed as an endowment effect, so that the full wage decomposition becomes; 
?. - 7f = x; ( ßm - ß, )+em (i) - i, )+(xm - xt y ßm + em (4 - i°f )+(é„ - è, )if 
With the wage gap being the sum of the five separate terms, the first two being the 
unexplained component and the last three being explained. The problem outlined above 
simply revolves around how to interpret the final term, (6m ~ 6f )Xf. The second Option, 
at the other extreme, is to assume that the differences are entirely due to discrimination, 
in which case the final term simply transfers into the unexplained portion. In both of 
these cases the assumptions appear to be unrealistically strong, it is implausible to 
suggest that all of the gender differences in the correlation between the unobserved 
characteristics from both equations are due to labour market discrimination. It is equally 
implausible to suggest that they are entirely due to endowment effects. The third Option is 
to regard gender differences in the wage effects of selectivity as a separate selectivity 
contribution. In this case the final term, (9m - Ö / ) A / , is treated neither as an endowment 
effect nor as a discrimination effect, but as a separate selectivity effect. 
Finally, it has to be accepted that decomposition analysis has a major limitation that has 
not yet been resolved within the literature. From any decomposition results it is 
impossible to establish how much of the 'unexplained' component results from 
discrimination. Any attempt to justify that it is entirely due to discrimination is open to 
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criticism, since it can just as easily reflect unobserved heterogeneity or omitted variable 
bias. As a conséquence, any décomposition results can only ever be viewed as indicative 
rather than being évidence in itself of wage discrimination. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The overall purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the methods by which the 
research questions raised in the introduction could be addressed. It has been shown that 
by carrying out a combination of différent décomposition techniques a detailed picture of 
gender differentials can be built up. 
From décompositions it is difficult to establish the précise extent of wage discrimination, 
however indicative results can at least be produced. There are a number of issues such as 
actual expérience, selectivity and non-discriminatory wage structure, leaving thèse 
indicative results potentially sensitive to the assumptions made. As a conséquence it is 
important to establish how robust the estimâtes of discrimination are to each of thèse 
potential problems, the best approach being to report a range of cross-sectional 
décomposition results. 
The empirical analysis in the later chapters will thus carry out décompositions at two 
distinct levels. Firstly a range of cross-sectional estimâtes will be produced for the UK in 
the most recently available year. This can then be used as the benchmark for the central 
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issues of this thesis, cross-country and inter-temporal analysis, which is carried out by 
applying the Juhn et al (1991 ) decomposition technique outlined above. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The detailed review of decomposition analysis in the previous chapter highlighted the 
difficulties of estimating discrimination through this type of technique. Although the 
'unexplained' component implies the presence of discrimination it is impossible to 
establish its extent, since it can also reflect other factors, particularly unobserved 
heterogeneity. This is largely unsatisfactory since it actually suggests that discrimination 
is probably present, but it cannot be confirmed, nor can its extent be estimated with any 
confidence. Obviously this indicates the need for further research and the development of 
superior techniques, in the absence of these decomposition is the best available tool. 
The potentially damaging effects of wage discrimination have been highlighted earlier in 
this study. However the previous chapter detailed the difficulties in trying to establish 
empirically the presence of wage discrimination. Unfortunately this does not mean that 
the influence of wage discrimination can be dismissed. The absence of a smoking gun 
does not mean that it has no significant impact within the labour market. Consequently it 
is crucial to have a clear understanding of how and why gender wage discrimination may 
exist. This chapter outlines the major theories seeking to explain this, where necessary 
highlighting their limitations. 
The previous chapter highlighted that estimating the extent of discrimination is a difficult 
task to undertake. Furthermore it is one that is made more complex by conflicting views 
as to how labour markets operate, these being the neo-classical and institutional schools. 
Similarly the debate relating to the causes of discrimination has, throughout the history of 
the literature, been informed by accounts from both schools as to the most likely causes 
of gender discrimination. With neo-classical scholars focusing upon individuate holding a 
taste for préjudice and then pursuing utility maximising behaviour that is likely to involve 
indulging their préjudice in some form. Whilst clearly institutionalists have focused upon 
labour market, and other institutions, as the source of gender discrimination. Indicating 
factors such as institutional pay structures that replicate the occupational ségrégation, and 
more recently, a lack of transparency in pay détermination as key contributors to the 
présence of discrimination. 
Although earlier writers such as, Florence (1931), Robinson (1933) and Bronfenbrenner 
(1939), had been discussing issues of discrimination on an observational level, it was not 
until the work of Becker (1957) that a formai theory of discrimination was developed. He 
argued that if individuals had a taste for discrimination they would be Willing to incur a 
cost, either through paying a higher price or a réduction in income, in order to associate 
with their desired group. Although this was an attempt to explain racial discrimination, it 
can equally be applied to the problem of gender discrimination. According to Becker the 
source of discrimination is the willingness of economie agents to pay in order to avoid 
contact with members of a particular group, and this discrimination can be revealed 
separately by the actions of employers, employées or consumers. Becker hypothesised 
that each of thèse led to a distinct method by which préjudice is translated into a wage 
differential. These formal explanations of discrimination lie very firmly within the neo-
classical school with market primacy underpinning them throughout. The limitations of 
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the neo-classical assumptions have already been discussed in Chapter 2 and don't need 
repeating here. However given that Becker 's work can be identified as a catalyst in the 
analysis of discrimination, thèse three methods are used as the starting point for the 
following review of discrimination théories. 
3.2 Employer Discrimination 
The first of Becker 's models results from the préjudices held by the employers with the 
basis of this employer discrimination being that firms do not simply maximise profits. 
They actually maximise a utility function that includes, as well as profits, the number of 
male and female workers employed. Defining the firm's profit function as: 
where / ( M + W) is output, wm is the male wage, ww is the female wage, and M and W 
are the respective numbers of male and female workers. Assuming male and female 
workers are perfect substitutes, capital is fixed, so that output is a function of labour only 
and ali firms have identical utility and production functions. Each firm's utility function 
can be represented as: 
n = f(M + W)-M\vm-Www1 (3.1) 
U = f{M + W)- MMPm - WMPW. (3.2) 
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Where MPm and MPW are the respective marginal producís of male and female workers. 
If there is zero discrimination and all employers are completely indifferent to employing 
men or women. A fully competitive labour market leads to the conclusión, where the neo-
classical assumptions outlined ¡n the previous chapter hold, that each worker witl be paid 
according to his/her marginal product, henee; 
MPm=wmtmá MPW = \\>W. 
Obviously in this case Equation (3.1) and (3.2) are identical, maximising profit and utility 
amount to the same thing. Every worker is paid according to his or her marginal product 
thus there is no discrimination. 
However if we now assume that employers hold discriminatory tastes against women, 
which Becker suggested could be represented in the form of a discriminatory coefficient 
(DC), then the net cost of employing female workers is greater than the net cost of 
employing equivalent men. For the sexist employer DC takes on a positive valué and 
increases the cost of employing women through reducing the employer 's level of utility. 
In effect the cost to the firm of employing each women becomes, \vw + DC and the 
utility function becomes: 
V = f(M + W)- MMPm - W(MPW + DCW) (3.3) 
The difference between Equation (3.2) and (3.3) is the negative component, WDCW . This 
in effect means that the net cost to employers of hiring female workers [fV(MPw + DCW)] 
has increased, through a reduction in the employer 's utility, relative to the net cost of 
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maie workers [M(MPm)]. As a resuit women are now only able to find employment with 
the sexist employer if they reduce their wage rate, so that (ww + DCW) = \vm. Clearly 
wm > ww since maie workers are paid the équivalent of their marginal productivity, 
whereas women are paid below. Therefore the employer discrimination is revealed 
through an underpayment of women workers. Although Goldberg (1982) does argue that 
employers actually have a positive préférence for employing men, rather than a négative 
one against women, with this nepotism being revealed through a maie overpayment. 
Becker's model also gives an insight into the likely size of any wage gap within any 
spécifie industry or market for labour of a particular type. The outeome being dépendent 
upon the prevalence and size of discriminatory tastes among employers, as well as the 
number of women seeking employment. Non-discriminatory employers are willing to 
employ women and men at the same wage rate, i.e. DC = 0. If there are a relatively large 
number of non-discriminatory firms they may be able to absorb the entire supply of 
women seeking employment in that particular industry, in which case there will be no 
wage discrimination. However if there is insufficient demand from non-discriminatory 
firms some women will be forced to find employment with the discriminatory firms. The 
fact that thèse firms are only willing to pay women the maie wage less the discriminatory 
coefficient ensures that the market wage for women faits. Otherwise ail of those women 
seeking work would not be able to find a job at the market wage. 
The size of the gender wage gap should be positively correlated with the prevalence of 
both discriminatory firms and the number of women seeking employment, since an 
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increase in either would lead more women to finding employment with the discriminatory 
emptoyers. There should also be a direct link between the strength of employées taste for 
discrimination, this being represented by DC in équation 3.3, and the size of the wage 
gap, as a higher DC will lead to a larger female underpayment. 
The above theory clearly describes how a discriminatory situation can exist, however it 
has been highlighted, initially by Arrow (1972) and subsequently by others, that there is a 
cost penalty for the discriminatory firms. It is unrealistic to assume that each employer 
will have the same discrimination coefficient, some will be more averse and some less 
averse to employing women, the most averse employers will have the largest proportion 
of men in their workforce and the highest production costs. In a competitive market ali 
but the least sexist firms will be earning below normal profits and will quickly be forced 
out of business, until the point is reached where the gender employment mix and wage 
differential reflects the utility of the least sexist firm. Taking this process to its naturai 
conclusion, eventually a firm will enter the market with a discrimination coefficient of 
zero, this will clearly be the least sexist firm in the market and any firm seeking to pursue 
a taste for discrimination will be forced out of the market. The increased supply of maie 
workers seeking employment with the non-discriminatory employers will then ensure that 
the wages offered to maie and female workers become equal. 
Consequently this model fails to explain the présence of gender wage discrimination in 
competitive markets, since the pursuit of any strategy which is not profit maximising 
cannot persist in the long run. The failure to substitute maie workers with cheaper and 
equally productive females would be a clear example of non-profit maximising 
behaviour. However Becker himself speculated that employer discrimination should be 
inversely related to the level of compétition within the industry, a proposai that has 
gained a certain amount of support within the literature. With Luksetich (1979), 
Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) as well as Black and Strahan (1999), being able to detect 
this relationship. Furthermore Hellerstein et al (1997) found that within firms enjoying a 
high level of product market power, those employing larger proportions of women were 
more profitable. Indicating that where there is scope for discrimination the less 
discriminatory firms are able to benefit from their lower costs of production. 
3.3 Employée Discrimination 
The second method by which Becker argued that préjudice is transmitted into a wage 
differential is where one group of workers is averse to working with another group. This 
would lead them to seek a higher wage to compensate them for the lower level of utility 
experienced when having to associate with the undesired group. If a maie holds 
discriminatory views against women and is unwilling to work with them, he will require a 
premium payment to induce him to do so. This payment will be equal to the male worker 
discriminatory coefficient, so that where a discriminatory maie works with women his 
wage will be equal to his marginal product plus this coefficient. 
One of the original conclusions of Becker was that if employées held discriminatory 
tastes, profit maximising employers would respond by hiring a segregated workforce. He 
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was applying the model to the issue of race and arguing that black and white workers in 
the same occupation would be employed in separate single race fïrms. They would be 
paid according to their marginal products and, ceterisparibus, the wage would be the 
same in both sectors. 
It is important to establish how well the model transfers to the issue of gender, sirice if the 
market is fully segregated there will be no wage discrimination. Arrow (1972) correctly 
points to the importance of adjustment costs as a barrier to ségrégation in the workforce, 
with any movement away from the initial position incurring a cost, be it for recruitment, 
screening or even firm specific training. Blau et al (2002) relate this to the issue of 
gender, explaining that rising female participation rates over time means that as women 
enter, or return to, the labour market they find men already in place in most sectors. 
Replacing thèse men would be costly and unprofitable, therefore it is almost impossible 
to envisage a sector where there are no firms with men and women working together. 
Having established that non-segregated employers are likely to be the norm, it is 
important to understand the factors influencing the extent of the wage discrimination. The 
key relationship is between the number of employées holding discriminatory tastes, as 
well as the extent of their discrimination, and the relative number of women seeking 
employment. If both are low it is feasible that ail women find employment within groups 
of non-discriminatory men and no wage gap occurs. However if either, or both, are large 
at least a proportion of women will have discriminating colleagues. This will resuit in 
those men receiving a higher wage and their female colleagues possibly receiving a lower 
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wage to compensate. It is important to note that non-discriminating maies and 
discriminating maies not working with women will not receive this premium, so there 
will be greater variation in maie wages. 
In addition to the impact of the Beckerian discrimination coefficient, Bergmann and 
Darity (1981) point out that employée discrimination may have a négative impact upon 
the morale and productivity of discriminating maie employées. This may well make firms 
retuctant to employ women and when they do they will pay them a lower wage. The 
reasoning being that their marginal productivity is lower, as it is the sum of their own 
addition to output less the réduction from existing maie employées. Furthermore Blau et 
al (2002) argue that employée discrimination could impact upon female productivity 
through the process of on the job training. If this process normally takes place through 
informai discussions, from which women are excluded, their productivity and wage is 
likely to be lower. 
Therefore in principle it is plausible for employée discrimination to persist in compétitive 
markets. Bergmann and Darity (1981) indicate that discrimination can influence the 
marginal productivities. Consequently, if the neo-classical premise is accepted that the 
profit maximising firm will equate the wage to the marginal productivity, then wage 
discrimination could persist under compétition. However it has to be accepted that this 
requires a fairly stringent assumption to hold, in that maie workers have to be in place at 
the firm before any women are employed. Then the réduction in the maie marginal 
productivity has to be directly attributed to the employment of women, before this can 
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happen. More importantly reducing the women's wage rejects one of the basic principles 
of neo-classical economics, that which holds the individual as the central economic unit. 
Therefore if a man 's marginal productivity falls why should the firm respond by lowering 
somebody else's wage? Equally the reduced female on the job training highlighted by 
Blau et al (2002) suggests that firms where discrimination is present will be at a cost 
disadvantage, since they are failing to make the best use of their female labour resource. 
As a result they will be unable to compete against non-discriminating firms in the long 
run. 
There is evidence within the literature supporting the presence of employee 
discrimination, for example Buffum and Whaples (1995) were able to detect its presence 
across ethnic groups in Michigan in the 19 t h century. However the evidence for gender 
wage discrimination is fairly scant, in fact Blau (1977) finds men earning more in sex 
segregated firms and women earning more in sex integrated firms, the opposite of what 
the model would predict. However that is not to say that gender employee discrimination 
does not exist, it may be that firms choose to deal with it through measures other than 
pay. Groshen (1991) argues that firms may choose to hire on a segregated basis, whilst 
not being able to segregate the whole plant completely she finds that firms tend to hire 
only men or only women into each j o b category. Alternatively the prejudice may not be 
as straightforward as blanket unwillingness to work with women, it could be that men are 
perfectly willing to work with women, but their discrimination is only revealed when 
required to work under women (Ferber et al 1979). Consequently it could have more of 
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an impact upon the occupational ségrégation with few women being promoted to 
supervisory or managerial positions. 
3.4 Customer Discrimination 
The final theory of Becker 's is that of customer discrimination, the basis being that 
customers have a préférence for commodities produced or sold by workers of a particular 
group. The préférence is revealed through the willingness of consumers to pay a higher 
price in order to obtain their preferred products. Given the derived nature of labour 
demand, this can create two compounding effects upon the wage differential. Firstly, the 
higher price will increase the marginal revenue products of preferred workers, increasing 
demand for workers in this group, which will be transmitted into higher wages. Secondly, 
the lower demand for non-preferred workers may force them to crowd into other jobs, 
this will increase supply in those areas and force wages downwards. 
If the underlying assumptions behind this theory hold, it is possible for the discrimination 
to continue indefinitely since the firms can operate efficiently by rewarding workers 
according to their marginal productivities. lt is entirely plausible that there could be a 
continued présence of discrimination in competitive markets in the long run, making this 
model distinct from the previous two. However it has to be accepted that this model is 
only likely to be relevant where there is a lot of customer contact. It is also likely to lead 
to ségrégation within thèse occupations with high levels of customer contact, where firms 
catering for discriminatory customers will hire only from the preferred group, pay higher 
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wages and charge higher priées. Whilst those firms attracting non-discriminatory 
customers will hire from the non-favoured group and be able to pay lower wages and 
charge lower priées. Clearly in this study men are the favoured group and there is 
évidence within the literature to support the présence of gender related customer 
discrimination, Neumark (1996) fmding that higher priced restaurants paid higher wages 
and were less likely to employ women. 
In summary, the work of Becker was an important step forward in this field. he 
established the principle that discrimination can occur as a resuit of the maximising 
décisions of economic agents. However its major weakness is that, within a neo-classical 
framework, in most cases it is unable to explain the continued présence of discrimination 
in the long run. The models actually predicting the disappearance of the phenomenon that 
they seek to explain (Arrow 1972). 
3.5 Statistical Discrimination 
It is clear from the previous sections that, although Becker 's théories were an important 
step forward for the study of discrimination, its présence was entirely dépendent upon 
individuate holding a taste for discrimination and being willing to incur a cost to indulge 
this taste. The work of Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972) sought to improve on this by 
developing théories that were based not on individuate having prejudiced tastes but on the 
imperfect nature of information in the labour market, especially in the recruitment 
process. As a resuit Statistical discrimination is still broadly within the neo-classical 
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school in that market primacy is to the fore, however the assumption of perfect 
knowledge no longer holds. It is impossible for fïrms to know precisely the actual 
productivity of potential employées, so by making various assumptions about what is and 
isn't known a model of statistical discrimination can be built up. 
Firstly, if only the average productivity of each group is known, obviously in the case of 
gender discrimination the groups are men and women, but no spécifie information is 
known about each individuar s productivity. Then the actual productivity of each worker 
will play no part in the wage offer, which can be represented formally as: 
g, = ct + u- E {u) = 0 V(u) = a2 
Where the individuai productivity of each worker (g. ) is equal to the average 
productivity of that person's group, plus a normally distributed error term (w,). Therefore 
in the absence of any spécifie productivity information, firms will offer workers wages 
equal to the meari value of their group's productivity, Wm = am and Wf =ccf, the 
subscripts m and f represent the male and female groups. However workers will on 
average be paid wages equal to their marginai produets, some will be overpaid and others 
underpaid, since women and men will be affected equally there will be individuai but not 
group discrimination, lf <xm>ct/, then there will be a wage differential and Wm>Wft 
but workers will stili be paid on average wages equal to their marginai produets. Hence 
the higher male wages simply reflect greater productivity and group discrimination will 
stili not be présent. 
Now if fírms attempi to assess the productivity of individual workers before making a 
wage offer, the individual productivity g is estimated through the resuit of some test, Y. 
Then; 
Where the wage offered to each person is equal to the expected value of his or her 
individual productivity, this is estimated through a combination of their test score and the 
average productivity of their group. p is the coefficient of détermination between g and 
Y, i.e. it is the degree of accuracy of the test as a predictor of actual productivity, 
therefore the better the test is as an indicator the greater the weight given to the test score 
in the wage offer. In the extreme case where the test is the perfect indicator, p ~ 1, 
(1 - p) = 0 and the wage offer is based entirely on the test score, and Wì=Yi. 
If p is larger for men, implying that the test is a better indicator of male productivity, 
then for a man and a woman achieving identical test scores the wage differential will be; 
a is the same for both groups. However this still fails to explain the présence of group 
discrimination, since the larger p merely implies that the wage offer curve is steeper for 
men. Henee above average men will be paid more than comparable women, but the 
converse will be true for below average workers. 
Finally, if the reliability of the indicator p affects the perceived mean productivity, i.e. as 
P falls so does perceived ce for the group, then the wages offered to men and women 
with the same test score become; 
W^Eig), =(\~P)â + PYi+ui (3.4) 
Wm-Wf=(Y-â)ÎPm-Pf) (3.5) assuming 
4 9 
K=P.r + Q-PmW. (3-6) a n d » > = P / y + ( l - P / ) a / (3.7) 
Clearly if fim > fif and from the perceived mean productivity's am > oty then some 
below average men will be paid more than comparable women and group discrimination 
can exist. This implies that decision-makers in the recruitment process have less than 
perfect recall of past events. If their memories assign greater signifícance to their faílures 
than their successes, they will have a clearer memory of the occasions when they 
inaccurately predicted an employee's true productivity. If the test is a poorer indicator for 
women, a disproportíonate amount of these 'failures' will be women, therefore it may 
lead to a conclusión that women 's mean productivity is lower than it actually is. 
This does represent an improvement upon Becker 's theories, since it does not require 
economic agents to be openly sexist, in addition to being willing to incur a cost, it merely 
needs past events to lead decision-makers to an inaccurate conclusión. However the 
original models presented by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1972) need to be qualified 
slightly when being applied to the issue of gender, as with all of the original formal 
theories of discrimination they sought to explain racial discrimination in the USA. The 
fact that education at the time was to a large extent racially segregated, with better 
resources being allocated to the white sector, meant that white workers were likely to be 
more productive than blacks with the same amount of education. In most cases, certainly 
for the UK and Germany, the system is predominately coeducational, with males and 
females having similar access to the available resources, consequently education should 
be a much more comparable predictor of productivity across the genders. This means that 
for empioyers the biggest área of uncertainty in appointments and promotions relates to 
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the future attachment of the individual, both to that firm and to the labour market. 
Consequently if on average women stay with an employer for a shorter period of time, or 
more importantly employers perceive this to be so, statistical discrimination will occur as 
outlined above. If this is the case the discrimination is likely to be a long-term 
phenomenon, Arrow (1972) pointed to a self-fulfílling element within employers' 
expectations. Employers believe that women are more likely to leave, therefore less time 
and resources are allocated to their fírm-specifíc training. They are also assigned to jobs 
where their departure will have the smallest impact. Consequently women feel less 
valued by the firm and are more likely to leave. As a result the most meaningful research 
relating to statistical discrimination by gender has focused upon differences in job tenure 
and quit rates, Viscusi (1980), Blau and Kahn (1981), Sicherman (1996) and Royalty 
(1998) all find that women are more likely to quit their current job than men. However in 
each case when controlled for differences in characteristics, wages and advancement 
opportunities, women were no more likely to leave than a man with comparable 
attributes, therefore in these cases any discrimination occurs as a result of perceived, 
rather than real, differences in quit rates. 
As with Becker 's theories there are doubts relating to the ability of this model to explain 
the presence of long term discrimination within competitive markets. There being clear 
efficiency gains for fírms who can identify women with a strong commitment to the 
labour market and those more likely to leave. Light and Ureta (1992) tested exactly this 
hypothesis and found no difference between the quit behaviour of men and women, 
implying that comparable men and women should be treated in the same fashion. There is 
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also a wage incentive for the highly committed women to reveal themselves to potential 
employers. One possibility is to accept contracts that require repayment of a proportion of 
firm specific training costs if the employée resigns within a certain period, encouraging 
workers with low levels of attachment towards Jobs with small amounts of firm specific 
training. 
3.6 Crowding Model 
In the models discussed so far both gender ségrégation and wage differentials are 
potential outcomes. Différences in both pay and employment are believed to result from 
tastes for discrimination against women or from perceived différences in average 
productivity or quit rates. Developing upon the earlier ideas of Fawcett (1917, 1918) and 
Edgeworth (1922), most specifically by giving a greater weight to the role played by 
employment ségrégation in explaining the gender wage gap, Bergmann (1974) produced 
a formal présentation of the crowding model. This occurs where greater supply, relative 
to demand, of female labour in particular sectors or occupations drives down their wages. 
If the labour market is separated info those sectors with predominante female employées 
and those with a majority of men, Bergmann argued that as long as there are différences 
in the demand for labour relative to the available supply in each of the sectors a gender 
wage gap is inévitable. This gender wage gap stili being présent irrespective of whether 
the employment allocation results from personal préférences, social conditioning or 
discrimination. 
As maie wages are generally higher, this would suggest that there is a greater supply of 
labour relative to demand in the female dominated sector, forcing the market wage down 
below the levé! found in the maie sector. In a fully compétitive situation labour would 
switch from the lower paying sector to the higher paying one until the market wage was 
the same in both sectors. However factors such as social conditioning, leading individuals 
to perceive particular occupations as either 'maie* or 'female'. Men and women not being 
perfect substitutes, i.e. women generally possessing skills more suitable to the female 
sector, or the possibilité that women are simply discriminated against by employers in the 
higher paying sectors may prevent this from happening. 
Finally, Bergmann (1974) gives us a clear insight into why potentially equally productive 
men and women are likely to be paid differently. In the female dominated sector 
production is likely to be more labour intensive as firms substitute cheaper labour for 
capital, whilst in the maie sector higher labour costs mean that the process is reversed. 
Consequently women will be less productive, and lower paid, since they generally have 
less capital to work with, this hypothesis being supported by Sorenson (1990). 
Although the crowding model is limited in that it focuses upon the outcomes of labour 
market ségrégation whilst only really speculating upon the initial causes. It is still 
important, simply because it is the first theory to highlight the potentially inflexible 
nature of a labour market. This being of particular significance as it allows for a greater 
appréciation of the institutional models that follow. 
3.7 Institi! ti on al Theories 
The earliest formai théories of discrimination, i.e. Becker's théories and statistica! 
discrimination, sought to explain the présence of discrimination within a competitive 
structure. The major weakness being that in virtually ali cases the maximising behaviour 
of economie agents should prevent the continued existence of wage discrimination in the 
long terni. As a resuit of this what can be referred to as the institutional models of 
discrimination were developed, where the labour market is assumed to have inhérent 
rigidities. These rigidities resulting from the institutional arrangements within firms, or 
from the monopoly power of firms in the product market and unions in the labour market. 
The link between the two types of théories being made by the crowding model, with 
Bergmann (1974) highlighting the possibilité of labour market rigidities. In short the 
failure of labour resources to transfer from low paying sectors into high paying ones 
gives rise to long term occupational ségrégation, gender wage differentials and, if there is 
a discriminatory element to the ségrégation, wage discrimination. 
The institutionalists argue that it is the arrangements within institutions, rather than 
independent individuai actions which hold the key to explaining the présence of wage 
discrimination. The first formai présentation of this line of thinking results from the 
seminai work by Doeringer and Piore (1971). Their internai labour market (ILM) theory 
attempts to explain the présence of wage discrimination on a number of levels, firstly 
through entry to the ILM, secondly as a result of internai allocation and finally with 
differential wage rates. 
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The internal labour market is 'an administrative unit, such as a manufacturing plant, 
within which the pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative 
rules and procedures' (Doeringer and Piore, 1971: pp 1-2). Conversely the external labour 
market is assumed to be competitive. The predictions of the theory are based on the 
movement of labour between the two markets at certain job classifications. At these 
classifications there are ports of entry and exit to and from the internal labour market. 
The remaining jobs in the internal labour market are filled by internal promotions. As 
such they are shielded from direct competition from the external market. 
The workers employed in the internal labour market are assumed to possess a degree of 
monopoly power over their jobs. The firms realise the benefits from the internal labour 
market through reduced labour turnover costs. According to Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
there are three kinds of discrimination that can occur in the internal labour market, these 
being entry discrimination, internal allocation discrimination and wage discrimination. 
Entry discrimination obviously indicates that the disadvantaged group is less able to gain 
access through each of the ports of entry into the internal labour market, this may well 
occur for a number of reasons. Firstly, hiring standards could be fixed at an artificially 
high level, this will make it relatively harder for workers from any group with lower 
productivity characteristics to gain entry. This was clearly relevant in Doeringer and 
Piore's (1971) original study, where blacks generally received education of lower quality, 
however when applied to women in the EU they are less likely to have lower productivity 
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characteristics. The later chapters reveal that there are only minor différences in 
productivity characteristics between men and women in the EU, and more often than not, 
women actually have higher levels of éducation. 
Alternat ive^ the hiring procédure itself can also be discriminatory. Hiring décisions are 
based upon productivity characteristics and on interviews, by their nature the outcomes of 
interviews are dépendent upon subjective opinions, thèse opinions may well be 
influenced by any préjudices held by the interviewers. The résultant level of 
discrimination is likely to be compounded by the uncertainty inhérent in the recruitment 
process, since employer information is imperfect and/or incomplète employment 
inefficiencies may arise. This is similar to the statistical discrimination discussed in 
section 2.5. If employers believe that one group is on average more productive than 
another group, then the more productive group will be preferred. As mentioned above, 
this may not be relevant to gender discrimination in the EU, however if lower 
participation rates for women lead employers to believe that men will on average stay 
longer in the job, the same outcome will resuit. 
Internai allocation discrimination occurs where one group is less successful in internai 
promotions between each of the ports of entry, consequently they are under represented 
within the higher paid and higher status positions. This may well occur because of 
reasons similar to those outlined in the previous paragraph. Finally wage discrimination 
can occur when there is an occupational ségrégation within the internai labour market, 
with women being assigned to the lower paying catégories. 
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A derivation of this, transcending the firm operating an internal labour market, is the dual 
labour market model, which was again developed by Doeringer and Piore, (see Doeringer 
and Piore 1971 as well as Piore 1971). The model distinguishes between primary and 
secondaryjobs, with primaryjobs necessitating high levéis of firm specific skills, leading 
to higher wages, better promotion prospects and low turnover rates. The secondary jobs 
have a lower requirement for firm specific skills, as a result they display low wages, poor 
promotion prospects and high turnover rates. The application of this model to gender 
discrimination merely requires that men have a higher probability of finding primary 
employment than comparable women. 
They also argued that the dual labour market did not necessarily have to be enclosed 
within the same fírm, i.e. along the same lines as the internal labour market, it could 
equally relevant on an industry basis. The fact that primary jobs are more likely to be 
found within monopolistic product markets enables these firms, if they desire, to indulge 
their preferences for employing males. Primary jobs are also more likely to be found in 
unionised industries, this could enable unions to exploit their monopsony and créate a 
more unified membership by restricting the proportion of women employed in the 
industry. 
There is very strong evidence within the literature of labour market segregation, which 
can obviously result from the presence of internal or dual labour markets. Most of the 
early work established its presence, both in terms of gender and race, in the USA (Blau 
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and Jusenius 1976, Cain 1976 and Gordon et al 1982). McNabb and Ryan (1990) were 
able to establish its présence in Britain, as well as indicating its historical perspective, 
being able to identify it existence as far back as the mid 19* century. 
Overall the institutional théories are arguably a more plausible explanation of howjobs 
are allocated and wages set in the labour market, particularly within large firms. However 
a major criticism, that could easily be levelled at the Crowding Model as well, is that they 
focus upon the conséquences without helping us to understand the causes. The résultant 
wage differentials and occupational ségrégation are clearly explained, but we are 
expected to simply assume that one of the possible causes is discrimination. Thus adding 
little to our understanding of how and why discrimination may be présent. As a 
conséquence we are stili no closer to being able to solve a key dilemma in the study of 
wage discrimination. It is widely accepted that the occupational ségrégation is an 
important component of gender wage differentials, however it is stili impossible to 
establish whether it results from discrimination, social conditioning or individuai choices. 
Hence it is a clear target for future research as well as being a challenge to theorists. 
3,8 Conclusion 
This chapter gives an overview of the most relevant théories seeking to explain the causes 
of gender wage discrimination, with each of them representing an important step forward 
in our understanding. The original théories focused upon the behaviour of individuate, 
with Becker highlighting the actions of people who held prejudiced views, and statistical 
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discrimination resulting from incomplete information. In virtually ail cases thèse revealed 
a competitive advantage for non-discriminatory firms, hence predicting that 
discrimination would disappear in the long run. However there is no real évidence of this 
occurring indicating the présence of a signifïcant level of labour market rigidities. In 
response to this additional théories were put forward seeking to explain the impact of 
thèse rigidities. The Crowding Model highlighting the failure of cheaper female labour to 
transfer into the higher paying male sector and the institutional théories indicating that 
not all positions were open to free and fair compétition. These théories being limited as 
they focus on the outcomes rather than explaining the causes. 
Overall this chapter reveals that there is no clear, robust and cohérent explanation of 
gender wage discrimination, as with most areas of économies each of the différent 
théories are relevant to a specific situation. The pessimista conclusion to this chapter and 
the previous one would be that we have difficulty in explaining the présence of 
discrimination, and even if we could, we have problems establishing it empirically. 
However the market failure and inefficiency implications of discrimination indicates that 
it is important to address thèse two issues in the future. Furthermore narrowing the gender 
differential, whether by reducing discrimination or by other means, is in itself a désirable 
objective. Consequently the remainder of the thesis will focus upon what empirical 
évidence reveals about gender wage differentials, in the UK and the rest of the EU, and 
what it implies for wage discrimination. With the following chapter reviewing the 
existing empirical évidence. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The major objective of this thesis is to carry out a detailed analysis of gender wage 
differentials and discrimination in the UK, focussing specifîcally upon in ter-temporal and 
cross-country factors. This chapter therefore seeks to explain the following issues. Firstly, 
why do gender differentials exist in the first place, secondly why do they differ across 
countries and finally what causes them to change over time?. The previous chapters have 
paid particular attention to the relevant theoretical and estimation issues. This chapter 
reviews the empirical work of others, highlighting how it assists understanding of thèse 
three key issues. 
The chapter adhères to the following structure. Firstly the literature is reviewed generally 
to identify the causes of a gender wage gap. This is used to establish the anticipated size 
of the U K ' s gap relative to Germany's, since Germany is chosen as the key country of 
comparison. It is also used to predict the expected path of the wage differentials over the 
period considered. Secondly, the country specific and cross-country literature for thèse 
two countries is reviewed highlighting important changes and developments. Finally the 
conclusion reaffirms the anticipated outcomes of the subséquent empirical analysis. 
4.2 General Evidence: Gender Wage Differentials 
The literature reveals a wide range of factors influencing the gender wage gap, with the 
most commonly held view being that the differential to a large extent reflects différences 
in human capital. An individuala stock of human capital is generally measured by their 
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educational attainment prior to joining the labour market as well as the extent of their 
expérience in employment. Therefore the argument is that a large proportion of the 
gender earnings differential is caused by the women's tendency to have lower levels of 
éducation and work expérience. O'Neill and Polachek (1993) showed that a significant 
factor in narrowing the wage differential in the USA was successive cohorts of women 
closing the éducation and expérience gap. Consequently if Germany and the UK display 
différences in the relative éducation and expérience of women compared to men this 
should be displayed in their respective pay differential s. 
Using the PACO data from 1991 the average years of éducation are as follows; UK, men 
13.95 years and women 13.1. Germany, men 11.48 years and women 11.92. So, although 
average éducation is higher for both genders in Britain, the relative position of German 
women is better, and this should contribute to a narrower German differential. The 
reverse is true of expérience. From the same source the means are; Germany, men 22.35 
years and women 10.82 years. UK, men 18.06 years and women 10.98. So the relative 
position of UK women is clearly better, but this needs to be qualified by reiterating the 
point made in Chapter 3 that it is very difficult accurately to measure women ' s true 
labour market expérience (Zabalza and Arrufat 1985). Also this higher participation rate 
may also reflect the greater prevalence of part-time work in the UK, (OECD 1992), hence 
the impact may not be as large as expected!. 
There is an additional problem with interprétation in this area, since the data available 
does not reveal the quality of éducation. Factors such as institution attended, subjects 
studied and final grades are routinely unavailable, this also being the case with the data 
used in this study. In a case where this type of information is available, McNabb et al 
(2002) show that although women on average perforiti better at university, men are more 
likely to obtain a first class honours degree since their distribution of outcomes is more 
diverse. Citing Battu et al (1999), who showed a considerably higher earnings premium 
for first class graduâtes, the authors speculate that the greater proportion of maie firsts 
could be an important explanatory factor, at least for the graduate gender wage gap. 
Consequently, for the reasons outlined above, it is difficult to predict the impact that 
relative différences in éducation and expérience will have on the two countries' gender 
wage gaps since in both cases the data potentially hides as much information as it reveals. 
The more récent literature points to the significance of wage dispersion to the gender 
differential. Since the work of Blau and Kahn (1992), where the important relationship 
between the level of wage inequality and the gender wage gap was established, there have 
been a number of papers highlighting this same relationship. The greater the level of 
wage dispersion the greater the wage gap tends to be. Blau and Kahn (1992) show that 
wage inequality leads to greater returns from éducation and expérience, which 
disproportionately favours men over women. Using évidence from 8 OECD countries the 
authors clearly show the relationship between a country's wage structure and its gender 
pay gap. 
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In terms of the relative British/German position, Bishop, Formby and Smith (1991) 
produced Lorenz curve estimâtes of income and earnings inequality for 9 différent 
countries. Some of their results were sensitive to the various définitions used, but for our 
area of interest Germany clearly displayed a more equal earnings distribution than the 
UK. Therefore it is fair to assume that the UK displays a greater level of inequality, 
which we would expect to be reflected in a larger UK gender differential. 
Additionally, the effects of changes to the overall wage distribution have been shown to 
be an important élément of inter-temporal wage gap movements. Blau and Kahn (1997) 
themselves coined the phrase 'swimming upstream', where women 's wage gains in the 
USA were being offset within an unfavourable environment of increasing wage 
inequality. Blackaby et al (1997) and Harkness and Machin (1995) show that for the UK 
the same process was at work, following a dramatic increase in wage inequality during 
the 1980s (Schmitt 1995). This is potentially important for Germany as well since Gang 
and Yun (2002) indicate a massive rise in inequality for East Germans in the 1990s. 
Consequently, this issue will be a centrai feature of the empirical analysis. 
An issue related to the level of wage inequality is the coverage of collective wage 
bargaining, since the level of centralisation of bargaining arrangements is likely to have 
an influence upon the wage gap. As previously mentioned, the larger the level of wage 
inequality the larger the gender differential tends to be, and as more centralised 
bargaining arrangements generally lead to less wage inequality, we can expect an inverse 
relationship between the differential and the degree of centralisation. Rosholm and Smith 
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(1996) show that increased décentralisation had a signifìcant impact upon the widening of 
the gender differential in Denmark. In the paper by Traxler (1996) he produces a detailed 
analysis of the structure of collective bargaining within 18 OECD countries. His findings 
for Germany show a labour market dominated by multi-employer bargaining, which in 
many cases extends to a sectoral or centrai level, with the overall level of coverage of 
collective bargaining in the région of 80%. The situation is différent in Britain, with 
single-employer bargaining being the norm, and the overall coverage of collective 
bargaining only in the région of 35%. Therefore this would suggest that the gender wage 
differential would be larger in the UK. 
However it is not as straightforward as looking at the coverage of collective bargaining 
and concluding that a higher coverage will lead to a narrower wage gap. The issue is 
more complex than that and requires a finer analysis of the institutional arrangements of 
collective bargaining in each country. Rubery et al (2002) indicate a number of factors in 
addition to the coverage of collective bargaining that are likely to influence the gender 
wage gap. These are the degree and strength of unionisation, the level at which 
bargaining takes place, the co-ordination of wage setting across occupations, firms and 
sectors as well as the facility to extend bargaining agreements to non-signatories. In 
addition, the national mechanism for regulating low pay is also likely to have an effect 
upon the gender differential. 
In direct comparisons between the two countries it has already been shown that, although 
union densities are similar in both countries, Germany has more extensive coverage of 
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collective bargaining and that bargaining is likely to take place at a higher level. 
Furthermore there is very little bargaining co-ordination in Britain, with the government 
in recent decades taking care not to restrict management prerogative (Smith & Morton 
2005). In Germany, tripartite attempts at co-ordination involving government, employers 
and unions have been far more prevalent, most notably through the ' Alliance for Work ' 
(Bündis für Arbeit). Similarly within the UK there is only a small degree of extensión of 
collective bargaining in specifíc sectors, predominantly in education and construction, but 
in Germany the extensión system is formally important (Artus et al 1998). Finally there is 
no national mínimum wage in the Germán economy as low pay is regulated through the 
extensión of collective bargaining agreements. Within the UK, although there clearly is a 
national mínimum wage, this is a relatively recent development and all of the data used in 
this thesis was collected prior to its introduction. Henee for the purpose of this study, 
aside from any adjustments made by employers in preparation for its introduction, it can 
be accepted that the UK had no formal mechanism for regulating low pay. 
Overall the more extensive collective bargaining, co-ordination, extensión and regulation 
of low pay would indícate a more equal wage distribution and a narrower gender wage 
gap for Germany. However national institutional wage setting arrangements are not set in 
stone, in fact they are constantly evolving. Consequently, for Germany, decreasing 
observance of collective bargaining deals (Streeck 2001), falling enforcement of sectoral 
bargains by works councils (Artus et al 1998), the growth of ' O T ' (Ohne Tarif) 
associations where employers opt out of sectoral bargains (Streeck 2001) could be 
widening their wage distribution. At the same time the implementation of the national 
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minimum wage in the UTC may well mean that the two countries' wage distributions and 
gender wage gaps are in fact converging. 
A number of studies have focussed upon social aspects of the gender wage gap, finding 
that male wages are positively influenced by marriage but unaffected by the présence of 
children. Conversely they find that female wages are negatively influenced, or unaffected 
in some studies, by marriage and always negatively affected by children, with the wage 
effect being smaller for each subséquent child. The reasoning being that marriage is 
viewed as a positive motivational signal for men by employers, whilst children, and to a 
lesser extent marriage, are seen as negative motivational factors for women. Equally, 
institutionalists argue that it is the way that the institutions of marriage and the household 
generally operate, supporting the male 'bread winner' role and placing greater domestic 
responsibilities on women, that leads to the positive male and negative female wage 
effects. Therefore, although the cause is debatable, it is apparent that marriage and 
children will have an impact upon the gender wage differential. For example Waldfogel 
(1995) estimâtes a female/male wage ratio of 70% and attributes over 50% of this gap to 
the effects of marriage and children. Similarly Dolton and Makepeace (1987) estimate 
that for UK graduâtes, men ' s earnings rise by 5.8% and women's fall by 4 % as a result of 
marriage. So clearly if there are any différences in the proportion of marriages or the 
number and profile of births in Britain and Germany, we can expect to see these reflected 
in the relative gender wage gap. 
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Both countries appear to have experienced a fairly similar marriage trend, with 6 3 % of 
women over 15 years old being married in the UK in 1968, which had fallen to 56% by 
1988. Germany had marginally lower rates, over a slightly shorter period, 60% in 1968 
falling to 54% in 1986 (OECD 1994). Such small inter-country différences are unlikely to 
have a significant impact upon their relative wage gaps. However with both countries 
showing a declining rate over a long period of time it is much more likely to have an 
effect upon the intra-country wage gap, causing it to narrow as less men are benefiting 
from the positive marriage wage effect. 
In terms of the number of births, between 1968 and 1988 the birth rate in the UK fell by 
17%, and between 1968 and 1986 it fell by 30% in Germany, (OECD 1994). As the birth 
rates were fairly similar in both countries in 1968 it is fair to assume that Germany now 
has the lower birth rate. Consequently, for both countries the birth rate should have had a 
narrowing effect upon the gender wage gap, with the effect being more pronounced in 
Germany. 
There are a number of important issues relating to labour supply décisions, not just the 
décision to participate but how long to work for and in what type of job. The first of 
thèse, sample sélection bias and its impact upon the gender wage gap, is an issue that has 
been largely ignored by the literature. Researchers routinely apply the Heckman (1979) 
procedure and adjust their estimâtes for the potential selectivity bias, however they rarely 
discuss or interpret the variables and coefficients generated by the process. Neuman and 
Oaxaca (1998) give clear guidance as to how this should be done, but only within a cross-
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sectional analysis, which does not give any assistance when trying to explain inter­
temporal changes. This is potentially a key process, since the whole issue of selectivity 
relates to whether the sample of those in employment is a representative sample of the 
overall population or not. Hence, if the employed sample becomes more (or less) 
representative over time, this is likely to have an impact upon the gender differential, 
particularly if there are gender differences within these changes. Consequently it is 
important to be able to explain it, or at least understand it. This relationship is one that 
has been totally ignored by the previous literature, and as a result the analysis in later 
chapters will focus heavily upon it. 
Secondly the prevalence of part-time work is an important explanatory factor. In a 
technical paper using a wage offer model, Ermisch and Wright (1993) show that the 
presence of part-time employment helps to generate a gender earnings gap, and a clearer 
understanding of the different supply decisions faced by part-timers gives a better insight 
into that gap. They argue that for part-time workers supply is less elastic, since a 
significant proportion of them are tied to finding an employer whose hours fit in with 
childcare arrangements or school hours. Part-timers can also be restricted to only local 
employers as the cost of commuting to other areas is prohibitive. In either situation there 
will be a cost advantage for firms employing part-time workers. The authors reason that 
in these cases part-time hourly wages can at best be the same as full-time, but in most 
cases they will be lower. This means that in hourly terms any over- representation of 
women amongst part-timers will contribute to a gender wage gap, but in cases where 
part-time employees are excluded from the analysis an understatement of the differential 
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will result. With respect to the UK and Germany, in both countries the incidence of men 
working part-time is very small, but the picture is very different for female employment. 
In the UK nearly 4 4 % of ali women employees are part-time, (OECD 1992), whereas in 
Germany the figure is significantly lower at 34% (Employment in Europe 1992). So in 
terms of the hourly wage the gender differential is likely to be smaller in Germany. 
Thirdly, the occupation that individuate choose to work in ateo has an impact upon the 
gender wage gap. The fact that this may result from discrimination has already been 
discussed in Chapter 2. Despite not analysing the causes of the occupational segregation 
in this thesis it is stili of importance to the gender differential on an observational level. 
Within the literature there is widespread coverage of the tendency in most countries for 
women to be disproportionately under-represented in some occupations and over-
represented in others. It is difficult to identify whether this results from pre-entry 
discrimination or simply from different occupational choices. However in terms of a 
gender pay differential it is clear that if women are over-represented in lower paying 
occupations an earnings gap will be present, and the size of the gap will be determined by 
the level of over-representation and the pay differential between occupations. 
This relationship is confirmed by Miller (1987) who decomposes the UK gender wage 
gap into intra-occupational and inter-occupational effects, finding that around 10-15% of 
the differential is due to occupational segregation, implying that most of the differential is 
caused by lower female seniority within the same occupation. Using the same technique 
Brown et al (1980) find broadly similar results for the USA. Evidence of an occupational 
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ségrégation in both Germany and the UK is reported by Gornick and Jacobs (1998), who 
also identify that women in the UK are more likely to be in a professional occupation 
category than their German counterparts, both in the public and private sectors. Overall 
this would suggest that occupational ségrégation is an important élément of the wage gap 
in both countries, but to a lesser extent in the UK. However if the findings of Miller 
(1987) are accurate, and vertical factors are more significant than horizontal ones in the 
UK, then this is unlikely to have any real impact upon the relative gender wage gaps. 
As an additional aspect of the occupational ségrégation the rôles of employment and pay 
policy in the public sector cannot be ignored. It is not unusual to find that the mean wage 
for public sector employées is greater than the mean wage in the private sector, although 
the public sector will generally display a narrower wage distribution. (Gornick and Jacobs 
1998). The public sector is particularly beneficiai to people in low paid occupations, 
within which women are disproportionately represented; generally the public/private 
differential is greater for unskilled workers. In addition the public sector provides a 
disproportionately high number of 'good* jobs for women, and to a lesser extent men 
(Gornick and Jacobs 1998). However once earnings are adjusted to take account of 
various explanatory variables, i.e. âge, éducation, expérience, etc., the findings are 
generally différent, more often than not the estimated coefficient assigned to the public 
sector dummy is negative. (Gornick and Jacobs 1998). Therefore the effects of the public 
sector upon the adjusted gender wage differential can be ambiguous. However if, as in 
most cases, there is a positive adjusted wage premium for private sector employment, the 
tendency for women to be over- represented in the public sector will lead to a wider 
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gender wage gap. The level of influence exerted by the public sector upon the differential 
will be determined by two factors. Firstly by the relative size of the public sector, since 
the larger the public sector the greater the pressure to restrict their pay settlements, and 
secondly by the extent of female over representation. 
The evidence is inconclusive as to whether public sector effects will lead to a wider or 
narrower gender wage gap in Germany compared to Britain. The public sector is smaller 
in the UK, 18% of the labour force, compared to 26% in Germany, (Gomick & Jacobs 
1998), so we can expect a larger public sector wage premium in the UK. However female 
over-representation is greater in Germany, with almost l / 3 r d of women employees being 
in the public sector, compared with around l / 5 t h in Britain (Gornick & Jacobs 1998). So 
the fact that fewer women benefit from the larger premium in the UK leaves the overall 
effect unclear. 
It is far more likely that the public sector will have a much greater effect upon inter­
temporal wage gap changes, since there has been a widespread trend over the last twenty 
or so years for governments to seek to control their spending. Policies have been targeted 
towards restricting the pay increases awarded to public sector employees, as well as 
controlling employment growth in that same sector. Therefore if women are over-
represented among this group it will adversely affect the wage gap through pay and 
employment effects. This is confirmed by Rosholm and Smith (1996) who find that this 
had a significant impact upon the gender pay differential in Denmark during the 1980s. 
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Finally, to conclude this section on différent factors of participation it is important to say 
a few words about participation rates themselves. The fact that women generally display 
lower participation rates could lead to a wage gap through signalling lower levels of 
labour market attachment to employers, and this may lead to statistical discrimination and 
lower levels of human capital investment. However any change in the female 
participation rate can have an ambiguous effect upon the gender differential. If the higher 
participation rate reflects an increase in the supply of female labour, this could depress 
women's wages and widen the gap. Alternatively it could reflect increases in labour 
demand from occupations particularly attractive to women, hence closing the wage gap. 
The évidence clearly shows that female participation is higher in the UK both in absolute 
and relative terms, with the OECD data revealing the following participation rates for 
1991, UK; maie 86.5%, female 70.9% and Germany; maie 79.8%, female 58.2%. Thèse 
figures concur with the results of Elhorst (1996), whose régional analysis of participation 
rates across the EU in 1989 shows a very similar picture with the UK having the highest 
rates for both men and women. For the reasons outlined above, it is difficult to détermine 
what impact this is likely to have upon the British gender wage gap in comparison to the 
German one. More important though are the long term effects of changes in participation, 
since a narrowing of the gender gap in participation rates will enable the skills gap to be 
narrowed, as women 's work expérience approaches that of the men. Consequently it is of 
greater significance to highlight the inter-temporal impact of changes in participation. 
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Table 4.1: Cross-country Wage Gaps: Implications of Empirical Evidence 
Factor Impact Upon the UK Gender 
Differential Relative to German y 
Education Inconclusive 
Expérience Inconclusive 
Wage Dispersion Wider 
Collective Bargaining Wider 
Marriage Inconclusive 
Children Wider 
Sample Sélection No Evidence 
Part-time Work Wider 
Occupational Ségrégation Inconclusive 
Public Sector Inconclusive 
Participation Rates Inconclusive 
The stated purpose of this chapter was to highlight the causes of a gender wage gap, as 
well as reasons for différences across countries and time. This section has revealed that 
gender differentials resuit from a wide range of factors, those affecting human capital, the 
overall wage distribution, wage bargaining arrangements, social factors as well as a 
number of issues relating to participation. National and chronological différences in each 
lead to cross-country differentials and inter-temporal changes. In Table 4 .1 , above, the 
évidence from this section is summarised, in each case pointing to what the particular 
factor predicts for the cross-country empirical analysis in the following chapters. 
Each of the individuai factors are important as they form the basis for the earnings 
functions used later and, where it is impossible to control for a factor, the impact upon the 
wage gap is analysed indirectly. Clearly, in the majority of cases, it is impossible to 
establish in advance the overall cross-country effect of a particular factor. However, 
where the évidence is conclusive, it does point to a narrower German gender wage gap. In 
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the following section the specific empirical évidence is reviewed, highlighting how 
closely it supports the findings of this section. 
4.3 Specific Evidence: U.K. 
As outlined in the previous chapters there is an ongoing theoretical and empirical debate 
as to the major influences upon gender discrimination and wage gaps. The neo-classical 
view is that the gender differentials result predominantly from human capital différences. 
Institutionalists, on the other hand, focus upon unequal treatment of men and women 
within those institutions that have an influence upon the labour market. The Oaxaca 
décomposition technique, upon which most of the empirical évidence is based, lies firmly 
within the neo-classical school. Earnings functions are estimated using various proxies 
for the individuar s stock of human as the explanatory variables. That is not to say that 
institutional factors are excluded from this type of analysis. Indeed as the technique has 
evolved and our understanding of gender wage gaps has developed empirical studies both 
here in the UK and elsewhere have gradually introduced more institutional factors into 
the earnings functions. For example, trade union membership is often included as an 
explanatory variable in order to control for the impact of thèse institutions upon the 
hourly wage. Furthermore marriage and children are also routinely included to control for 
the possibility that the institutions of marriage and family tend to support the labour 
market, 'bread winning' , activities of men. As a conséquence it is fair to say that the 
estimated earnings functions tend to be a hybrid of neo-classical human capital variables 
and institutional factors. 
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Within the UK pay differentials between men and women had displayed remarkable 
consistency from the turn of the Century until the early 1970's, (Sloane 1990 p.125), at 
that point there was a signifìcant narrowing of the pay gap, which is generally attributed 
to the implementati on of equal opportunities législation. Since then there have been 
numerous estimâtes of the UK gender differential. The most signifìcant of these are 
summarised here in Table 4.2 and discussed in greater detail in the rest of this section. 
For each of the studies Table 4.2 records the data set used, the estimated wage gap 
measured through the ratio of the mean female to male wage, the basis upon which 
earnings are measured, as well as the groups for which they are measured. Finally it 
reports the upper estimate of discrimination revealed through the unexplained portion of 
the wage gap and expressed as a proportion of the female mean wage. The wide variety 
of data sets used, as well as différences in the chosen groups, ensures that it is difficult to 
achieve any consensus from these studies. This strongly supports the need for the inter-
temporally robust analysis provided by this thesis. The key fìndings from the existing 
literature can only be revealed through a more detailed review of their conclusions, with 
the remainder of this section carrying this out. 
Firstly, Chiplin and Sloane (1976) estimate the mean male wage to be 16% greater than 
the women 's average wage. They identify unequal treatment in job level opportunities 
and differing returns to productive characteristics, especially expérience, as the major 
causes of the pay gap. They also find that the differential is 96% explained by différences 
Table 4.2: Su m man of UK Evidence 






Chiplin & Sloane Establishment Survey 1976 0.86 Annual 0.5% & 
8.7%* 
Greenhalgh GHS 1971 0.85 Hourly for 4 . 1 % 
GHS 1975 singles only 0.3% 
Zabalza &Tzannatos GHS 1975 0.62 Hourly 7% 
Miller GHS 1980 0.61 Hourly 15% 
Wright & Ermisch WES 1980 0.67 Hourly, marrieds only 17% 
Sloane & Theodossiou NES 1970 0.6 Hourly No Estimate 
NES 1982 0.68 Hourly No Estimate 
Harkness GHS 1974 0.66 Hourly for 30% 
BHPS 1992-93 0.8 full-timers 18% 
Joshi & Paci NCDS 1991 0.83 Hourly, full-timers 10.2% 
0.71 Hourly, ail women 11.6% 
Black et al ISSP 1989 0.57 Hourly, marrieds only 26% 
Lissenburgh BHPS 1991-95 0.82 Hourly, full-timers 9% 
0.75 Hourly, ail women 9% 
Anderson et al WERS 1998 0.83 Hourly, full-timers 5.4% 
0.75 Hourly, ail women 12% 
Swaffield BHPS 1991-97 0.82 Hourly, full-timers 12% 
0.73 Hourly, ail women 12% 
Separale estimâtes using the maie and female structures respectively as Ûie base group. 
in characteristics if it is assumed that females are paid according to the male wage 
équation. However it is only 3 8 % explained if the opposite assumption is made, 
suggesting that the cause of discrimination lies more with nepotism and overpayments to 
men, rather than underpaying women. Unfortunately it is impossible to deduce how 
représentative this is of the whole of the UK labour market, since the sample used was 
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constructed from employées in a specific occupation within one large multi-plant 
concerà Furthermore, Groshen (1991) indicates that there is very little wage variation 
across gender for the same occupation within the same organisation, hence these results 
may simply reflect this. 
Using a more représentative sample, namely the General Household Surveys of 1971 and 
1975, Greenhalgh (1980) seeks to map the effects of the equal opportunities législation. 
She concentrâtes on the influence that marriage exerts upon gender differentials, in that 
there is generally a wage premium for married men, but a negative return for married 
women. The differentials are reported separately by maritai status, without reporting the 
overall gender wage gap. However the impact of the législation is clearly shown as the 
single female/single male wage ratio closes from 8 5 % in 1971 to 9 7 % by 1975 and the 
same ratio for married men and women narrows from 5 1 % to 62%. There is also a similar 
effect upon discrimination with the portion of the single men/single women wage gap that 
is unexplained by characteristics falling from 24% in 1971 to 10% in 1975. Theauthor 
highlights the differing motivational effects of marriage upon men and women as well as 
the greater likelihood of married women suffering financially through sex segregated 
employment, as the most significant factors behind the differentials. It is likely that the 
reported male/female wage gaps are overstated, since the absence of any data on overtime 
premia means that the estimated hourly wage is biased upwards. This upward bias will be 
greater for men since they show a greater tendency to work overtime (see Chiplin & 
Sloane 1976). Also the lack of data relating to labour market expérience and éducation is 
likely to have exaggerated the unexplained wage gap, since higher maie work expérience 
and éducation has typically been a significant explanatory factor. 
Siebert and Sloane (1981) also concentrate on the influence of marital status, using 
establishment data from 5 employers, ail in différent sectors; they report gender 
differentials by marital status in each of the 5 sectors. They find significant différences 
between the wage gaps in each sector, with engineering being the most equal and finance 
by far the most unequal of the distributions. However they concur with Greenhalgh 
(1980), as in ail cases the single female/single maie ratio is much higher than their 
married counterparts. They identify differing returns to éducation and tenure as the major 
influences upon the wage gap, the latter being the most interesting as it was not included 
as a variable by Greenhalgh (1980). However care must be taken if attempting to interpret 
thèse results as représentative estimâtes of gender pay differentials. As with Chiplin and 
Sloane (1976), the sample used falls short of reflecting the overall labour market. Most 
important is the absence of any small employers, who in aggregate are by far the most 
significant employers of women. 
The authoritative work by Zabalza and Arrufat, (1985), sought to address two problems 
faced by studies of earnings functions, not just here in the UK but in other countries as 
well. The first was a response to criticism relating to the use of potential expérience in the 
absence of actual expérience data, since potential expérience, particularly for married 
women, is likely to be a relatively poor indicator of labour market expérience, 
particularly for married women. They used a technique to predict actual expérience based 
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upon estimâtes of the probability of labour market participation in différent years, this 
imputed estimate of expérience was shown to produce less biased estimâtes of women's 
expérience coefficients. Secondly the possibility of the female labour market participants 
not being a représentative sample of the total female population, since it is possible that 
some of the variables included in the wage équation are also déterminants of the 
participation décision, had been somewhat neglected in previous studies. To overcome 
this, the authors applied the two-stage procédure first proposed by Heckman (1979). 
Using the same data set as Greenhalgh (1980), the General Household Survey of 1975, 
they calculate women's average hourly wages to be 62 .3% of men's . They accept this to 
be a slight exaggeration of the true pay gap since the absence of overtime premia data has 
a greater impact upon the maie hourly wage. However the authors réfute Greenhalgh's 
claims that the différent motivational effects of marriage are the driving forces behind 
gender differentials. They argue that this appears to be so when expérience is inaccurately 
modelled by potential expérience, as this overstates labour market expérience and causes 
the estimated coefficients on married women's expérience to be biased downwards. 
Unfortunately the absence of any actual expérience data makes it impossible to détermine 
which of thèse two viewpoints is the most valid. When expérience is represented by 
imputed expérience Zabalza and Arrufat find that married women 's expérience is 
rewarded similar to married men 's , it is just that potential expérience picks up the 
positive effects of work expérience, as well as the négative effects of home time. The 
overall conclusion is that it is a lower accumulation of labour market expérience, 
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combined with the effects of home time depressing earnings capacity, which are the 
crucial factors in determining the wage gap. 
The partial success of the equal opportunities legislation in the 1970s, (Sloane & 
Theodossiou 1994), led critics to search for more effective methods of narrowing the 
gender pay gap. To do this required the causes of the differential to be more accurately 
defined. More specifically it needed to be established whether occupational segregation 
or the gender distribution within occupations was the most important factor. Miller 
(1987) attempted to do this by decomposing the wage gap into its intra and inter-
occupational factors, and found a differential of 39%, of which around 15 percentage 
points were due to discrimination, and virtually all (87%) of this wage gap was due to 
intra-occupational factors. Decomposing the intra-occupational factors further revealed 
that around 2/3rds was justified by differences in endowments and home time, whilst the 
remaining l / 3 r d was unjustified. This suggests that in the same occupations equally 
qualified women suffered lower rates of pay and worse promotion prospects than their 
male counterparts. This indicated that future anti-discriminatory legislation should be 
targeted at promoting equal opportunities and pay within occupations rather than 
encouraging a more equal gender distribution across occupations. However care must be 
taken before accepting this proposal, since the relatively small number of occupational 
groups, only six, means that each one is a very broad category. Hence within each 
category some significantly different jobs are treated as being the same, i.e. lawyers and 
nurses in the professional category, and therefore inter-occupational factors are appearing 
as intra ones. 
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Sloane (1990) encompassed much narrower catégories; the New Earnings Survey 
classifies respondents by industry and occupation, allowing the author to identify literally 
hundreds of specific catégories. The vast number of results that this gives makes it 
difficult to examine each one individually, however in summary the author found that the 
gender wage differential had narrowed over the period studied, 1970-1982, although, as 
with Siebert and Sloane (1981), there were wide variations across groups. Obviously the 
equal opportunités législation was a factor in this narrowing, but structural factors were 
found to be more important than previously thought. Most important was the increase of 
female employment in the higher paying industries, and a less influential, although still 
significant, rôle was played by the improvement in the female distribution within 
industries. 
This certainly represents an improvement upon previous works; the greater number of 
occupations and industries makes it clearer that problems in the vertical, rather than the 
horizontal distribution, of women should be the focus of future equal opportunities 
législation. In addition the NES allows for the inclusion of data on job tenure, as well as 
wage premia for overtime, shift work and incentive payments, which were important 
previous omissions. However there are major limitations. Firstly the NES is constructed 
from Inland Revenue records which exclude low paid workers who do not reach the floor 
of National Insurance payments. This is likely to affect women disproportionately and 
hence understate the differential within some groups. Secondly, the absence of 
educational variables makes it difficult to accept the findings on the relative female 
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distributions without further examination. Finally, the further omission of marital status 
information makes it impossible to confimi the previous findings relating to the 
motivational effects of marriage (Zabalza and Arrufat 1985). 
The 1980 Women and Employment Survey was the first nationally représentative survey 
to collect detailed work historiés. From this data Wright and Ermisch (1991) wereable to 
estimate women 's earnings functions using actual expérience rather than potential or 
imputed. The inclusion of earnings data for the husbands of married women in the survey 
meant that comparisons could be made between the wages of married men and women. 
Their results show that the average hourly wage of married women is 6 7 % of their 
married male counterparts. Decomposing the wage gap further reveals that 17% of it is 
due to différences in attributes, 25-30% to home time, and the remainder, approximately 
half, is unexplained. Furthermore they are able to show the validity of using imputed 
expérience in the absence of actual data, since their results are robust to substituting an 
imputed term for the actual one. Unfortunately, since the analysis excludes single people, 
it is impossible to establish how relevant thèse findings are to the overall population. 
Using an alternative method Sloane and Theodossiou (1994) analyse changes in women ' s 
relative earnings during the period 1970-82. Adopting a generalised Lorenz Curve 
approach they analyse changes in the differential estimated from the New Earnings 
Survey. This reveals that the female/male wage ratio narrowed during the 1970's. From a 
starting point of just below 0.6 in 1970 it narrowed rapidly to a peak of 0.7 by 1977, 
generally accepted as the effects of equal opportunités législation. However the ratio 
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subsequently declined gradually to reach 0.68 by 1982, and the authors argue that this is 
indicative of the lack of long term effectiveness of the législation. They also argue that 
fiat rate incomes policies and narrowing of skill differentials were unimportant, since the 
relative improvement of the lowest paid women was not the most marked. Furthermore 
they argue that the changes are multi-causal and changes in the supply and demand 
conditions within the labour market would have improved women 's relative position, 
even in the absence of the législation. 
As previously mentioned, the absence of educational and marital status variables within 
this data set tends to limit the scope of the analysis. For example, in this case, the 
conclusions are valid and accurately reached from the reported results. However the data 
set prevents further examination into the effects of changing educational attainment and 
rising divorce rates over the same time period which could equally have had a significant 
impact upon the wage ratio. 
Despite the number and breadth of studies discussed so far there are a number of issues 
that have not been adequately resolved. However some of the more récent work 
published in this area help to shed light upon a couple of thèse. Firstly the problem of 
measuring female work expérience, and the limitations of potential expérience as a proxy, 
have been recurring thèmes throughout the history of estimating the UK gender wage 
gap. However, the British Household Panel Survey now records actual labour market 
expérience for women, with Lissenburgh (2000) and Swaffield (2000) making use of this 
in an attempt to establish the impact of lower female work expérience upon the gender 
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wage gap. Lissenburgh (2000) reports that each additional year of full-time expérience 
raises the male wage rate by 3-4% and 2 - 3 % for the women, whilst part-time expérience 
and time out of work had a negative effect. Each additional part-time year lowered male 
wages by 8% and the female wage by 2 % and each year out of the labour market reduced 
the male wage by 8% and female by 3%. 
Furthermore Swaffield (2000) indicates that it is not just t ime out of the labour market 
that is important but what the individuai is doing with that time. Withdrawing from the 
labour market for domestic responsibilities only reduces the female wage by 1% for each 
additional year, with ali of this negative effect occurring within the first four years of 
non-participation. However, and more importantly for the gender wage gap, she reveals 
that labour market withdrawal for éducation had a significant negative effect upon the 
subséquent wage for women, but not for men. 
Unfortunately in both cases there is only a limited attempt to control for occupational 
différences, hence some of the gender differential may resuit from differing typical rates 
of wage growth across occupations. Furthermore it clouds the distinction between what 
Jobs women end up doing and what they earn in that occupation upon their return to the 
labour market. 
Secondly, although the neo-classical/institutional debate has continued, it has done so 
within a neo-classical framework. To a large extent this reflects the dominance of 
individuai or household data within previous empirical work. Although attempts have 
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been made to include institutions such as marriage and trade unions within this 
framework there are limits. This type of data says very little about the most important 
labour market institution, i.e. the organisation employing the individuai. In response to 
this Anderson at al (2001) made use of establishment data, the 1998 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey, to estimate the gender wage gap within a more 
institutionally focussed framework. They were able to control for factors such as gender 
ségrégation within the industry, occupation and work celi, the présence of union 
bargaining, type of payment system etc, ali of which would be impossible with household 
data. Their findings indicated that 10% of the 2 1 % estimated gender wage gap is 
explained, with 4 and 3 percentage points of this explained gap being due to the 
characteristics of the job and the employer respectively. 
However there is always a downside and the inclusion of more effective institutional 
measures cornes at a price. By définition establishment data excludes those not in the 
labour market, hence those surveyed are not a représentative sample of the overall 
population. Therefore the problems of biased estimâtes through sample sélection re-
appear and it is very difficult to adjust for them using establishment data. 
In conclusion, the overall diversity of thèse studies prevents a clear conclusion being 
reached as to the major causes of the UK gender wage gap. However the évidence does 
support the importance of the majority of the anticipated factors. With differing returns to 
expérience, éducation, tenure and marriage, lower levels of female work expérience, 
érosion of skills due to home time as well as lower pay and fewer j o b opportunités for 
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women within occupations variously cited as the crucial éléments. This confirms the need 
to control for thèse factors when estimating gender wage gaps. 
4.4 Specific Evidence: Germany 
There are far fewer sources to examine the nature of, and changes in, the gender wage 
differential in Germany. This is simply because of the absence of appropriate data sets 
(Gerlach 1987). The first attempt was based upon a random sample in 1981 of ali 
employées in the state of Bremen (Gerlach 1987). The author calculated the female/male 
wage ratio to be 0.68 for marrieds and 0.89 for singles; only a small proportion of this 
was due to différences in endowments, in both cases the unexplained portion is between 
80 and 90%. Admittedly a significant part of the unexplained élément may be due to the 
présence of potential as opposed to actual expérience data. There are further problems 
with thèse estimâtes; firstly the author does not reveal how représentative Bremen is of 
the overall German labour market. Secondly the postal questionnaire resulted in bias in 
the response rates, with unskilled workers and employées in small plants having much 
lower response rates. A disproportionate présence of women in these groups could lead to 
an underestimate of the gender wage gap. A later study, (Hubler 1991), using cross-
sectional data for 1984 to 1986, reports gender wage gaps of a similar magnitude but 
records even higher estimâtes of discrimination. 
More recently Kunze (2005) analyses the gender wage gap for cohorts of West German 
workers undertaking apprenticeship training between 1975 and 1990. She reports a wage 
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differential around 2 5 % upon entry into the labour market, with this remaining largely 
unaltered over time as each cohort builds up work experience and human capital. Only 
9% of the entry wage gap is explained by observable differences in human capital, for 
new entrants this equates to differences in educational attainment. However a much larger 
proportion, 52%, is explained by occupation, i.e. men are over-represented in the higher 
paying occupations. The overall implication is that differences in the occupations that 
men and women tend to gain their occupational qualifications in result in a permanent 
wage disadvantage for women. 
The empirical analysis makes use of administrative data collected from a sample of those 
undertaking apprenticeships. Consequently this leads to the sample being non-
representative of the West German population; since non-apprentices are excluded the 
findings are not applicable to other types of workers. However this is less important than 
it would be in most other countries as around 50-60% of the population in Germany 
undertake apprenticeships (Munch 1992). 
Unfortunately within the large unexplained entry wage gap there is likely to be a 
significant amount of unobserved educational heterogeneity. Education is measured 
simply by the number of years, with differences in subjects studied and attainment levels 
not recorded. Hence those subsequently employed in the higher paying occupations may 
do so because they signalled higher levels of human capital to employers through better 
academic performance, or else it resulted from the subjects that they opted to study. The 
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latter is influenced by social conditioning, certain subjects being viewed as 'ma le ' or 
Temale ' as well as educational expectations. 
There have been a number of more recent studies focusing upon the impact of transition 
for East Germany. Hunt (1997) found that for East Germans, between 1990 and 1994, 
female wages rose from 74% to 84% of the average male wage, unfortunately this was 
driven by a 2 1 % fall in female employment ( 5 % more than for men). The increase in 
unemployment was predominantly amongst the low skilled, where women are over-
represented, therefore the narrowing of the wage gap is caused by the lowest paid women 
losing theirjobs. 
Gang and Yun (2002) established that there has been a very large increase in wage 
inequality in East Germany between 1990 and 2000. Given the transition from a socialist 
system to a market economy this was to be expected. However with the link between the 
gender wage gap and the level of inequality, highlighted by Blau and Kahn (1992), this is 
likely to have a negative impact upon the gender differential. 
Clearly the previous two papers are a limited basis for making inferences on a country-
wide basis, since they only cover East Germany. However, although East Germans are in 
the minority, they are a very significant minority within the German population and given 
the vast changes that they have experienced since re-unification, it is likely that they have 
had an important effect upon the German gender wage gap over this period. 
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Unfortunately the most recent data sets make it impossible to separate East Germany, so 
it has become difficult to examine thèse factors in isolation. 
4.5 Specific Evidence: Cross-Country S tu di es 
The analysis in Section 4.2 has already established that we would expect gender wage 
différentials to be narrower in Germany than in the UK. In this section we shall see if this 
has been borne out by past comparative analysis. There is a relative lack of cross-country 
work compared with studies of individuai labour markets, particularly the USA, UK and 
Sweden, however the literature which is available gives inconclusive support. 
The évidence that is available is summarised below in Table 4.3, where the respective 
wage gaps and the relevant years are recorded. This shows that in the majority, but not 
all, cases the anticipated narrower wage gaps were experienced in Germany. In the 
remainder of this section each of these is reviewed in detail to reveal the major 
explanatory factors. Gunderson (1989) produced a comparative study of 10 countries. For 
each country he reported women's eamings/men's earnings ratios for 1960 and 1980. The 
former gave the expected resuit with Germany's being 0.65 and Britain's 0.61. However 
by 1980 their relative positions had changed and the results were 0.72 and 0.79 
respectively. In the paper the author stresses the importance of increased female 
participation rates to the changing earnings ratios, and there is indeed a much higher 
increase in Britain, a 20 percentage point rise compared to less than 10 in Germany. 
However it is unlikely that this alone could explain such a large narrowing of the 
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differential, especially as 5 of the 10 countries had even larger increases in participation 
rates, yet Britain rose from fh to 3 r d in the overall rankings. 
Table 4.3: Summary of Cross-country Results 
Author F/M Ratio Germany F/M Ratio UK Year 






Blau & Kahn 1992 0.69 0.63 1985-88 
Callan et al 1996 0.75 0.71 1991 
Gornick & Jacobs 1998 0.72 Public Sector 
0.62 Private Sector 
0.78 Public Sector 
0.66 Private Sector 
1989 
1989 
Black et al 1999 0.72 Marrieds 0.57 Marrieds 1989 






Machin & Puhani 2003 0.72 Graduâtes 0.79 Graduâtes 1996 
Employment in Europe 
2002 
0.81 
0.89 Public Sector 
0.75 Private Sector 
0.76 
0.80 Public Sector 
0.71 Private Sector 
1998 
There are problems with the comparability of the data; the estimated wage ratio for the 
UK is based upon manual workers only, whereas for Germany all types of worker are 
included (Mincer 1985). This means that for the UK, service sector growth and the 
related rise in female employment is largely ignored. Henee the greater than expected 
narrowing of the differential may be explained, since a substantial number of women 
became employed in low paid non-manual jobs, which would clearly over-estimate the 
female/male wage ratio. 
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Using the International Social Survey Programme, Blau and Kahn (1992) estimate 
female/male earnings ratios, corrected for hours, for eight countries. The estimâtes for the 
UK and Germany are based upon pooled data from the 1985-88 surveys. The authors 
stress the importance of wage inequality in a nation's labour market to the size of the 
gender differential. Their results are as expected with the German ratio being 0.69 and the 
UK's 0.63. However there is potential bias within thèse results as the estimâtes were 
produced assuming a 40-hour workweek, which may have differing effects upon the 
mean wages of men and women. It has long been established that men tend to work more 
hours and are more likely to work overtime (Chiplin and Sloane 1976), hence limited data 
on working hours exaggerates the size of the hourly wage gap. Furthermore the higher 
average working hours for men in the UK (Employment in Europe 2002) is likely to 
make this bias more pronounced with the estimated wage gap in Britain. 
Using the same data set, but restricting the time period to 1985-87, Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1989) produce earnings functions for a number of countries. They do not report 
the gender wage gaps, although it would be fair to assume that they would be similar to 
Blau & Kahn's (1992) above, but they do estimate discrimination to be 4 6 % of the 
average wage in West Germany and 56% in Great Britain. However they do use a fairly 
simplistic method, running the wage régression on men and women combined, then 
interpreting the gender dummy as discrimination. This means that the estimated 
coefficients may well suffer from bias, since they are based on the combined endowments 
of men and women, when in truth the particular endowments of men and women 
separately may differ signifícantly. Therefore it is likely that these estimates of 
discrimina ti on are higher than their true valué. 
Progress in the área of comparative studies had to a large extent been hampered by the 
absence of comparable data sets in each of the countries being studied. There were 
always problems with certain variables being available in one country but not in another, 
plus variables that on the surface seemed the same but differing definitions across 
countries made comparisons difficult. However the production of the Luxembourg 
Income Study meant that far more comparable data became available. From this source 
two cross-country studies have so far been attempted. 
Firstly Callan et al (1996) estímate the ratio of female/male mean hourly gross wage to be 
7 1 % in the UK and 75%» in Germany, both figures are for 1991. Gornick and Jacobs 
(1998) produced a similar study but concentrated on the relative effects of the public and 
prívate sectors, and report female/male earnings ratios for the UK; public 0.78 and prívate 
0.66, and for Germany; public 0.72 and prívate 0.62. The UK estímate is produced from 
the same survey, (1991), and given the relative sizes of the public and prívate sectors, the 
estimates are consistent with Callan's results. However for Germany both the public and 
private sector ratios are lower than Callan's figure, which is clearly not consistent. The 
two results are not directly comparable since, for Germany, Gornick and Jacobs used the 
1989 survey, but it is unlikely that this alone would account for something in the región 
of a 10-percentage point narrowing in the wage gap. It is most probable that differences 
in the choice of dependent variable Ied to this inconsistency; Gornick and Jacobs used 
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gross annual earnings of the full-time labour force. The greater tendency of men to work 
longer hours and overtime etc. will increase their average earnings relative to women's 
(Chiplin & Sloane 1976). Furthermore from 1991 additional information in thesurveys 
relating to the gross wage paid and the hours to which that wage applíes, (Callan et al 
1996), means that their use of gross hourly wages will lead to more accurate calculations 
of the gender wage ratio. 
One of the most récent attempts at a cross-country study of pay by gender was by Black 
et al (1999). They focus on the reïationship between wage protection Systems and gender 
pay inequalities and their results give female/male ratios of the means of gross hourly 
earnings for married people only; UK 5 7 % and Germany 72%. The estimâtes were 
produced from ISSP 1989 data, which allows us to compare the results with those of Blau 
and Kahn (1992) who used pooled data from the ISSP 1985-88 surveys. Blau and Kahn 
also report wage ratios separately for married and single people, their married ratios are; 
UK 60% and Germany 57%. The two UK estimâtes are clearly consistent, but again the 
later German estimate suggests a much larger narrowing of the pay gap than is 
reasonable. Once more the reasons behind this inconsistency probably lie with the 
construction of the earnings variable. As a resuit of difficultés with the work expérience 
and home time variables Black et al had to exclude women over 44 from their analysis, 
leaving them with only 60 women in their German sample. If this is combined with the 
fact that the earnings data were banded, it may well lead to an inaccurate estimate of the 
mean wage. In addition if married women in Germany over the age of 44 are over-
represented amongst the low paid this will cause the pay gap to be underestimated. 
Finally the ISSP data records gross earnings for Britain and net earnings for Germany, 
which Blau and Kahn do not adjust for, whilst Black et al interpret the Germán tax and 
social security system to estímate the gross wage for each individual. However without 
detailed knowledge of different treatment of men and women within the Germán tax and 
social security system it is difficult to predict what effect this would have upon pay 
differentials. 
Black et al (1999) is the only cross-country study to report discrimination coefficients. 
They report 6 1 % for Great Britain and 3 7 % for West Germany, and this means that 
discrimination is a crucial element of the gender differential in each country, with it 
accounting for 80% of the differential in Britain and 9 5 % in Germany. The authors argüe 
that these estimates are broadly in line with previous work, as the UK had revealed much 
higher discrimination coefficients when post-1980 data had been used, and the Germán 
estimate was comparable with the only previous estímate using actual experience. 
(Hubler 1991). 
Finally Blau and Kahn (2000) highlight some of the changes in gender differentials over 
time for a number of countries. For Germany, over the period 1989-1990, they report a 
female/male weekly earnings ratio of 0.74 for full-time workers, with the same ratio 
being 0.68 in t heUK. By the period 1994-1998, (the earlier years are for West Germany 
only), there had been a slight narrowing to 0.76 in the Germany, but a much stronger 
narrowing to 0.75 in the UK. The reasons for these changes are not discussed, since 
reporting results for 15 other countries as well restricts the depth of analysis. However the 
finding of a slight narrowing in Germany and a much larger one in the UK concurs with 
the findings of this thesis. Thèse will be reported and discussed at length in later chapters. 
Up to this point the major limitation has been problems with the comparability of data 
across countries. However more recently data has become available that is collected using 
the same survey in each country, rendering it more easily comparable. Machin and 
Puhani (2003) focus upon graduâtes only and, using the Labour Force Survey, estimate a 
graduate gender wage gap of 2 8 % in Germany and 2 1 % in the UK. The gap is around 
50% explained in the UK by age, industry, part-time working, sector and occupation, 
with the explained portion rising to 70% once subject of degree is included. The same 
process in Germany raises the much smaller explained wage gap of 30% to only 38%. 
This is one of the few studies that report a narrower wage gap in the UK, although clearly 
the graduate gender wage gap does not necessarily reflect the position in the wider labour 
market. The authors speculate that this results from women in the UK being more 
advanced in the wage hierarchy than their counterparts in more traditional Germany. 
A more significant development in the availability of comparable data was the reléase of 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). This recorded longitudinal data, 
initially in the 12 pre-1995 EU nations, using the same questionnaire in each country, 
thus overcoming some of the diffículties faced by earlier researchers. A major EU-wide 
study has been published reporting gender wage gaps for ali of the ECHP countries. 
Employment in Europe (2002) reveáis both Germany and the UK performing poorly in 
terms of their gender wage gaps. Female/Male average gross earnings ratios of 75.7 and 
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80.6 rank the UK and Germany 12 and 8 respectively out of twelve, with both 
countries having wage gaps significantly wider than the EU mean ratio of 83.8. 
The large scale of the project makes it difficult to disentangle the reasons for the UK's 
position in comparison to Germany. However the EU-wide picture is that the 
predominance of women in smaller firms, low paying sectors, in non-supervisory 
positions with short experience and tenure are the key explanatory factors. However even 
when all of these are controlled for, plus personal and job characteristics, women are still 
paid significantly less than comparable men within all but one industrial sector. 
Importantly, the UK is the only country where part-time work has a negative effect upon 
hourly earnings. This, combined with the fact that it has the highest proportion of women 
in part-time employment means that the treatment of pert-timers is a crucial factor in the 
UK having the largest gender wage gap in the EU. 
Overall the discussion within this section highlights the difficulty of carrying out cross-
country analysis when the available data displays limited comparability. The majority of 
the limitations noted simply result from international differences within the variables. 
Consequently the need for cross-country comparisons using harmonised data is clearly 
shown, thus supporting one of the major objectives of this thesis. 
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4.6 Specific Evidence: In ter-Temporal Studies 
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To a large extent the empirical inter-temporal évidence has already been presented either 
in the country specific or cross-country sections. For example, in the UK, Greenhalgh 
( 1980) reports a wage gap narrowing of 12 percentage points between 1971 and 1975 as a 
resuit of the implementation of equal opportunities législation. Sloane and Theodossiou 
(1994) record a more conservative narrowing of 8 percentage points between 1970 and 
1982, arguing that this was more to do with changes in the supply and demand conditions 
than any other possible factors. 
In more recent times there have been a number of studies paying much closer attention to 
the path of the wage gap over time. Firstly, Harkness (1996) studies the path of the 
earnings gap from 1973 to 1993. Using the Family Expenditure Survey she identifies that 
the ratio of female to male average hourly earnings narrows from 0.59 in 1973 to 0.71 in 
1993. Equal opportunities législation led to a rapid narrowing to 0.67 between 1973 and 
1977, this was followed by a fall back in the late 70s and early 80 's and finally a graduai 
increase between 1982 and 1993. Further analysis using the General Household Survey 
(1974) and the British Household Panel Survey (1992-93) shows that for full-timers the 
hourly earnings ratio was 0.66 in 1974 and 0.80 in 1992-93. Closer inspection of this 
reveals that 3 percentage points of the overall 14 percentage point rise is explained by a 
narrowing of the skills gap. This means that most of the improvement is due to a fall in 
discrimination. However the results show that discrimination is stili a major factor in the 
gender wage gap with over 90% of the differential being unexplained in 1974 and 1992-
93. 
Secondly, Blackaby et al (1997) also use the General Household Survey, this time 
between the years 1973 and 1991. The most important finding is that there was a strong 
narrowing of the wage differential post 1983, with this mainly being driven by a 
narrowing of the skills gap. 
The extensive work by Joshi and Paci (1998) uses the National Child Development 
Survey and is a cohort study of those born in 1958 carried out in 1991. Within the 
questionnaire there is detailed information relating to éducation, work expérience and 
training. They report a gender gap of 20% in hourly earnings for men over full-time 
women and 4 0 % for men over ali women. Initially concentrating on human capital 
variables they find around a quarter of thèse pay gaps to be explained by différences in 
characteristics. By extending the analysis to include data on types of firm, job and 
occupation the explained portion rises to 2/5ths for full-timers and 3/5ths for the overall 
gap. As a follow up to this Makepeace et al (1999) use the same data set and compare it 
with an earlier cohort study, for those born in 1945 and carried out in 1978. They found 
that the wage gap had narrowed from 36% in the earlier year to 18% by 1991, resulting 
predominantly from a significant closing of the skills gap. However thèse data sets only 
include people who at the time of survey were in their early thirties, and unfortunately 
there is'no guarantee that the same process was présent across the whole population. 
From the German perspective, again some of the évidence has already been discussed, 
with Gunderson (1989) estimating a wage gap narrowing of 7 percentage points for West 
Germans between 1960 and 1980. More recently Blau and Kahn (2000) showed a small 2 
percentage point narrowing for Germany between the periods 1989-90 and 1994-98. 
However within this small narrowing Hunt (1997) was able to isolate an interesting 
feature resulting from the integration process by focussing solely upon East Germany. 
She estimated a 10% narrowing of the wage gap for East German women during the early 
1990s, with no évidence of them closing the skills gap. The narrowing resulted entirely 
from a large growth in unemployment for women with relatively low skill levels. 
Overall a number of important features can be identified from the existing inter-temporal 
évidence. For the UK there is a clear indication of the gender wage gap narrowing over 
the last decade or so, with most of this resulting from a closing of the gender skills gap. 
For Germany the differential has been falling at a much slower rate, but within this there 
is a much stronger narrowing, at the expense of higher unemployment, in the Eastern 
Laender. 
Finally none of the existing inter-temporal évidence has made use of panel data. They 
have predominantly made comparisons from 2 or more cross-sectional estimâtes. As 
highlighted earlier thèse techniques are limited in their ability to explain inter-temporal 
changes. Consequently the need to carry out inter-temporal analysis making use of the 
panel structure of data sets is reinforced, with this need being satisfied by the empirical 
analysis in Chapter 6. 
4.7 Conclusion 
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The purpose of this chapter was to identify the reasons for a gender wage gap being 
present, then to establish why the gap differs across the chosen countries and time. The 
literature reviewed in Sections 4.2 - 4.4 highlighted a large number of factors influencing 
the size of the gender wage gap, it also implied that the differential should be smaller in 
Germany. This was largely confirmed by the cross-country literature reviewed in Section 
4.5, but this also revealed the problems and difficulties in carrying out cross-country 
analysis when there is limited comparability within the data. Finally the inter-temporal 
evidence shows a narrowing of the skills gap leading to a smaller differential, particularly 
in the UK in more recent times. Unfortunately the existing analysis has not made use of a 
panel-structured data set, and therefore the ability to understand the inter-temporal 
processes driving the wage gap narrowing is severely limited. Consequently, the 
limitations within existing cross-country analysis as well as the omissions of inter­
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5.1 Introduction 
The overall objective of this thesis is to carry out a detailed analysis of the gender wage 
gap in the UK, focusing specifically upon cross-country and inter-temporal issues to 
assist in a deepening of our understanding. The review of the existing literature carried 
out in the earlier chapters revealed firstly, the major déterminants of the gender wage gap, 
thèse being used as the basis for selecting the explanatory variables in the econometrie 
models. The literature review also highlighted major limitations within existing cross-
country and inter-temporal analysis. This chapter begins the empirical analysis 
calculating the gender differential then decomposing cross-sectionally and inter-
temporally, as well as carrying out a cross-country décomposition with Germany. The 
analysis makes use of the cross-country consistency and the panel structure of the data to 
produce more compatible and insightful analysis. 
5.2 Data and the Model 
It is clear from the conclusions of the second chapter that previous studies in this area 
have been hampered by the shortage of consistent data sets (Brookes et al 2001). 
However the présence of the recently conceived PACO data set from the Panel 
Comparability Project allows direct cross-country comparisons to be made, the 
harmonised variables overcome some of the difficultés encountered by earlier 
researchers. Furthermore the consistency of the variables allows for more meaningful 
intra-country analysis over time 
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The Panel Comparability (PACO) Project uses existing panel data for the individuai 
countries, British Household Panel Study (BHPS) for the UK and Sozio-Oekonomisches 
Panel/Bundesrepublik Deutschland (SOEP) for Germany. The data is then re-coded and 
re-classified to create consistent variables and identical data structures. The UK is a fairly 
new addition to the project, data only being available from 1991, so the analysis will start 
from this point. This covers the periods 1991-1997 for the UK and 1991-1996 for 
Germany. 1 
In each country separate eamings functions will be estimated for men and women, using 
the same set of variables. These functions are of the form; 
ln(^) , . = a + Z'iß + ul, i= l , ,n 
where; Wi = the hourly wage of the / -th worker, 
a = the intercept term, 
Z\ - a vector of individuai characteristics, 
ß = a vector of coefficients, 
and ui - a disturbance term. 
The estimated function is a human capital model with the individuala stock of human 
capital being measured by their éducation and years of expérience. A number of dummy 
variables categorising the circumstances of the individuate current employment are also 
included. The explanatory variables included in the vector Z are outlined below in Table 
5.1. 
1
 For a complete description of the data the officiai documentation is reproduced in Appendix 5.1. 
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Table 5 .1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Description Purpose 
Education 1 Highestlevel of education obtained 
= primary level The impact of education upon earnings is 
established within the literature. These 4 
educational dummies control for différent 
levels of educational attainment. 
Education 2 is used as the base group. 
Education 2 Highest l e v e l of éducation obtained 
= second level - first stage 
Education 3 Highestlevel of education obtained 
= second level - second stage 
Education 4 Highest level of education obtained 
= third level 
Experience. A potential experience term, âge minus the 
years of education minus 6 (or 5 f o r UK). 
The concept of earnings following a 
quadratic age/earnings function is also w e l l 
established in the l i t e r a t u r e . With thèse 2 
variables C o n t r o l l i n g for that process. 
Experience'1. Experience squared. 
P a r t - t i m e . A dummy variable to identify those 
working less than 30 hours per w e e k 
Controlling for the negative impact of 
part-time work on hourly earnings. 
Public. Séparâtes public and private sector 
workers, public=1, private=0. 
Accounting for the possible pay différences 
between the 2 sectors. 
Married. A dummy variable identifying 
those legally married. 
Picks up the possible motivational effects 
that marriage has upon employées. 
Large Firm. Dummy variable for those employed in 
firms with more than 500 employées. 
Controls for the rent sharing behaviour of 
firms with workers in large firms(small firms) 
likely to be paid more (less) than workers 
in the base group of 50-500 employées. 
Small Firm. Dummy variable for those in firms with 
fewer than 50 employées. 
Outsider. Employed by their current organisation 
for l e s s than 2 years. 
The effect of tenure upon earnings is well 
documented with wages rising as workers 
gain firm-specific capital. These control for 
this as well as the potential présence of 
internai labour markets. With initiated 
workers being used as the base group. 
Initiated Worker. Employed by current organisation for 
between 2 and 5 years. 
Insider. Employed by current organisation 
for more than 5 years. 
East Germany Dummy variable for those 
living in East Germany. 
Controls for the lower levels of earnings 
experienced in the former East Germany. 
Ag riculture. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. 
A séries of sector dummies to adjust for 
sectoral différences in pay. Manufacturing 
is used a s the base group. 
Mining. Mining and quarrying. 
Manufacturing. Manufacturing. 
Utilities. Electricity, gas and water. 
Constructjon. Construction. 
Services. Wholesale and retail trade 
and restaurants and hôtels. 
Transport. Transport, storage a n d communication. 
Fin ance. Financing, insurance, real estate 
and business service. 
Community. Community, social and personal services. 
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5.3 Method 
Earnings functions are estimated for men and women separately, using the variables 
outlined above, in each country firstly in the most récent year and secondly in 1991. From 
thèse the gender earnings differentials can be estimated, then analysed closely to establish 
the relative importance of the various factors outlined in Chapter 4. A measure of 
discrimination can then be calculated using the various décomposition methods described 
in Chapter 3. There are a number of issues that need to be considered when applying 
décomposition analysis, thèse have been highlighted and discussed at length previously, 
also in Chapter 3. Consequently to paint as robust a picture as possible of the explained 
and unexplained wage gaps, décomposition results are reported using the following 
techniques: 
Oaxaca/Blinder(1973) \nWm-\nWf={Zm-Zf)pm+Zf{Pm-pf) 
Cotton(1988) l n ^ - \nWf = Z\(pm - P*) + Tf (p * ~Pf) + (Zm - Zf)'P *. 
With p* being the représentation of the estimated non-discriminatory 
wage structure, given by; P* = Cipm+(l-G)Pf,with Q being the 
proportion of the sample made up by men. 
Oaxaca and Ransom ( 1994). Same décomposition as above but, 
Cl = (X'X) \X'm Xm) where X is the observation matrix for the pooled 
sample of maies and females and X m is the observation matrix for the maie 
sample. 
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Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) 
K - = r, (k - Pf ) + ê . (i°f - i, ) + (xm - xf y p„ + e . (im - i"f ) + (êm - êf )if 
For this décomposition, since it is unclear how to interpret the final 
t e r m ( 0 m ~6f)Xf> three sets of results are reported. Option 1 where this 
term is deemed to be unexplained, Option 2 explained, and Option 3 
where it is treated as a separate selectivity efïect. 
Once the wage differentials have been analysed within the two countries, cross-country 
analysis will take place. The previous chapter identified the potential importance of 
différences in wage inequality and sample sélection to comparative wage gaps. The first 
of thèse is analysed using the method originally devised by Juhn et al (1991). Firstly, the 
cross-country wage differential can be decomposed as follows: 
The wage équation for male worker ; in country j is; 
Where In W& is the log of the hourly wage for worker /" in country j . 
Zi} is the vector of explanatory variables. 
p . is the vector of estimated maie coefficients in country j . 
<jj is the residuai standard déviation of male wages in j . 
if/y is a standardised residuai, with mean zero and variance 1. 
The male-female wage gap for country j is; 
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DJ^\n}Vmj-\nWs=5ZJPJ+aJ5Wj 
The / and m subscripts refer to maie and female averages, the 5 prefix signifies the 
average male-female différence for the immediately following variable. 
The pay gap différence between two countries j and k can then be decomposed as 
follows; 
Dj -Dh= (ÔZJ - 5 Z k ) P k + ÔZj(PJ -pk) + ( ô > , - ô > , ) a k + ô > , ( c r j -ak) 
This reveals that the pay gap différence between two countries is the sum of four terms. 
The first term being the contribution of inter-country différences in productive 
characteristics. The second the impact of male-female price differentials for productivity 
characteristics in each country. The third compares the relative positions of women when 
their wage residuals are ranked in the distribution of maie wage residuals, this reflects 
différences in unmeasured characteristics. Finally the fourth term reveals inter-country 
différences in residual inequality, in effect it is the price of the unobserved characteristics 
from term 3. Since the mean maie wage residual equals zéro, 5y/ can be estimated for 
each country by estimating female wages with the maie coefficients imposed on their 
wage function. Then the résultant residuals are used to estimate the average female 
position in that country's distribution of maie residuals. (Blau 1996). 
This method of décomposition implies a grouping of the four separate terms into gender-
specific effects and wage structure effects (Kidd and Shannon 2001). Terms 1 and 3 of 
the décomposition are the gender-specific factors, capturing the impact of cross-country 
différences in the relative male-female levels of observed and unobserved productivity 
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characteristics. Whilst terms 2 and 4 capture the wage structure effects in that they 
measure the returns from these observed and unobserved characteristics. However it has 
to be accepted that it is difficult to simply accept the findings from this type of analysis. 
The earlier discussion in Chapter 3 highlights the limitations of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce 
decomposition. Wage discrimination can in fact be incorporated into any one of the four 
components (Blau and Kahn 1997). Furthermore a change or difference in the distribution 
of male wage residuals is interpreted as a difference or change in the prices for 
unobserved characteristics. This is too simplistic and it could equally reflect a number of 
other factors, such as measurement error, misspecification etc. It assumes that inequality 
affects men and women equally whilst the decomposition of terms 3 and 4 is subject to 
potential bias if the percentile rankings are sensitive to changes in the standard deviation 
(Suen 1997). Finally the wage structure effects, terms 2 and 4, can be significantly 
different dependent upon whether the male, female or pooled sample distribution is used 
as the reference group. Hence the findings from this type of analysis can only ever be 
treated as indicative. 
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Secondly, cross-country sample sélection différences are isolated, this is done by 
subtracting the Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) décomposition of one country from the other. 
The décomposition then becomes; 
D, -Dk= X'„(PmJ -Plj)-X'lk{Pmk-h') 
+
 (X,„j -Xfì){3mj -{Xmk -Xpr)(3mk 
Where the relative cross-country wage gap is the sum of the five terms, relative cross-
country différences in characteristics, treatment, explained components of participation, 
unexplained components of participation, as well as relative différences in selectivity. 
Inter-temporal analysis is then carried out using exactly the same two décomposition 
techniques as for cross-country, although clearly it is a comparison of the same country in 
two différent years, rather than two différent countries. The various components can then 
simply be interpreted as inter-temporal changes, rather than cross-country différences, in 
that parti cul ar factor. 
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5.4 Results 
i) O vervi ew 
Table 5.2 Summary of Observed Gender Wage Differentials 










Germ. 91 Male 2488 2.861 Fem. 1885 2.587 0.760 
Germ. 96 Male 1798 3.151 Fem. 1604 2.884 0.766 
UK 91 Male 2149 1.714 Fem. 2153 1.393 0.725 
UK 97 Male 2106 1.896 Fem. 2130 1.652 0.784 
Table 5.2, above, summarises the Overall position in both countries, giving the number of 
observations and the mean log wage by gender for each of the years, it also displays the 
average female wage expressed as a proportion of the male mean. Initially the wage gap 
was narrower in Germany, a female/male ratio of 0.76 indicating a gender gap of 24%, 
compared to 27 .5% in the UK. So the analysis of the earlier chapters, predicting a 
narrower wage gap in Germany, is initially supported by the évidence. However over the 
period there was a slight narrowing to 23.4% in Germany and a much larger narrowing to 
21.6% in the UK. Consequently, by 1996/7 women in the UK were in a marginally more 
favourable position. 
m 
ii) UK 1997 
Table 5.3 Earnings Functions: UK 1997 
Variable Mean 
Maie 
Coefficient t-ratio# Mean 
Female 
Coefficient t-ratio" 
Constant 1.331" 31.2 1.321" 28.5 
Expérience 18.989 0.044" 13.1 20.433 0.030** 9.1 
Expérience2 492.7 -0.001** -9.9 563.7 -0 .001" -7.6 
Education 1 0.121 -0.213** -5.5 0.133 -0.079" -2.2 
Education 3 0.163 0.115" 3.7 0.137 0.105** 3.4 
Education 4 0.461 0 .281" 11.3 0.385 0.311** 12.9 
Part-time 0.027 0.011 0.2 0.367 -0.153" -7.1 
Public Sector 0.194 0.054 1.3 0.377 0.257** 7.9 
Large Firm 0.197 0.077" 2.8 0.179 -0.025 -0.9 
Small Firm 0.414 -0.127" -5.6 0.518 -0.136" -6.1 
Married 0.575 0.097" 4.3 0.596 0.031 1.4 
Agriculture 0.015 -0.183" -2.2 0.006 0.085 0.7 
Mining 0.009 0.227" 2.2 0.004 0.272* 1.7 
Utilities 0.014 0 .181" 2.2 0.007 0.076 0.6 
Construction 0.058 -0.021 -0.5 0.006 0.231* 1.8 
Services 0.159 -0.174" -5.6 0.222 -0.146** -4.3 
Transport 0.084 -0.029 -0.7 0.036 0 .141" 2.5 
Finance 0.133 0.245" 7.5 0.138 0.220" 5.9 
Community 0.206 0.001 -0.1 0.449 -0.108" -2.7 
Insider 0.321 0.001 0.4 •0.329 0.059" 2.2 
Outsider 0.429 -0.160" -6.5 0.416 -0.124** -5.1 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 1.896 1.652 
Standard Dev. 0.562 0.526 
Observations 2106 2130 
R-squared 0.38 0.32 
RSS 411.2 402.1 
Log-Like -1268.3 -1246.8 
** and * représente significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
# reported l-ratios are based upon White's heteroscedastic consistent standard errors. 
Table 5.3 reports the sample means of the explanatory variables, the estimated wage 
régression results and the associated t-ratios for the UK in 1997. Discussion of the results 
is made easier by having a log dépendent variable, allowing the estimated coefficients in 
the régression model to be interpreted as percentages. According to the above estimâtes 
the mean work expérience of maies is just under 19 years, with an additional year of 
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experience resulting, ceteris paribus, in an extra 4.4 per cent in the average wage. The 
equivalent analysis for females reveals that with a mean experience of 20.4 years each 
additional year adds only 3 per cent to the average wage. 
To a large extent the regression results concur with the wage gap expectations formulated 
in the previous chapter. Men do on average have more education, particularly with regard 
to higher education. However female workers have a higher rate of return to education 
than male workers. Although women appear to have higher levels of work experience 
than men, which contradicts the expected lower participatory rates, this finding is 
possibly misleading, stemming from the experience term actually being a 'potential ' 
experience term, age less age on completing education. Thus the higher figure may 
simply reflect women on average being a similar age to males but tending to have fewer 
years of education. This interpretation is confirmed by a higher rate of returns to 
experience for males relative to females. 
The previous chapter's literature review highlighted that gender differences in the nature 
of employment are key determinants of the wage gap, with these being shown to be 
crucial again here. Firstly, with part-time workers, Ermisch and Wright (1993) illustrate 
the importance of predominantly female part-time employment to the wage gap. Table 
5.3 reveals a much higher incidence of part-time women in the labour market (37%) 
relative to men (3%) and according to the female wage regression estimates part-time 
female employees encounter on average a 15.3 per cent wage penalty compared with full-
time female workers. Additionally women are almost twice as likely to work in the public 
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sector than men (37.7% to 19.4%). The potentially ambiguous relationship between 
public sector employment and the gender earnings gap (Gornick and Jacobs 1998) has 
been discussed in Chapter 4. However the positive and significant returns for females 
working in the public sector illustrates that, ceteris paribus, the gender wage differential 
narrows. 
Table 5.3 also reveals the importance of firm size and occupational group on the 
respective wage rates of male and female workers and more importantly on the gender 
wage differential. Firstly, men are more likely to work for a large firm and less likely to 
work for a small one, with the rate of return from both types of employment favouring the 
men. Secondly, there is a clear occupational segregation along gender lines, 2/3rds of 
women are employed in community, social and personal services or retai 1, restaurante and 
hotels. As discussed in Chapter 4, Miller (1987) highlights the importance of this, and it 
is confirmed here with a significant wage penalty present in both of these sectors relative 
to those employed in manufacturing. The impact upon the gender wage differential is 
compounded by a more even distribution of the men across the occupational categories. 
Finally, the different motivational signals from married men and women (Waldfogel 
1995) appear to be present, the returns to being married are positive and significant for 
men but not for women. Although it could equally be argued that this reflects the 
institutional arrangement^ within the household supporting the male 'bread winner' role. 
However at the same time the effects of job tenure are at odds with expectations as they 
favour the women. There is no real difference in the likelihood of women being in their 
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current job for less than 2 years and more than 5 years, but they receive a significant 
premium for being an insider as well as a smaller penalty for being an outsider. This may 
well resuit from the higher incidence of women in the public sector and hence the greater 
likelihood of them being employed within an internai labour market. 
Table 5.4 
Wage Gap Décompositions: UK 1997 
Mean Ln Wage (Male) 1.896 
Mean Ln Wage (Female) 1.652 
Wage Gap 0.244 
Female/Male Ratio 0.784 
% Wage Gap 21.6% 
Oaxaca/ Blinder Cotton (1988) Oaxaca & Ransom 
(1973) (1994) 
Explained 0.021 9% 0.059 24% 0.070 29% 
Unexplained 0.223 9 1 % 0.185 76% 0.174 71% 
Maie Overpayment 0.074 30% 0.082 34% 
Female Underpayment 0.111 46% 0.092 37% 
Clearly once the earnings functions have been estimated it is important to décompose the 
gender wage gap in order to identify the portions of that wage gap that can, and can't, be 
explained by différences in the observed characteristics. The discussion from Chapter 2 
points to the difficulties in interpreting the unexplained term as discrimination, however 
the results can at least be viewed as indicative. Table 5.4 summarises the outcomes from 
the décomposition techniques described in the method section. The top row of the table 
records the observed gender wage différences and the bottom row has the wage gap 
separated into its recognisable catégories for each of the décomposition techniques. 
The results are to a certain extent sensitive to the technique used, with the explained term 
from the Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) method (29%) being more than three times the size 
of the one from the originai Oaxaca/Blinder (9%). However it is clear that irrespective of 
the method chosen the majority of the gender wage gap is unexplained by différences in 
the observed characteristics. This is confirmed by Black et al (1999) who find that as the 
wage gap has fallen in the UK the relative size of the unexplained portion has risen. 
The full décompositions are reproduced in Appendix 5.2 and closer inspection of these 
reveals that the explained différences are almost entirely due to higher levels of éducation 
for men as well as the much greater proportion of women working part-time. Whilst the 
unexplained term is mainly due to, in order of importance, lower female returns to 
expérience, the wage premium for married men and the unfavourable occupational 
division of women. 
Obviously the earnings functions and related décompositions used thus far are open to the 
possible bias as a result of sample sélection. This issue, as well as the Heckman (1979) 
adjustment technique, has already been discussed at length in Chapter 2. This technique 
has been applied with firstly participation probits being estimated using âge, éducation, 
marriage, number of children, children under 5, poor health and household income as the 
explanatory variables. Age and its square are included to control for the changing 
116 
employment probabilities over a working life. The two children variables reflect the 
increased child care responsibilities, particularly with pre-school children, and the likely 
résultant réduction in participation. Household income is included as an alternative to the 
neo-classical view that participation décisions are made on an individuai basis. It is more 
likely that thèse décisions are made on a household basis with income from sources other 
than the individuar s earnings influencing the décision, hence this possibility is controlied 
for. Those recording themselves to be in poor health are identified with a dummy variable 
to reflect their likely lower level of labour market attachment. Finally, the éducation and 
married variables are included in both the participation probit and the earnings function. 
Education because a higher level of éducation is likely to influence both the likelihood of 
being employed, as well as the résultant earnings, and marriage because the institutional 
impact of the division of labour within the household is also likely to impact upon both 
participation and earnings. 
The estimated régression results once this technique has been applied are reported in 
Table 5.5, with the adjustment term or inverse Mills ratio (k) included as an additional 
explanatory variable. The means of the inverse Mills ratios are higher for women (0.57) 
compared to men ' s (0.53), suggesting slightly lower employment probabilities for 
women, although admittedly a significant proportion of the female employment is part-
time employment. The coefficient on the IMR variable is negative and significant for 
- both men and women, indicating that those employed are less productive than the 
anticipated mean productivité of the overall sample (Zabalza and Arrufat 1985). When 
comparing the corrected and non-corrected régression estimâtes, i.e. Table 5.3 with Table 
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5.5 the most noticeable change is a fall in the absolute values and significance of the 
éducation and expérience variables, as well as a rise in the intercept terms. Indicating that 
the sample sélection adjustment renders the earnings functions flatter and that these two 
variables have a greater impact upon employment than earnings. 
Table 5.5 Selectivity Corrected Earnings Functions: UK 1997 
Variable Mean 
Maie 
Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Female 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant • 2.466" 44.3 1.692** 29.7 
Expérience 18.989 -0.002 -0.6 20.433 0.013" 3.7 
Expérience2 492.7 0.0005" 6.1 563.7 -0.0002" -2.5 
Education 1 0.121 -0.175" -5.3 0.133 -0.033 -0.9 
Education 3 0.163 0.208" 7.8 0.137 0.129" 4.3 
Education 4 0.461 0.106" 4.7 0.385 0.267" 11.2 
Part-time 0.027 0.184" 3.5 0.367 -0 .081" -3.7 
Public Sector 0.194 0.019 0.5 0.377 0.253" 7.9 
Large Firm 0.197 0.060" 2.6 0.179 -0.026 -0.9 
Small Firm 0.414 -0.108" -5.5 0.518 -0.124" -5.7 
Married 0.575 -0.046" -2.3 0.596 0.010 0.5 
Agriculture 0.015 -0.081 -1.1 0.006 0.119 0.9 
Mining 0.009 0.169* 1.9 0.004 0.243 1.6 
Utilities 0.014 0.174" 2.4 0.007 0.087 0.7 
Construction 0.058 -0.026 -0.7 0.006 0.219* 1.7 
Services 0.159 -0.127" -4.8 0.222 -0.137" -4.1 
Transport 0.084 -0.045 -1.4 0.036 0.119" 2.2 
Finance 0.133 0 .151" 5.3 0.138 0.194" 5.3 
Community 0.206 0.030 0.8 0.449 -0.099" -2.5 
Insider 0.321 0.019 0.8 0.329 0.058" 2.3 
Outsider 0.429 -0.119" -5.6 0.416 -0.108" -4.6 
A 0.530 -1.396" -27.1 0.572 -0.444** -10.7 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 1.896 1.652 
Standard Dev. 0.562 0.526 
Observations 2106 2130 
R-squared 0.542 0.352 
RSS 303.9 381.3 
Log-Like -950.1 -1190.3 
* * and * représente significance at the 5% and 10% levels respective!y. 
# reported t-ratios are based upon White's heleroscedastic consistent standard errors. 
The probit estimâtes from which the >. variable is produced are in Appendix 5.3 
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Once the earnings functions have been adjusted for sample sélection bias the issue of how 
to deal with the X. terms and their estimated coefficients within the décomposition needs 
to be resolved. This was discussed at length in Chapter 2, leading to the conclusion that 
this has largely been ignored to date, with the tendency for researchers to décompose the 
Xterm in the same fashion as the other explanatory variables. This being the justification 
for one of the major objectives of this thesis, to highlight the importance of sample 
sélection to estimated levels of discrimination, as well as its impact upon gender wage 
gap changes or différences. 
Table 5.6 Décomposition of Wage Differentials with Selectivity Correction. 
UK 1997 
Estimâtes of average lambdas and associated coefficients, 

































Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) indicate how the X term can be decomposed more effectively 
and this forms the basis for the décompositions recorded in Table 5.6, with the full results 
in Appendix 5.4 for référence. The technique breaks down the X term into an explained 
employment term, 6m (Xm - X°f ) , an unexplained employment term, 9m (Â° - Xf ) , as well 
as an additional selectivity component, 0„(A}. - Xf). It is unclear whether this final term 
is an explained or unexplained component of the gender wage gap (Neuman and Oaxaca 
1998), therefore the three options reported in Table 5.6 resuit from assuming this term to 
be explained, unexplained and a separate selectivity component respectively. 
As should be expected, when the earnings functions have significant IMR variables, 
correcting for selectivity does have a noticeable impact upon the décomposition of the 
wage gap. In this case the wage gap is dwarfed by two opposing effects, the différence 
between the male and female intercepts being considerably larger than the overall 
differential and this being offset by a similar différence between the coefficients on the 
IMR variables. Différences between the intercept terms can be problematic since to a 
large extent they reflect our level of ignorance regarding the earnings functions and are 
generally interpreted as factors unobserved by the model. However in this case by 
highlighting the impact of the sample sélection adjustment upon the intercept terms some 
conclusions can at least be reached. The inclusion of the IMR variable in both cases 
flattens out the earnings function by reducing the expérience and éducation coefficients 
and raising the intercept, with this process being more pronounced for the men. This 
suggests that thèse variables have a greater effect upon participation than they do upon 
120 
earnings. Hence they have a bigger impact upon the likelihood of finding and accepting a 
job and the subséquent trajectory of earnings is less sensitive to différences within the 
explanatory variables. Overall it suggests that, once the sample sélection adjustment is 
made, for a given age/experience, level of éducation, marital status, men are likely on 
average to find and accept a higher paying job. 
The second dwarfing factor is the différence between the maie and female EvfR 
coefficients, both are négative and significant indicating that those employed are not a 
représentative sample of the overall population, with the lower skilled being over 
represented in the sample (Wright and Ermisch 1991 ). Dolton and Makepeace ( 1987) 
reveal that for a given level of measured human capital wage offers display considerably 
less variation than réservation wages, hence the réservation wage is more important to the 
participation décision than the potential wage offer. This implies that those with less 
human capital are more likely to be employed as they have a considerably lower 
réservation wage. The greater magnitude of the maie coefficient indicates that low skilled 
men have a lower réservation wage relative to low skilled women. The décompositions in 
Table 5.6 indicate that in the absence of sample sélection différences the gender wage gap 
would be considerably wider. This implies that removing sample sélection différences 
would require a réduction in the réservation wage of low skilled women, thus leading 
them to accept lower paying employment and reducing the mean female wage. 
Overall from this section four key things can be concluded. Firstly any décomposition 
analysis based upon unadjusted earnings functions is likely to lead to inaccurate 
estimâtes, this hardly being new as it has been widely accepted since Heckman (1979) 
developed his adjustment procédure. Secondly, any décomposition analysis treating the 
adjustment term (X) in the same fashion as the other variables is also likely to lead to 
inaccurate estimâtes of the explained and unexplained components. Thirdly, even where 
the (X) term is decomposed into its différent effects the estimated components are 
sensitive to the assumptions made. Finally, any increase in female participation that 
results from a réduction in the réservation wage is, at least initially, likely to widen the 
gender wage gap as low-skilled women are encouraged into paid employment. 
iii) Germany 1996 
The unadjusted earnings functions for German men and women are reported in Table 5.7, 
as before the means, estimated coefficients and t-ratios are recorded for each explanatory 
variable. The returns from virtually ail of the explanatory variables favour the women, 
although admittedly only marginally in most cases, with the only exceptions being for 
part-time and married workers. There are a smaller number of female part-timers in 
Germany, 27.4% compared to 36 .7% in the UK, and although they incur a wage penalty 
of 7.4%, it is around half the size of the 15% UK penalty. By far the largest impact upon 
the gender wage gap cornes from the treatment of married men and women in 
employment, with married men receiving a premium close to 1 1 % over comparable 
singletons and married women incurring a penalty close to 7.2% in comparison to their 
unmarried counterparts. 
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Also it is important to note that clear différences still exist between the former East 
Germany and the rest of the country. There are much lower rates of pay in the eastern 
landau, with both men and women experiencing a large pay eut in comparison to those in 
the West. Interestingly, although overall female participation rates are, as expected, lower 
in Germany than in the UK, this is not the case in the former East Germany with women 
making up 54% of the employed sample in East Germany. 
Table 5.7 Earnings Functions: Germany 1996 
Variable Mean 
Maie 
Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Female 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 2 .681" 58.4 2.424" 44.3 
Expérience 20.710 0.030" 7.9 19.973 0.037" 8.4 
Expérience2 540.3 -0 .001" -7.6 513.6 -0 .001" -7.6 
Education 1 0.038 0.078 1.5 0.037 0.057 0.9 
Education 3 0.648 0.123" 4.1 0.627 0.156" 4.5 
Education 4 0.217 0.392" 11.3 0.203 0.458" 10.5 
Part-time 0.021 0.159" 2.6 0.274 -0.074" -2.8 
Public Sector 0.247 0.005 0.1 0.392 0.069" 2.0 
Large Firm 0.545 0.098" 4.8 0.468 0.133" 5.0 
Small Firm 0.170 -0.175" -6.6 0.252 -0.126** -4.1 
Married 0.715 0.108" 5.0 0.658 -0.072** -2.7 
Agriculture 0.018 -0.150" -2.3 0.017 -0.129 -1.5 
Mining 0.011 -0.057 -0.7 0.001 0.500 1.2 
Utilities 0.019 0.124* 1.9 0.008 0.209* 1.7 
Construction 0.127 0.031 1.1 0.024 0.014 0.2 
Services 0.082 -0.128" -3.8 0.183 -0.056 -1.5 
Transport 0.076 -0.072* -1.8 0.049 -0.080 -1.4 
Finance 0.051 0.074* 1.8 0.085 0.159" 3.4 
Community 0.203 -0.004 -0.1 0.438 0.057 1.4 
East Germany 0.195 -0.414" -17.9 0.311 -0.318" -11.8 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 3.151 2.884 
Standard Dev. 0.448 0.497 
Observations 1798 1604 
R-squared 0.360 0.260 
RSS 230.61 292.9 
Log-Like -704.9 -912.4 
* * and * représente significance al the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
# reported t-ratios are based upon White*s heteroscedastic consistent standard errors. 
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This higher female employment rate is of importance when analysing the 
décompositions, the results are summarised in Table 5.8. The füll results are reproduced 
in Appendix 5.5 and inspection of thèse reveals that the greater proportion of female 
employment in the East, but unfortunately at lower rates of pay, accounts for over 2/3rds 
of the explained différence. Overall thèse décompositions are far less sensitive to the 
chosen technique than those for the UK, with ail three methods calculating unexplained 
terms in the région of two thirds to three quarters of the wage gap. Closer examination of 
the décompositions reveals three key factors. Firstly, the décompositions are 
overwhelmed by the intercept term. The différence between the maie and female 
intercepts at 0.257 log points is almost as large as the total wage gap, suggesting that it 
results from factors not observed within the model. 
Table 5.8 
Wage Gap Décompositions: Germany 1996 
Mean Ln Wage (Male) 3.151 
Mean Ln Wage (Female) 2.884 
Wage Gap 0.267 
Female/Male Ratio 0.766 
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Secondly, the majority of the estimated coefficients actually favour women, most notably 
the returns to éducation, expérience and public sector employment have a significant 
narrowing effect upon the wage gap. As flagged earlier the only variables widening the 
differential are marriage and part-time employment, with thèse contributing in the région 
of 12% and 6% respectively to the unexplained gender wage gap. Finally, there is no 
évidence at ail of the occupational ségrégation widening the wage gap. The degree of 
ségrégation is similar to that in the UK, but there is not the same level of differential 
gender wage penalties/premiums within the sectors. This presumably results from the 
more extensive coverage of collective bargaining and the résultant narrower wage 
distribution. 
Obviously thèse wage équations need to be adjusted for the possibility of sample 
sélection bias, this has been done with the results shown below in Table 5.9, the 
participation probit estimâtes are in Appendix 5.6. The major features identified when 
carrying out this same process for the UK are once again présent here. There is a 
flattening of the earnings function with an increase in the intercept ternis combined with a 
réduction in the size of the éducation and expérience terms, the impact upon the 
expérience coefficients being far more pronounced for the men in this case. Overall this 
confirms the finding for the UK that thèse variables play a bigger part in the likelihood of 
being employed than in the wages subsequently earned. Interestingly, the previously 
négative returns for married women become insignificant, indicating that marriage has a 
bigger impact upon the participation décision. 
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Table 5.9 Selectivity Corrected Earnings Functions: Germany 1996 
Va ria bl e Mean 
Male 
Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Female 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 3.767** 71.2 2.996" 42.3 
Experience 20.710 -0.018" -5.0 19.973 0.008* 1.7 
Experience2 540.3 0.0004" 5.7 513.6 -0.0001 -1.0 
Education 1 0.038 -0.038 -0.9 0.037 0.138" 2.2 
Education 3 0.648 -0.012" -0.5 0.627 0.082" 2.4 
Education 4 0.217 0.215" 7.4 0.203 0.339** 7.9 
Part-time 0.021 0.245 4.9 0.274 0.002 0.1 
Public Sector 0.247 0.043 1.5 0.392 0.066** 2.0 
Large Firm 0.545 0.063" 3.7 0.468 0.110** 4.3 
Smafl Firm 0.170 -0.079" -3.6 0.252 -0.115" -3.9 
M arri ed 0.715 0.002" 0.1 0.658 -0.021 -0.8 
Agri culture 0.018 -0.082" -1.5 0.017 -0.097 -1.1 
Mining 0.011 -0.022 -0.3 0.001 0.448 1.1 
Utilities 0.019 0.023" 0.4 0.008 0.200* 1.7 
Constai ction 0.127 0.031 1.3 0.024 -0.030 -0.4 
Services 0.082 -0.117** -4.3 0.183 -0.045 -1.3 
Transport 0.076 -0.092* -2.9 0.049 -0.074 -1.3 
Finance 0.051 -0.023 -0.7 0.085 0.099** 2.2 
Community 0.203 -0.043 -1.4 0.438 0.042 1.1 
East Germany 0.195 -0.297" -15.3 0.311 -0 .251" -9.5 
X 0.520 -0.923" -29.2 0.691 -0 .461" -12.0 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 3.151 2.884 
Standard Dev. 0.448 0.497 
Observatìons 1798 1604 
R-squared 0.568 0.322 
RSS 155.7 268.4 
Log-Like -351.8 -842.2 
** and * represents signitìcance al ihe 5% and 10% levels respeclively. 
U reported t-ratios are based upon White's heteroscedasiic consisienl standard errors. 
Once the adjusted eamings functions are decomposed the same key features as for the 
UK again become apparent, the decompositions are summarised in Table 5.10 with the 
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full results in Appendix 5.7 for référence. However, the results for Germany do differ in 
that their female mean IMR is clearly higher than the men 's , 0.69 to 0.52, as there is a 
négative relationship between the EvlR and the likelihood of participating this reflects the 
lower participation rates of German women. The rest of the results largely concur with 
the UK, there is a clear impact upon the wage gap from the exptained and unexplained 
components of the participation functions, 0.027 and 0.132 respectively, suggesting a 
significant narrowing of the wage gap by 14 percentage points in their absence. The most 
striking feature is again the large négative selectivity component dwarfing the other 
effects, thus again confirming that trying to indicate the extent of discrimination through 
decomposing selectivity adjusted earnings functions is sensitive to the assumptions made. 
In this case the unexplained term ranges from 4 0 % to 209%. The relative positions of the 
maie and female corrélation coefficients (p) and residual wage inequality (o u ) are the 
same as in the UK. However, given the lower female participation rates in Germany the 
impact of those out of employment is of greater importance in this case. Hunt (1997) 
showed for East Germany rising unemployment had disproportionately affected unskilled 
women, with the resuit that those women being out of work rather than earning low 
wages had narrowed the wage gap. Thèse décomposition results suggest that increasing 
the participation rates to that of the men would involve employing a lot of currently out 
of work women at below average wages, with the whole process leading to massive 
increase in the gender wage gap. As also found in the UK both coefficients on the IMR 
variable are négative and significant, indicating that those in employment tend to be less 
skilled than the mean of the overall population. The différence is not as pronounced as in 
the UK but the size of the maie coefficient is much larger than the female one, once again 
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suggesting that lower skilled women tend to have a higher réservation wage than similar 
men. Consequently, as found in the UK, thèse less productive women who remain out of 
employment have a strong narrowing effect upon the gender wage gap. 
Table 5.10 Décomposition of Wage Differentials with Selectivity Correction. 
Germany 1996 
Estimâtes of average lambdas and associatcd coefficients. 













log w m - log W f 
Contribution of 
Explained Unexplained Selectivity 
Oaxaca 0.267 0.161 (60%) 0.107 (40%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
Option 1 -0.291 (-109%) 0.558 (209%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
Option 2 0.029(11%) 0.238 (89%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
Option 3 0.029(11%) 0.558 (209%) -0.320 (-120%) 
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iv) Comparative Results 1996/7 
One of the major objectives of this thesis is to highlight what can be learned about gender 
wage gaps through making cross-country comparisons. This is done by carrying out a 
Juhn et al (1991) decomposition upon Germany and the UK using the most recently 
available years, i.e. 1997 for the UK and 1996 for Germany. This type of decomposition 
shows what would happen to the gender wage gap if you imposed another country's 
relative endowment of characteristics, returns to those characteristics as well as their 
wage distributions. Although admittedly the limitations of this technique highlighted in 
the previous chapter suggests that any subsequent findings resulting from these 
decompositions need to be tempered accordingly. As can be seen from Table 5.2, by 1997 
the UK gender wage gap had narrowed to such an extent that it was slightly smaller than 
Germany's, 21.4% compared to 23.4%. This 1.8 percentage point disadvantage for 
German women is decomposed using the Juhn et al (1991) method, revealing the results 
shown in Table 5.11 below. 
Table 5.11 
Year Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Total 
{6Zj-8Zt)Pt SZj{Pj-Pk) (Sty - Syrian 8\fj (<Jj - o-fc) 
1996/7 0.233 -0.058 -0.119 -0.031 0.023 
(18.1%) (-4.6%) (-9.3%) (-2.4%) (1.8%) 
The method section from earlier in this chapter shows that the four terms reflect cross­
country differences in the relative endowment of observed characteristics, the prices paid 
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to thèse characteristics, the relative endowment of unobserved characteristics and their 
priées respectively. The small relative gender wage gap différence of 1.8 percentage 
points translates to a différence of 0.233 log points. The relative wage gap widens, i.e. 
German women are worse off, by 0.062 log points as a resuit of their productive and 
employment characteristics. However, they are also 0.058 better off because of the priées 
paid to thèse characteristics. German women are able to narrow the gap as a resuit of the 
factors unobserved by the earnings fonctions. They are 0.119 log points better off due to 
their unobserved characteristics and 0.031 better off from the returns paid to thèse 
characteristics. 
By analysing the full décomposition, in Appendix 5.8, a number of factors become 
apparent. Each of the four separate terms are ail of greater magnitude than the relative 
gender wage gap, so the relatively small cross-country différence of 1.8% is in fact the 
outcome of some larger but opposing factors. By far the largest factor influencing the size 
of the cross-country relative wage gap is the impact of différences in setectivity, with this 
in total teading to a narrower UK differential of 0.1 or around 8%. This in itself results 
from 2 offsetting factors, firstly the much smaller UK différence in the means of the IMR 
variable indicates that UK women transmit their endowment of factors determining 
participation into actual employment at a similar rate to the men. This improves the 
position of UK women relative to German by 0.181 log points. Secondly, the greater 
magnitude of the coefficient on the UK maie IMR worsens their position relative to 
Germany by 0.081 log points. The two male IMR means are virtually identical, 0.52 in 
Germany and 0.53 in the UK, suggesting that men with the same participation 
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characteristics are equally likely to be in employment in both countries. At the same time 
both the IMR coefficients are négative indicating that those in employment tend to be 
below average compared to the overall population. The much lower UK coefficient, -
1.396 compared to -0 .923 , suggests that the lower skilled workers in the UK have a 
lower réservation wage than their German counterparts, with this widening the UK 
gender wage gap relative to Germany's . 
Taking the selectivity factors away leaves much smaller différences in the productivité 
characteristics and their priées. Firstly a more favourable endowment for UK women 
improves their position by 0.052 log points, or around 4%, with virtually ail of this 
resulting from relative différences in the distribution of expérience. Women employed in 
the UK tend to have around 18 months more expérience than the men (20.4 years 
compared to 18.9 years), but German women t end to have about 9 months less(19.9 
years compared to 20.7 years). Admittedly as this is a potential expérience term it reflects 
différences in both expérience as well as âge. In terms of the priées paid for thèse 
characteristics, ignoring selectivity factors, UK women are treated more equitably to the 
tune of 0.033 log points. However, this almost exactly matches the impact upon the 
German wage gap of women working in East Germany. Therefore it could be said that 
the returns for UK women appear to be more favourable simply because none of them 
suffer the wage penalty of being employed in the East German labour market, whilst the 
returns from the remaining characteristics are largely similar. 
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Turning to the unobserved éléments of the décompositions. When placed within the male 
residual distribution UK women achieve a lower position than their German counterparts, 
they are ranked at 14% compared to 25%. German women make differential gains of 9.3 
percentage points as a resuit of this relatively more favourable endowment of unobserved 
characteristics. There is also less wage inequality within the German labour market, the 
residual standard déviations from the male earnings fonctions are .296 for Germany and 
.382 for the UK. The relative gain from this for German women is 2.4 percentage points. 
Combining the terms into the productivity effects and the wage inequality effects, as 
recommended by Kidd and Shannon (2001), reveals the following results; 
Productivity = term 1 + term 3 = 0.233 - 0.119 = 0.114 
Wage Inequality = term 2 + term 4 = -0.058 - 0.031 = -0.089. 
Showing that UK women are in a more favourable position in that their relative 
endowment of observed and unobserved characteristics is closer to the male endowment 
in their country. Whilst the German women receive more équitable returns from their 
endowment of skills, thus confirming one of the propositions of this chapter. Wage 
inequality has a negative impact upon the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn 1992) and 
given the analysis in Chapter 3 it was anticipated that there would be less wage inequality 
in Germany, hence that should have a positive impact upon its wage gap comparative to 
the UK. 
A second major objective of this thesis is to reveal the impact that différences in the 
sample of employed people, i.e. selectivity différences, have to cross-country 
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differentials. This is done by calculating the cross-country différences in the Neuman and 
Oaxaca (1998) décompositions, thèse are shown in Table 5 .11, below. The German and 
UK values are from the original décompositions reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.9 
respectively, then the différence is simply the UK value subtracted from the German one. 
Table 5.12 
Germany 1996 U K 1997 Différence 
(xm-x,yßm 0.002 -0.072 0.074 
x/(ßm-ßf) 0.426 0.802 -0.376 
0.027 0.036 -0.009 
0.132 0.022 0.11 
( o . -èf)if -0.320 -0.544 0.224 
Wage Gap 0.267 0.244 0.023 
As reported above, the relative position of German women is slightly worse than their 
UK counterparts, with their wage gap being 1.8% wider. Terms 1 and 3, (Xm - X fy ßm 
and 6m (Am - X°f ), reflect the factors explained in both the wage and participation 
équations, thèse two combined reveal that German women are 0.065 log points (0.074 -
0.009) worse off as a resuit of thèse. AU of this is being due to the variables explaining 
wages as German women have a slightly more favourable endowment of the factors 
explaining participation. This concurs with the earlier finding that the endowment of 
labour market characteristics for UK women is far dose r to the men ' s than it is in 
Germany. Terms 2 and 4, Xf\ßm-ßf) and èm(X°fcombined show that German 
women are 0.266 log points better off as a resuit of factors unexplained in the wage and 
participation functions. As outlined earlier the inclusion of the sample sélection term has 
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the effect of flattening out the earnings function and raising the intercept, because 
age/experience and éducation have a bigger impact upon participation than earnings. For 
both countries the more marked increase in the maie intercept then dominâtes the 
décomposition. The gender différence in the intercept term being significantly greater 
than the wage gap. In this cross-country comparison the Germán women are shown to be 
better off as the flattening process is less pronounced in their case and they retain more 
favourable returns to their expérience. Indicating that where Germán women remain in 
employment they can expect to narrow the gender wage gap over time. 
Finally, the selectivity term, (Qm treats Germán women in a less bénéficiai 
fashion. The earlier analysis highlighted some common features relating to selectivity, 
with it having a strong narrowing effect upon the gender wage gap in both countries. For 
men and women in Germany as well as in the UK the coefficient on the sample sélection 
term is négative. Indicating that in ail four cases those in employment tend to be below 
the average in ternis of measured characteristics. This then leads to a narrower gender 
wage gap in both countries as the low skilled men have a lower réservation wage than 
comparable women. In short, low skilled men tend to accept low paid employment whilst 
low skilled women have a greater tendency to remain outside of paid employment. When 
it cornes to making a cross-country comparison of this it is simply more pronounced in 
the UK. Although UK women are closer to the men in terms of participation, which 
widens the relative gender wage gap, this is more than offset by a larger différence in the 
maie and female sample sélection coefficients. This indicates that in the UK the gap 
134 
between the male and female low skilled réservation wage tends to be larger and it 
improves the relative wage differential position of UK women by 0.224 log points. 
v) Inter-temporal Analysis: 
A third major objective of this thesis is to use the greater compatibility and panel 
structure of the data to highlight the causes of inter-temporal changes. With the first step 
in the process being to repeat the earlier analysis using the data for 1991. In the same 
manner as previously the unadjusted estimâtes and décompositions have been carried out, 
but in the interests of brevity and clarity they are included in Appendix 5.9. Table 5.13 
reports the results from the earnings fonctions corrected for selectivity bias, the related 
probit estimâtes are in Appendix 5.10. As a result of the adjustment the changes are very 
similar to those in 1997, with the éducation and expérience variables falling in value and 
losing some of their significance. This is translated into the décomposition with 
differential returns to expérience being the dominant factor, in this case around 7 5 % of 
the unexplained term is due to lower female returns to expérience. The EMR variable is 
once again negative and significant in both cases, but once again the much lower male 
value suggests a lower réservation wage for men. 
Table 5.14 shows the various décompositions with selectivity included, for référence the 
full décomposition is in Appendix 5.11. As with 1997 the décomposition is dominated by 
two features. Firstly, a large unexplained component from the earnings fonctions 
predominantly made up of différences in the intercept terms, although differing returns to 
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expérience are also important in this year. Secondly, the large narrowing effect of the 
selectivity term reflecting the lower male réservation wage. 
Table 5.13 Selectivity Corrected Earnings Functions: UK 1991 
Variatile Mean 
Male 
Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Female 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 2.163" 35.8 1.461" 29.4 
Experience 19.981 0.015" 4.8 20.944 0.010* 3.1 
Experience2 543.8 -0 .0001" -1.0 591.2 -0.0001 -1.9 
Education 1 0.183 0.014 0.5 0.205 -0.099** -3.4 
Educa ti on 3 0.157 0.123" 4.7 0.103 0.113" 3.6 
Education 4 0.413 0 .261" 11.7 0.343 0.284" 12.4 
Part-time 0.020 0.118 1.9 0.377 -0.070" -3.3 
Public Sector 0.201 0.007 0.2 0.381 0.240" 7.9 
Large Firm 0.220 0.039" 1.7 0.158 0.007 0.3 
Small Firm 0.391 -0.094" -4.8 0.524 -0.144** -7.0 
Married 0.665 -0.093" -4.1 0.642 0.019 0.9 
Agriculture 0.016 -0.259" -3.7 0.005 -0.328" -2.6 
Mining 0.020 0 .161" 2.6 0.004 0.186* 1.3 
Utilities 0.026 0.130" 2.4 0.006 0.325" 2.8 
Construction 0.061 -0.019 -0.5 0.006 0.048 0.4 
Services 0.133 -0.097" -3.4 0.202 -0.094" -3.1 
Transport 0.094 -0.060 -1.9 0.028 0.059 1.0 
Finance 0.109 0.170" 5.6 0.127 0.244" 7.2 
Community 0.195 0.007 0.2 0.467 -0.116" -3.2 
Insider 0.359 -0.003 -0.1 0.279 0.002 0.1 
Outsider 0.357 -0.110" -5.2 0.408 -0 .121" -5.7 
X 0.580 -1.227" -20.3 0.599 -0.333" -9.0 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 1.714 1.393 
Standard Dev. 0.515 0.497 
Observations 2149 2153 
R-squared 0.441 0.340 
RSS 318.5 350.6 
Log-Like -997.8 -1101.2 
** and * représente significance al the 5% and \Wa levels respectively. 
# reported t-ratios are based upon While's heleroscedastic consistent standard errors. 
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Table 5 1 4 Décomposition of Wage Differentials with Selectivity Correction. 
UK 1991 
Estimâtes of average lambdas and associated coefficients, 





























For ease of comparison the décomposition results for both years are summarised together 
in Table 5.15. Over the period considered the differential narrows by 5.9 percentage 
points, this being consistent with Kingsmill (2003), who reports from cross-sectional data 
a narrowing of 5 percentage points during the 1990's. The very strong narrowing of the 
wage gap in the UK is mainly due to two factors, the results show that the overall 
narrowing of 0.077 log points is actually exceeded by improvements solely within the 
factors determining earnings, there is actually a slight worsening in the factors 
influencing participation. Closer inspection of the décomposition reveals that more 
équitable returns to éducation and a more favourable age/experience distribution for 
women in employment as the major déterminants of the improvements in the unexplained 
and explained differentials respectively. 
Table 5.15 UK Sample Sélection Décomposition Summarv 
1991 1997 Différence 
(xm-x,yßm -0.12 -0.072 0.060 
Xf'iß.-ßf) 0.846 0.802 0.044 
0.015 0.036 -0.021 
0.008 0.022 -0.014 
-0.536 -0.544 0.008 
Wage Gap 0.321 0.248 0.077 
Finally, in order to highlight the impact of any changes within the wage distributions the 
Juhn et al (1991) inter-temporal décomposition is applied, this being summarised in Table 
5.16, the full set of results are in Appendix 5.12. 
Table 5.16 UK Juhn et al Décomposition Summarv 
Year Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Total 
(SZj-SZk)ßt Ôytj ((Jj - an) 
1991/97 -0.003 0.029 0.047 0.004 0.077 
(-0.2%) (2.2%) (3.6%) (0.3%) (5.9%) 
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Remembering that the terms can be combined into the endowment effects (term 1 + term 
3) and the wage structure effects (term 2 + term 4) (Kidd and Shannon 2001), thèse reveal 
that the narrowing is due to a strong endowment effect, (-0.003 + 0.047 = 0.044). With 
this revealing women closìng the gap in terms of unobserved characteristics but there has 
been a marginal worsening in observed characteristics. The wage structure effects, terms 
2 and 4, are both positive, (0.029 + 0.004 = 0.033), hence unlike the 1980's there is no 
évidence of rising inequality. This concurs with Prasad (2002) who found that UK wage 
inequality has been fairly steady since the early 1990's. Thus UK women have continued 
in then 1990's, as they did in the 1980's, to close the skills gap (Blau and Kahn 1996), 
however they are no longer ' swimming upstream' against the tide of rising inequality. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to use décomposition analysis as a tool to explore the gender wage 
gaps in the UK and Germany. This analysis was used to indicate the extent of 
discrimination in both countries, as well as highlighting what is revealed by cross-country 
and inter-temporal comparisons. In all cases a clear majority of the wage gap was shown 
to be unexplained by the chosen variables. Whilst accepting the difficulties of estimating 
discrimination with any précision using décomposition techniques, it does at least suggest 
that gender wage discrimination is still présent in both countries. 
In terms of the broader investigation of the wage gaps the UK differential was shown to 
be largely 'explained' by men having more éducation and the high proportion of women 
139 
working part-time. Whilst being predominantly 'unexplained' by differential returns to 
expérience, marriage as well as an unfavourable occupational ségrégation. In Germany 
the 'explained' component was dominated by higher temale employment rates in the low 
paying East, with the 'unexplained' term being mainly due to differential returns to 
marriage. 
By the end of the period studied the UK gender gap was marginally narrower than 
Germany's. It was anticipated that the UK gap would be wider and this was indeed the 
case initially. The eventual smaller UK differential was entirely due to a narrower UK 
skills gap, this being offset by higher levels of inequality in the UK. The inter-temporal 
analysis revealed that the UK narrowed the wage gap very strongly during the 1990's. 
Changes in selectivity were shown to have a major positive effect upon the gender 
differential and in the UK this was compounded by a narrowing of the skills gap and a 
halt to rising wage inequality. 
From both the cross-country and inter-temporal analysis it is clear that once comparisons 
are being made across countries or time the issue of selectivity takes on heightened 
significance. In cross-sectional studies the issue is merely one of removing possible 
sample sélection bias. However, in comparative studies selectivity différences raise 
important issues, such as why is the employed sample more (or less) représentative of the 
overall population in one period than another? With the resolution of such issues leading 
to a much clearer understanding of the gender wage gap and its causes. 
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In this analysis the impact of sample sélection has a massive efïect upon the gender wage 
gap in both countries. Common features being that those in employment tend to be below 
average compared to the overall population in terms of their labour supply characteristics. 
Also for those with lower levels of labour market skills réservation wages tend to be 
relatively low. It is shown in both the UK and Germany that this last feature is more 
pronounced for the men leading to a strong narrowing effect upon the gender wage gap. 
This resulting from low skilled women being more likely to remain outside of 
employment and low skilled men being more likely to accept relatively poorly paying job 
offers. 
Given that différences in sample sélection have been shown here to be crucial to the size 
of the gender wage gap. It is not unreasonable to assume that any changes to the 
characteristics of those employed in comparison to the overall population and/or changes 
to the relationship between labour supply characteristics and the réservation wage are 
likely to lead to movements in the gender wage gap. It has already been highlighted that 
this has been largely ignored within the literature, consequently the following chapter will 
explore this issue in detail to reveal the driving forces behind thèse selectivity changes. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In situations where there has been a narrowing of the gender wage gap it is commonplace 
to explain this in terms of either an improvement in women 's relative endowment of the 
factors determining wages, i.e. skills etc., or else more équitable returns from thèse 
factors. The inter-temporal analysis of the previous chapter highlights an extra dimension 
to this in that it reveals changes in sample sélection as another possibly important 
component. Within cross-sectional analysis sample sélection merely represents a 
potential source of bias and requires the necessary adjustment to remove that bias. 
However within an inter-temporal framework changes to the population of employed 
people can obviously have an impact upon the gender wage gap. 
Between two points in time if women in gênerai attain a better endowment of the factors 
determining employment, or become more successful in translating those factors into 
higher wages, or there is a réduction in residual inequality, there will be a narrowing of 
the gender wage gap. With this improvement being revealed, in décomposition analysis, 
through changes to the selectivity term. Admittedly this is not too dissimilar to saying 
that women's skill endowments or their returns from thèse endowments have improved. 
However, what is significantly différent, is that by making use of panel data it is possible 
to separate any wage differential change into the contribution from those women in 
employment throughout the period considered and those who found employment after 
that date. With this being of critical importance for policy makers since if the former are 
shown to be the main source of the wage gap narrowing, this would imply that policies 
promoting female participation would be the most likely to have a positive effect upon 
the gender differential. Whilst if it is the latter this would pinpoint female human capital 
accumulation prior to joining, or rejoining, the labour market as the most fruitful policy 
target. Consequently the purpose of this chapter is to develop a clearer understanding of 
the inter-temporal wage gap changes highlighted in Chapter 5. This being done by 
focusing separately upon the impact of women who were already in employment at the 
start of the analysis in 1991 compared to those finding employment at a later date. 
If changes within the employed population are going to raise the mean female wage 
relative to the men's it implies that either the characteristics of those women employed 
has moved further up the distribution of characteristics for the whole population. Or else 
for a given endowment of characteristics, women have become more successful in 
translating thèse into higher earnings. 
The population of people in employment is a stock and flow concept with, over any 
period, some people remaining employed for the entire period, others leaving and some 
people finding a job. This allows any sample sélection changes, revealed through an 
inter-temporal décomposition, to be separated into 4 possibilities. It has occurred either 
because those women who have remained in employment have improved their 
endowment of productive characteristics relative to those men also remaining in 
employment, or they have received more équitable treatment for their characteristics. 
Alternatively those women moving into jobs may be relatively higher skilled than those 
moving out, or again they may simply be receiving fairer treatment. In any inter-temporal 
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analysis this séparation is important since problems in each of the four areas require a 
différent policy response. For example if there is a gender skills gap amongst those 
entering employment that would raise issues relating to educational provision, if there 
was inéquitable treatment of those new entrants that would point to the recruitment 
processes. Whilst the same features within those continuing in employment would flag up 
access to on the job training and promotion respectively. 
Since cross-sectional data would use completely separate samples in each period this type 
of approach would be impossible. As a resuit this chapter makes use of the panel 
structure of the data to separate those in employment into thèse two identifiable groups, 
then carries out analysis of their impact upon the gender wage gap independently. This is 
done by exploring earnings mobility for those remaining in employment and by using 
décomposition of earnings fonctions for the rest. With the results highlighting the relative 
importance of each of the four factors outlined above to gender wage gap changes. 
6.2 Backgroung to Earnings Mobility 
As earnings mobility differs from the analysis undertaken so far it is important to 
establish in advance the factors likely to influence it. Clearly the rate at which women, 
compared to men, move up (and down) the earnings distribution will have a significant 
impact upon inter-temporal wage gap changes. Whilst earnings mobility is not as rieh a 
source within the literature as décomposition analysis, there are a number of key sources 
for the UK and Germany. 
Firstly, in a static analysis Sloaneand Theodossiou (1994) establish that, for the UK, the 
probability of being high paid increases significantly for married men, highly educated 
and those employed in larger establishments. With being a women by far the most 
important factor influencing the probability of appearing in the low paid category. 
Dynamic studies of the UK by Gregory and Elias (1994), and Stewart and Swaffield 
(1998) indicate that education, training, firm size, and, for men only, being under 25 and 
marriage have the most significant impact upon the likelihood of moving out of the low 
pay category. The reverse position of being more likely to remain in low pay is most 
significantly affected by service sector and part-time employment, as well as being 
female. 
Studies of earnings mobility in Germany are far less prevalent, but DiPrete and McManus 
(1996) do identify age and education as the most important explanatory factors. With 
changing jobs also having a positive impact upon mobility. 
The historical empirical evidence points to there being two consistent factors present, 
however the results detailed in the previous chapter suggest that they may not be as 
applicable to more recent times. Firstly past evidence indicated that women would be at a 
disadvantage in terms of earnings mobility when compared to men. In single country 
studies of earnings mobility Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin and Rhody (1996) confirmed this 
for West German women in the 1980's, with Sloane and Theodossiou (1996) revealing 
the same for British women. However, with both countries narrowing the wage gap, as 
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shown in the previous chapter, this may not be the case for this period. Secondly, for a 
range of reasons outlined below, past evidence suggests that the level of this disadvantage 
would be less acute for German women, but again the much stronger narrowing within 
the UK indicates that this may not be the case for the 1990's. 
In their study of OECD countries Keese, et al (1998) found that the low paid tend to be 
the low skilled, under 25's and women. With the exception of the under 25's the incidence 
of people in these groups being low paid is higher in the UK than in Germany. 
Furthermore UK workers are found to be more likely to move down into low pay and less 
likely to move out. Researchers have already established that the gender wage gap has 
generally been narrower in Germany than in the UK, (Brookes 1999, Brookes, Hinks and 
Watson 1999, Blau and Kahn 1992, Callan 1996, Black, Trainor and Spencer 1999). This 
in itself would suggest that female relative mobility has been more favourable in 
Germany, but the large UK narrowing during the period under study, highlighted in the 
previous chapter, means that this is unlikely to be so for this period. 
In addition the level of earnings inequality has been shown to be greater in the UK, 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997), this is important here because, Dickens (2000) detects 
an inverse relationship between earnings inequality and earnings mobility. As inequality 
rises the wage distribution widens and individuals then have to increase (or decrease) 
their wage by a greater amount to move up or down the distribution by the same 
proportion. The overall picture is that UK women have been shown to be in a less 
favourable position than their German counterparts, they also have to increase (or 
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decrease) their earnings by a greater proportion to display the same level of earnings 
mobility because of the greater inequality. 
The remainder of this chapter calculâtes a descriptive measure of individuai earnings 
mobility across the two countries, before estimating the impact of various explanatory 
factors upon the likelihood of upward and downward mobility. Thèse estimâtes are then 
used to establish the level of advantage/disadvantage that women face in each country. 
To a large extent the initial expectations are rejected by the results, so the later sections 
attempt to reconcile the results with the expectations. The focus then switches to the short 
term participants with the results showing that changes within this group have a much 
larger impact upon the gender wage gap, especially in the UK. 
6.3 Method 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a deeper understanding of the factors generating 
an inter-temporal narrowing of the gender wage gap, most specifically those factors 
which had appeared as sample sélection changes in the empirical analysis of the previous 
chapter. In order to facilitate this it is necessary to separate the sample into two groups. 
Firstly those who are in paid employment at the start of the period being studied as well 
as at the end, or long term participants. And secondly, those only observed to be 
employed in one of those years, with this group being referred to as short term 
participants. The analysis then proceeds by focusing intially upon the long term 
participants and then concluding with the short term. 
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The years used in the analysis are 1991-1996 inclusive for both countries. This difïers 
from the period studied in the last chapter as it is crucial to make comparisons using the 
sanie period because mobility is likely to rise over time. Using this data the chapter 
begins by considering the long term participants, analysing gender mobility in the UK 
and Germany and making a comparative analysis. 
To get a measure of mobility we follow Fabig (1998) and compute a relative earnings 
position for each individuai by dividing hourly earnings for that person by the population 
mean. The distribution of earnings is then calibrated into décile groups and individuala 
are assigned to their relevant group in each year. Relative mobility is then measured by 
the extent of movement over the decite groups. This can be formalised through the 
calculation of a Batholomex Index (Batholomew 1973). A matrix is constructed showing 
each individuals décile ranking in years / and j , and the conditional probabilities of 
being in each décile group in the subséquent year given that the individuai was in a 
particular group in the previous year are calculated. The values outside of the main 
diagonal of this transition matrix are then weighted by the probability of being in that 
décile group in the initial period, the sum of thèse estimâtes gives the Bartholemew 
Index. 3 
Adopting the notation used by Fabig (1998) gives; 
See Bartholomew 1973 and Boudon 1973 for fuller coverage of the index and transition mairi ces respectively. 
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^ = 1 I P,PÌJ\'-J I 
»=l J=\ 
where p i is the probability of being in décile group i in the first year and 
PJ- is the probability of being in décile group j in the later yeargiven the initial year 
décile group i. The greater the level of mobility the lower will be the values along the 
main diagonal and the greater the value of the index. In the extrême case where there is 
no mobility BI=0. Overall earnings mobility is made up of both upward and downward 
movements, therefore it is important to separate the two since they have the opposite 
effect upon the mean wage. Fabig (1998) indicates how this can be done by producing 
two truncated indices, this merely requires splitting the initial index into the section 
above the leading diagonal and the section below. Thus allowing for upward mobility and 
downward mobility to be measured separately. 
Ordered probit models are estimated for both countries to estimate the impact of the key 
explanatory factors, highlighted in the previous section, upon earnings mobility. The 
dépendent variable takes on a value of 0 if the individuai is in a lower décile group in 
1996 than in 1991, 1 for the same group and 2 for a higher group. Since the values of the 
dépendent variable have a clear ranking an ordered probit technique is adopted. (Greene 
2000). 
The model is estimated from the équation; y* = p\x + e , y* is unobserved but we do 
observe; 
y = 0 if y* < 0 , y = 1 if 0 < y* < and y = 2 if p} < y* < p2 
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The ju's are unknown parameters to be estimated with p. The probabilities of the three 
outcomes are; ?vob(y = 0) = 1 -<f>(pfx) 
?rob(y = \) = ^ - P x ) - ^ x ) 
?roh(y = 2) = 1 - <f>(nl - p'x) 0 is the standardised 
normal distribution. From these probabilities the marginal effects of changes in the 
regressors are; Marginal Effect (0) = -<f>(p'x)p 
Marginal Effect (1) = [<f>(~P'x) ~<KVi ~P'X)]P 
Marginal Effect (2) - P'x)p. (Greene 2000). 
In addition, to allow cross-country comparisons to be made, the restriction that the female 
coefficients are equal to the male coefficients is imposed upon the female equations. The 
3 probabilities are then re-calculated to show the differences in the likelihood of upward 
and downward mobility for equally endowed men and women. This reveals a percentile 
mobility advantage/disadvantage for women in one country which can be directly 
compared with the same estimate from another country. 
Finally, in order to facilitate analysis of the impact of those workers whose earnings 
mobility cannot be calculated, i.e. those in employment in 1991 but not in 1996 and vice 
versa, the focus switches to the short term participants. As earnings mobility cannot be 
established for this group decomposition analysis is applied. The same technique is used 
as in the previous chapter, where earnings functions are estimated separately for each 
gender in both of the relevant years, then any changes in the gender wage gap are 
decomposed inter-temporally using the Juhn et al (1991) method. 
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6.4 Chosen Variables : Ordered Probit Model 
The dépendent variable is created from each individuala décile position in the two chosen 
years, the décile positions are based upon the distribution of the log of gross hourly 
earnings of the combined male and female sample in each year. The following 
explanatory variables are included within the ordered probit model, as those most likely 
to explain an individuals earnings mobility over time: 
Age I, 2, 3 and 4. Différent âge catégories of 16-24, 25-34, 35-49 and 50+ 
respectively. Seeks to map the age-earnings profile and pick up the effects of 
upward mobility in the early parts of the working life and the likely downward 
mobility in the later stages. Age 3 is used as the base group. 
Education 1,2,3 and 4. Dummy variables for the highest level of 
éducation obtained, being, primary level, second level - first stage, second level -
second stage and third level respectively. Education 2 is used as the base group in 
each case. These seek to highlight the impact of éducation upon the trajectory of 
the earnings profile. More éducation indicates a higher skill level upon entry into 
the labour market, i.e. a higher starting salary, this could in itself limit the scope • 
for future upward mobility. However it could also indicate a higher propensity to 
acquire human capital throughout their working life, hence making the age-
earnings profile steeper for those with higher levels of éducation. 
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Part-time. A dummy variable to identify those working less than 30 hours per 
week. For part-timers it is likely that they will not be able to acquire human 
capital at the same rate as full-timers, consequently they will be more likely to slip 
down the earnings distribution over time. 
Health. Identifies those reporting to be in poor health at the time of the 
survey. Highlighting any adverse effects upon their work performance. 
East Germany. Dummy variable for those living in East Germany. It is 
likely that as the two économies integrate over time, factors such as, collective 
bargaining agreements spreading to include employées in the former East German 
state, will have a positive impact upon earnings mobility for thèse workers. 
One of the problems with dynamic analysis of this type is the potential for individuals to 
change their state during the period being considered, this is covered in détail by Stewart 
and Swaffield (1998). Relating it to this situation, the above variables identify the various 
states at the outset which are most likely to have an impact upon upward or downward 
mobility, however how can, for example, a part-timer finding full-time employment be 
taken account of? Consequently the following variables are included to pick up the 
effects of any changes to the individuala state over the time period. 
Unemployed. This dummy variable identifies any workers from the 1991 
survey who expérience a speli of unemployment, before returning to paid 
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employaient at some point prior to the 1996 survey. Mincer and Ofek (1983) 
identify the relationship between unemployment and earnings mobility, with 
érosion of human capital whilst unemployed increasing the probability of 
returning to work at a wage below the exit wage. Then once back in employment 
there is a rapid repair to the human capital, as old skills are quickly re-learned, 
leading to a sharp wage increase. Consequently, although it is important to control 
for the impact of unemployment, the sign of the estimated coefficient is 
ambìguous depending upon which of the two effects is dominant. 
Part-time - Full-time and Full-time - Part-time. If the relationship between 
time at work and human capital accumulation holds, clearly moving from one 
state to the other will affect the rate at which capital is accumulated, hence 
influencing the probability of upward or downward mobility. 
Health Improves and Health Déclines. Dummy variables identifying those 
that move into or out of the poor health category. 
Job Change. A dummy variable to identify those who change job without 
experiencing a period of unemployment. There are two potentially opposing 
factors at work fiere depending upon whether the individuai has quit or been laid 
off from their originai job. A quit would indicate finding a new, probably more 
lucrative job, whilst a lay off would suggest having to accept a job offer, in many 
cases lower paid, as the existing j o b disappears. 
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East - West. A dummy variable for anyone living in East Germany in 1991 who, 
by 1996, had moved to the Wes t There are no examples of individuals moving 
from West to East, so the reverse dummy could not be constructed. 
Previous Unemployment. Unemployment has a lasting effect upon earnings, 
therefore it is likely that anyone unemployed prior to the start of the study will 
have différent earnings mobility probabilities. Therefore a dummy variable is 
created for anyone experiencing a speli of unemployment in the two years prior to 
1991. However this could not be done for t h e U K since 1991 is the first year 
where the data is available. 
In principle this type of analysis seeks to establish the trajectory of an individuala 
earnings over time and estimate the impact of the various explanatory variables upon that 
trajectory. Fundamentally it assumes that the rate of increase in earnings for a particular 
period is influenced by the rate of increase in previous periods. A potential problem with 
this is that when the analysis begins, in this case a fairly arbitrary date of 1991, 
individuals have already embarked upon a particular trajectory. If earnings mobility is 
influenced by earnings growth in previous periods, what about the periods prior to 1991 ? 
With this data giving us little or no information about that. This 'initial conditions 
problem' can be traced back to Heckman (1981) and more recently Stewart and Swaffield 
(1999) have developed upon this and argued that initial conditions are endogenous, hence 
omitting them from the analysis leads to biased estimâtes. Although it has to be accepted 
that Cappellari (2002) reaches a conflicting conclusion using Italian data. The important 
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thing being here that the relatively limited attempts to control for initial conditions could 
possibly lead to biased estimâtes. This indicates that any gender différences in earnings 
mobility may simply reflect individuals being already linked to particular trajectories 
prior to the commencement of the analysis. Hence, with the limited amount of adjustment 
for the initial conditions, the résultant findings need to bc tempered accordingly. 
In addition to the above variables, Sloane and Theodossiou (1996) show that marriage 
and children have a significant impact upon upward and downward mobility respectively, 
so thèse variables were included in the model. However as they were insignifïcant in 
every single case they were therefore omitted for clarity and ease of analysis. 
6.5 Results 
The purpose of this empirical analysis is to isolate the impact of earnings mobility, as 
well as people moving into, and out of, employment upon the gender wage gap. Before 
this can be done it requires firstly, a description of the wage distributions, since thèse are 
the basis for quantifying earnings mobility, and secondly, splitting the samples into their 
short term and long term participants. 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics (Combined) 
Observat ions C o m b i n e d M e a n St. Dev. Ma ie M e a n F e m a l e M e a n F/M Rat io 
Germany 91 4137 2.902 . 0.488 2.962 2.672 0.749 
Germany 96 3247 3.121 0.477 3.187 2.907 0.756 
UK 91 4505 1.57 0.521 1.705 1.385 0.726 
UK96 4599 1.85 0.527 1.877 1.661 0.806 
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The necessary information to carry out the first of these is reproduced in Table 6.1. This 
records, firstly, the overall wage distribution with men and women combined, this is the 
basis upon which each individuate earnings décile ranking is established. Secondly, it 
records the gender means separately and their résultant wage gaps. These concur with the 
findings from the previous chapter, with a smaller narrowing in Germany and a very large 
one in the UK. 
The second stage of the process is to separate the data into the long terni labour market 
participants, i.e. those working in both years and able to be included in the ordered probit 
model, and those who are earning in only one of the two chosen years. 





Observations Mean F/M Ratio 
Long Term 
Germany 91 1451 3.013 930 2.731 0.754 
Germany 96 1451 3.223 930 2.962 0.770 
UK91 1333 1.734 1339 1.415 0.727 
UK96 1333 2.001 1339 1.705 0.744 
Short Term 
Germany 91 997 2.908 759 2.612 0.744 
Germany 96 400 3.061 466 2.794 0.766 
UK 91 934 1.666 899 1.345 0.725 
UK96 926 1.714 1001 1.614 0.905 
Table 6.2 gives the means and the wage gaps for each of the eight différent catégories. 
The most striking result is the large improvement of female short term participants in the 
UK, with a very large narrowing of the wage gap from 27.5% to 9.5%. Germany displays 
a relatively minor change, when compared to the UK, resulting from similar 
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improvements from both the short term and the long term participants, 2.2 and 1.6% 
respectively. In the UK however the significant réduction of the gender wage gap is the 
resuit of factors within the short term group (18%), the narrowing in the long term group 
is of a similar magnitude to their counterparts in Germany (1.7%). This in itself is a 
highly significant fïnding. The analysis from Chapter 5 revealed that sample sélection 
changes were an important component of the wage gap narrowing in the UK. However it 
left a number of questions unanswered as to what the causes of thèse changes might be, 
but thèse results give a clear insight into what those causes actually are.There is a striking 
différence between the men and women in the labour market in 1991 but not in 1996 and 
those reporting earnings in 1996 but not in 1991, or else a différence in the way they are 
treated by the labour market, with this being the basis for most of the sample sélection 
changes. 
Table 6.3. Earnings Mobility Statistics 
Area Group Movers Bartholomew Index Truncated Index Observations 
Germany Men 473 up (32.6%) 0.793 0.369 up 1451 
529 down (36.5%) 0.423 down 
Germany Women 343 up (36.9%) 0.817 0.433 up 933 
313 down (33.6%) 0.385 down 
UK Men 452 up (33.9%) 0.812 0.361 up 1333 
533 down (40.0%) 0.451 down 
UK Women 480 up (35.8%) 0.821 0.416 up 1339 
494 down (36.9%) 0.405 down 
Thèse results also indicate that the long term participants played a relatively minor rôle in 
the narrowing of the gender differential, this once again questions whether promoting 
female participation will necessarily have much of an impact upon the wage gap. 
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Consequently the empirical analysis will focus initially upon the long terni participants 
before returning to the short terni participants later. 
In order to establish the extent of earnings mobility within the long term group transition 
matrices are calculated for each gender in both countries, thèse matrices are reproduced 
for référence in Appendices 6.1 - 6.4. The resulting Bartholomew indices and the raw 
movement numbers are given in Table 6.3 above. This indicates both countries are fairly 
similar in terms of the amount of mobility with similar movement numbers, the 
Bartholomew indices show maie and female overall mobility of similar magnitude in 
both countries. However once upward and downward mobility is separated, the 
proportions show thaï women are more likely to move up the earnings distribution and 
less likely to move down, a finding which is supported by the truncated indices in both 
countries. This reveals that in both countries over this period women displayed more 
favourable levels of earnings mobility which is likely to have a positive impact upon the 
gender wage gap. However it is important to understand the key factors behind any 
gender différences in earnings mobility, i.e. to what extent does it reflect the relative 
endowments of those factors determining mobility and to what extent does it reflect the 
returns from those factors. Consequently quantitative models seeking to estimate the 
likelihood of individuala moving up or down the earnings distribution are applied. 
For both countries ordered probit models of earnings mobility are estimated for men and 
women seperately, with Table 6.4 recording the estimâtes for Germany. With 
longitudinal analysis of this type there is always the possibility of sample sélection bias, 
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(see Asplund, Sloane and Theodossiou 1998 p.8.), consequently the Heckman 2 step 
procédure (Heckman 1979) has been applied. However for Germany the résultant inverse 
Mills ratio is insignificant for both genders. Suggesting that, at least in terms of earnings 
mobility, the observed sample is représentative of the overall population. 
The coefficients in Table 6.4 reveal that for men earnings mobility follows the age-
earnings profile very closely, with strong upward mobility from the younger workers and 
downward mobility from those workers over 50. The female équation follows a fairly 
similar pattern, except that their coefficient on the late 20's early 30's dummy is 
insignificant, reflecting the greater likelihood of this group taking on child care 
responsibilities. Outside of âge there are very few of the explanatory variables which 
reach significance, éducation has a positive impact upon earnings mobility but only at the 
highest level, those whose health became poor were adversely affected and East Germans 
experienced very strong upward mobility, presumably as the coverage of collective 
bargaining agreements extended into the former communist state. 
Hunt (1997) suggests that two of the résultant features of the re-unification have been a 
sharp increase in unemployment rates in the East combined with a rise in the earnings of 
those managing to retain employment. As clearly this sample only includes those East 
Germans in the latter group it is to be expected that for those individuals there would 
have been positive and significant earnings mobility. This positive effect is significantly 
greater for women, since the female coefficient is higher than the men's. Again Hunt 
(1997) reveals the cause of this with the growth of East German unemployment not 
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affecting men and women in the same fashion. For women becoming unemployed it has 
disprortionately been those with lower levels of skill, whilst for the men it has tended to 
be predominantly manual workers with considerably higher levels of skill. The outcome 
being that for those women in employment their average skill level and scope for 
earnings mobility has increased, but for men in employment they have decreased relative 
to the women 
Table 6.4. 
Ordered Probit Results: 
Germany 
Male Female 
Variable Coeff. t-ratio Mean Coeff. t-ratio Mean 
Constant 0.10 1.02 1.00 0.17 1.56 1.00 
Age 16-24 0 .30" 2.73 0.09 0 .45" 3.40 0.11 
Age 25-34 0 .34" 4.77 0.31 0.13 1.43 0.30 
Age 50+ - 0 . 3 3 " -3.39 0.13 -0.20* -1.57 0.11 
Education 1 -0.05 -0.27 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.05 
Education 3 0:11 1.04 0.66 0.12 1.12 0.62 
Education 4 0 .37" 3.12 0.19 0 .50" 3.37 0.14 
Part-time -0.09 -0.27 0.01 -0.10 -1.08 0.29 
Health -0.25 -0.94 0.04 0.36 1.48 0.07 
Unemployed -0.14 -1.01 0.05 -0 .37" -2.40 0.07 
Part-time - Full-time -0.82 -1.39 0.004 -0.19 -1.14 0.07 
Full-time - Part-time 0.11 0.33 0.01 -0.10 -0.63 0.07 
Health Improves 0.49 1.55 0.03 -0.11 -0.36 0.04 
Health Declines - 0 . 4 3 " -3.37 0.06 -0.32* -1.91 0.05 
East - West 6.53 0.00 0.001 -0.30 -0.45 0.003 
Job Change -0.05 -0.50 0.10 0.22* 1.78 0.11 
Previous Unemployment -0.33* -1.60 0.02 0 . 4 1 " 2.11 0.04 
East Germany 0 .80" 7.98 0.13 1.00" 7.55 0.14 
Lambda -0.20 -1.04 1.01 -0.22 -1.01 1.25 
V 0.84 0.83 
Obs. 1451 930 
Chi sq.(17) 159.6 143.8 
Iterations 17 16 
Log Like. -1510.7 -945.1 
Rest.Log Like. -1590.5 -1017.1 
* and *• denotes significunce at ihe 1 0 % and 5% levels respectively. 
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The earnings mobility of those returning after unemployment is interesting since the 
unemployed variable is insignifiant for men but négative and significant for women. 
Whilst for those unemployed prior to 1991 it is significant in both cases, but positive for 
women and négative for men. The overall implication being that although unemployment 
has a smaller impact on earnings mobility initially for men, the effect is longer lasting, 





Variable Coeff. t-ratio Mean Coeff. t-ratio Mean 
Constant 0 .67" 2.71 1.00 -0.003 0.21 1.00 
Age 16-24 0 .96" 8.75 0.001 0 . 5 0 " 4.11 0.01 
Age 25-34 0 .19" 2.50 0.11 0.07 0.91 0.13 
Age 50+ -0.07 -0.47 0.19 -0.33** -2.36 0.17 
Education 1 0.80 0.78 0.14 0.24 0.57 0.13 
Education 3 -0.10 -0.93 0.34 0.06 0.59 0.29 
Education 4 -0.02 -0.16 0.10 0 . 2 4 " 2.56 0.10 
Part-time -0.30 -0.69 0.02 - 0 . 2 1 " -2.67 0.37 
Health -0.83* -1.88 0.03 0.20 0.52 0.05 
Unemployed -0 .60" -4.35 0.07 - 0 . 5 3 " -3.16 0.04 
Part-time - Full-time -0.09 -0.17 0.01 0.17 1.43 0.09 
Full-time - Part-time 0.33 1.43 0.02 -0.04 -0.36 0.10 
Job Change -0 .20" -2.90 0.32 - 0 . 3 0 " -4.29 0.30 
Health Improves 0.76 1.56 0.02 -0.29 -0.70 0.04 
Health Déclines -0.20 -1.00 0.03 0.07 0.42 0.04 
Lambda -0 .47" -1.98 0.98 0 . 4 3 " 1.97 1.00 
0.70 0.72 
Obs. 1333 1339 
Chi sq.(15) 122.2 87.9 
Itérations 15 15 
Log Like. -1382.1 -1414.6 
Rest.Log Like. -1443.2 1458.6 
* and ** dénotes significance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
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Table 6.5, above, reproduces the ordered probit results for the UK, in this case the inverse 
Mills ratio variables from the Heckman procedure are significant. Once again earnings 
mobility follows the age-earnings profile fairly closely, although for men it is fiat after 
the mid-30's peak with no significant évidence of downward mobility for the over 50's. 
For women, as was the case in Germany, there is no significant mobility for those women 
in their late 20's and early 30's. Education has no effect at ali upon earnings mobility for 
men and only has a significant impact at the highest level for women. 
The lower capital accumulation of part-timers has the expected negative impact for 
women. The effects of unemployment are more universal than in Germany, with both 
men and women having their likely return to work earnings lowered by a similar 
magnitude. The impact of changing jobs is also fairly universal, in both cases the 
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that lay offs rather than quits are the 
more likely dominant cause of job change. Finally, looking at the IMR variable, it is 
significant in both cases, but positive for women and negative for men. This indicates that 
better qualified women, in terms of the factors explaining participation, are actually less 
likely to move up the earnings distribution. Possibly suggesting that for thèse women it is 
relatively easy to find employaient, but they have much greater difficultés in obtaining 
subséquent significant pay increases. 
Now, if the restriction that the female coefficients are equal to the male ones is imposed, 
the parameters can be re-estimated and values can be assigned to the extent of female 
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mobility advantage/disadvantage in each case. In essence it simply estimâtes the 
différence between women's mobility performance over the period and how they would 
have performed if they received the same treatment as the men. 
Table 6.6. Ordered Probit: Key Parameters 
Germany 
ß'x Prob. (y=0) Prob. (y=2) Prob. 
\-<t>(ß'x)- l-<t>(ß-ß'x) Advantage 
Male 0.838 0.391 34.8% 32.6% 
Female 0.827 0.485 31.8% 36.7% 7.1% 
Imposed Female 0.838 0.331 37.1% 30.5% -4.4% 
UK 
ß'x Prob. (y=0) Prob. (y=2) Prob. 
\-®(n-ß'x) Advantage 
Male 0.701 0.267 39.4% 33.4% 
Female 0.721 0.35 36.3% 35.6% 5.3% 
Imposed Female 0.701 0.165 43.4% 29.5% -7.9% 
Table 6.6, above, summarises the key parameters from the ordered probit estimâtes. The 
first row reveals the German model prédiction that 34.8% of the men will move down the 
distribution and 32.6% will move up, this compares with 31.8% down and 36.7% up for 
the women. As a rough guide we can take this as a 7 .1% mobility advantage for women, 
since they are 3 % less likely to move down and 4 . 1 % more likely to move up. Obviously 
this results from a combination of differential treatment, revealed through the estimated 
coefficients, plus différent endowments of the explanatory factors, which can be 
described as an endowment effect. Imposing the maie coefficients upon the female 
équation removes any differential treatment, with the results of this appearing in the final 
row of Table 6.6, consequently any remaining gender différences can be assigned to the 
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endowment effect. Applying this to German women moves both of the parameters 
rightward, suggesting that they are more likely to move down and less likely to move up, 
the parameters actually move beyond the male ones to 37 .1% down and 30.5% up. This 
implies that the women actually have a poorer endowment of the explanatory factors 
since the model predicts that they should perform less well than the men in terms of 
mobility. Based on their endowments alone, and assuming equal treatment, comparing 
the first and third rows of Table 6.6 shows that they would be 2 .3% more likely to move 
down and 2 .1% less likely to move up. The fact that they perform better must ali result 
from more favourable mobility returns from these explanatory factors. Although it must 
be accepted that the inability of the data to pick up any additional training during the 
period masks an important potential cause. Closer inspection of the coefficients, see 
Table 6.4, reveals that the most important factor is stronger mobility from the East 
German women, so although the process of integration is raising wages in East Germany 
generally, it is clearly happening at a faster rate for the women. With this resulting, as 
outlined earlier, from the changing relative skill levels of the men and women in 
employment. 
The results from carrying out the same process for the UK are in the bottom section of 
Tablè 6.6, with these revealing a similar pattern within the UK, women have a probability 
advantage of 5.3%, (3 .1% less likely to move down and 2.2% more likely to move up). 
Imposing the male coefficients upon the female équation predicts that women would have 
significantly poorer earnings mobility. Consequently ali of this probability advantage is 
due to differential treatment, since as with Germany they have a poorer endowment of the 
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explanatory factors. Analysing the estimated coefficients shows that by far the most 
significant factor is the behaviour of the 1MR variable, this concurs with the findings 
from the previous chapter, confirming for the UK that the relationship between the error 
terms from the participation probit and the estimated model play an important role in 
gender wage gap movements. The interpretation in this case is that women predicted not 
to participate who actually do arc more likely to move up the earnings distribution, and 
men in the same category are more likely to move down. 
In an attempt to quantify the impact of this stronger female mobility upon the gender 
wage gap, Table 6.2 shows that for long term participants the gender wage gap narrowed 
by 1.6% and 1.7% for Germany and the UK respectively. Consequently it is fair to 
conclude that even when one gender has a clear advantage in terms of earnings mobility, 
it only has a relatively minor impact upon the gender wage gap over this type of period. 
Finally it needs to be established how these results can be reconciled with previous 
estimates, as they are clearly at odds with expectations. For example Burkhauser et al 
(1996) find a mobility disadvantage for West German women in the 1980's, identifying 
random permanent yearly earnings shocks for men and more transitory shocks for 
women. Clearly with the case of Germany it is quite likely that the re-integration of the 
East German economy has had a major impact upon these results. It appears that the very 
strong mobility shown by East German women has been the key to their mobility 
exceeding that of the men. One would expect that as integration progresses the relative 
performances both across the genders and across the whole country will become more 
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similar. Furthermore, a large proportion of the strong female mobility in East Germany 
has been caused by public sector wage growth, since a significant majority of East 
German women in the sample are public employées. This can be attributed to public 
sector pay in the East being brought in line with the West. Clearly when this process is 
completed the two differing levels of mobility will converge. 
Similarly for the UK, the results are obviously at odds with the previous study by Sloane 
and Theodossiou (1996), who fïnd a clear probability advantage for men both in terms of 
moving out of low pay and in terms of dropping into it. However Dickens (2000) did find 
marginally higher levels of female mobility in the 1990's. Consequently it may well be 
that improvements in female earnings mobility are simply one of a number of factors 
enabling the wage gap to narrow so strongly over this period. 
The overall picture in terms of earnings mobility may in fact reflect changes in the 
structural composition of the UK labour market over the period considered. The principio 
of polarisation within modem labour markets where skill-based technical change is taking 
place and improving the position of skilled workers, whilst worsening the position of 
unskilled workers, is well documented within the literature, (see Katz and Autor 1999 for 
a detailed review). However more récent research suggests that this is too simplistic and 
the relationship between technical change and labour skill is more nuanced than this. 
Autor et al (2003) argue that for routine tasks technology can replace human labour 
irrespective of the skill level, but it cannot replace labour in non-routine tasks even if they 
are relatively low skill tasks. The conséquence being that relative demand for labour will 
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fall in routine tasks as technology supplants labour, but it will increase in non-routine 
tasks. As a resuit the scope for earnings mobility is likely to be higher amongst those 
workers performing non-routine tasks. Goos and Manning (2003) explore this 
relationship at length for the Uk labour market and find that some of the jobs most likely 
to be 'female jobs ' such as care assistants, hospital ward assistants, nursery nurses and 
flight attendants arc the oncs displaying some of the highest growth levels. Whilst some 
traditional 'maie jobs ' such as coal mining, machine setter-operators and labourers in 
engineering and foundries are the ones showing the largest décline. Hencc if the impact 
of this technical change effects women more favourably than men over this period it can 
plausibly explain the greater female eamings mobility. 
The detailed analysis so far has focused entirely upon the long term participants within 
the sample, however as Table 6.2 reveals the short term participants play at least as 
important a rôle in wage gap changes. Table 6.7, below reports the gender means and 
gender wage ratios from the combincd and separated samples. There is a narrowing of the 
gender wage gap in both countries, a very large one in the UK. and a much smaller one in 
Germany, in each case the narrowing from the short term participants exceeds that of the 
long term participants. For any narrowing of the gender wage gap for thèse short term 
participants to take place, the women in this group in 1996 must be either more 
favourably endowed with productive characteristics, compared to the men, than their 
counterparts in 1991. Or else they must be more favourably treated within the labour 
market. The following analysis seeks to estimate the impact of each by applying the same 
technique as used in the previous chapter. Firstly estimating earnings fonctions seperately 
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by gender in each of the years, then decomposing inter-temporally to reveal changes in 
the relative endowments of productive characteristics as well as inequality. 






Observations Mean St. Dev. 
2448 2.962 0.474 
1451 3.013 0.455 
997 2.908 0.497 
Female 
Observations Mean St. Dev. 
1689 2.672 0.506 
930 2.731 0.488 










Observations Mean St. Dev. 
1851 3.187 0.464 
1451 3.223 0.439 
400 3.061 0.523 
Female 
Observations Mean St. Dev. 
1396 2.907 0.517 
930 2.962 0.5 










Observations Mean St. Dev. 
2267 1.705 0.523 
1333 1.734 0.502 
934 1.666 0.549 
Female 
Observations Mean St. Dev. 
2238 1.385 0.498 
1339 1.415 0.483 










Observations Mean St. Dev. 
2259 1.877 0.554 
1333 2.001 0.508 
926 1.714 0.569 
Female 
Observations Mean St. Dev. 
2340 1.661 0.543 
1339 1.705 0.502 





Table 6.8, below, summarises the results from carrying out this process for Germany, the 
narrowing of the differential by 2.2 percentage points is the outcome of two conflicting 
factors. Remembcring from the previous chapter that terms 1 and 3 are the effects of 
observed and unobserved characteristics respectively and that terms 2 and 4 are the 
impact of wage and residual inequality. There is very clear évidence of a narrowing of the 
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skills gap, particularly unobserved characteristics, since both terms 1 and 3 had a positive 
effect upon the wage gap. However there is also clear évidence of rising inequality with 
terms 2 and 4 being négative. Therefore the 'swimming upstream against the tide of 
rising inequality' (Blau and K.ahn 1996) highlighted in the previous chapter is also présent 
for short tenu participants. 
Table 6.8. Décomposition Summary: Germany 1991-1996 
Year Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Total 
(ÔZj-8Zk)Pk (S[f/j - ôy*)o> Ôtf/j (Oi-Ok) 
1991/96 0.029 -0.056 0.089 -0.033 0.029 
(2.2%) (-4.2%) (6.7%) (-2.5%) (2.2%) 
The earnings functions are included in Appendix 6.2 and the full décompositions are in 
Appendix 6.3, closer inspection of thèse reveal that the major factor behind the closing of 
the skills gap is a large shift in the average expérience in each sample. For 1991 the 
average years of expérience are 23.34 for men and 20.82 for women, by 1996 thèse had 
become 14.71 and 16.29 respectively. Obviously as some older workers had left the 
labour market they had been replaced in the sample by younger workers. As this process 
was more marked within the maie sample, by 1996 the expérience profile of the short 
term sample now favoured the women. Interestingly the IMR variable is insignificant in 
ail 4 cases, this is also so for the UK., clearly changes in sample sélection which played 
such an important rôle previously, are not relevant to changes in the gender wage gap for 
thèse short term participants. 
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Table 6.9. Décomposition Summary: UK 1991-1996 
Year Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Total 
{ÖZ^ÖZJß, SZj(ßj-ßk) (öy/j - öy/ijak Ölffj (Oy - tTfc) 
1991/96 0.092 -0.127 0.289 -0.033 0.221 
(7.5%) (-10.3%) (23.5%) (-2.7%) (18.0%) 
Table 6.9, above, summarises the same results for the UK., as already noted there is an 
exceedingly large narrowing of the wage gap for those short term participants of 18 
percentage points. This results from the same two opposing factors as found with the 
German short term participants, although obviously in this case they are far more 
pronounced. These being a very large closing of the skills gap, again predominantly 
unobserved characteristics, overall this equated to an improvement of 31 percentage 
points. This being offset to the tune of 13 percentage points by an increase in inequality. 
So although there is no évidence of rising inequality within the cross-sectional sample 
used in Chapter 5 it is clearly a factor within the short term participants. 
Closer inspection of the the earnings functions in Appendix 6.4 and the décompositions 
in Appendix 6.5. reveals that in both years they are dominated by the intercept terms. The 
male intercept is significantly higher in 1991, yet significantly lower in 1996, clearly 
indicating a major change. Différences in the intercept terms are tricky to interpret and 
are generally assumed to result from factors unobserved in the model. However in this 
case as expérience is the only continuous variable it results from pre-entry factors. Over 
the last decade the populär press has made us fully aware of two educational facts, firstly 
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girls now now consistently outperform boys at GCSE level, and secondly for the first 
time in history women make up the majority of undergraduates. Therefore this pre-entry 
change simply relects thèse factors feeding into the labour market. 
Additionally as the change is such a large one, such a graduai change may not be 
sufficient to fully explain it. Consequently a major shift within the labour market needs to 
be identified. By far the most fundamental change to the nature of work during the 1990*s 
was the burgconing use and reliance upon information and communication technology. 
Hence this major réduction in the short-term wage gap may reflect women bringing a 
better mix of ICT skills, with thèse becoming more highly valued by employers over this 
period. Overall this indicates that changes in the gender wage gap are as much to do with 
changes in the relative supply and demand for labour as with any policy initiative. 
Historically the supply relative to demand has been higher in female dominated 
occupations than in maie dominated ones and over time graduai changes to this have 
narrowed the wage differential. This was first highlighted in the UK. by Sloane and 
Theodossiou (1994) who found that the wage gap narrowing following the equal 
opportunities législation of the 1970's was as much to do with changes in the demand for 
labour as it was with the législation. Consequently it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that for any policy designed to narrow the wage gap there is the potential for it to be 
negated by unfavourable supply or demand changes. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to achieve a deeper understanding of the strong narrowing effect 
upon the gender wage gap, found in both the UK and Germany, as a resuit of changes 
revealed through the sample sélection adjustment. This was done by separating the 
employed sample into its long and short-term participants. Then applying an ordered 
probit model to the former and décomposition analysis to the latter. The hypothesis being 
that any inter-temporal wage gap narrowing is due to improvements in the skills and 
treatment of women in the long term group and similar improvements within the short 
term group. With the empirical analysis highlighting which of the four possibilities has 
been the most important. 
The results revealed that for Germany there was a fairly similar improvement from both 
groups. With the 1.6% narrowing from the long-term group having nothing to do with the 
skill mix, but predominantly caused by wage gains made by East German women. 
Unfortunately this was only achieved at the expense of higher unemployment (Hunt 
1997). Whilst within the short term participants there was évidence of a narrowing of the 
skills gap, although this was mainly in areas not observed by the data. 
For the UK the much stronger wage gap narrowing was almost entirely due to the short-
term sample. The very large 18% narrowing was caused by a closing of the skills gap, 
again predominantly unobserved charateristics, but this was partially offset by a rise in 
inequality for this group. However within the long-term sample there was a much more 
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conservative narrowing of 1.8% this is shown, as in Germany, to be nothing to do with 
skill endowments, but results from more favourable returns from these characteristics. 
This feature being dominated by the sample sélection adjustment, suggesting that women 
are improving in their ability to translate those characteristics keeping them in 
employment into higher earnings, implying fairer treatment. So overall the strong wage 
gap narrowing in the UK was caused by an improved skill endowment from those women 
entering the labour market and fairer treatment for the long term participants. With the 
size of the improvement suggesting that both of these factors had been supported by 
favourable changes in labour demand. 
At the outset the importance of this séparation between long and short-term participants 
was shown to be important, since it allowed for wage gap changes to be placed into four 
différent catégories. The crucial factor being that each potential problem required a 
différent policy response. 
For Germany there was some évidence of fairer treatment for the long-term group, there 
was also évidence of a closing of the skills gap, but there was no indication of fairer 
treatment for those entering or re-entering the labour market. This could well suggest that 
a review of sélection procédures may well be in order. 
Similarly, for the UK, there was also évidence of fairer long-term treatment and skill gap 
narrowing. However there was no real indication of unfair treatment for those women in 
the short-term sample, what was more worrying was the rising level of inequality within 
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this group. The importance of wage inequatity to wage differentials is well known (Blau 
and Kahn 1992) and the previous chapter showed that the UK's gender wage gap position 
worsened, compared to Germany, as a resuit of its higher level of inequality. This was 
countered to a certain extent because the same chapter revealed that the differential 
narrowing during the 1990's was aided by static inequality. 
Unfortunately for the UK this may prove to be a short term phenomenon, since the 
increased inequality amongst entrants suggests increasing future inequality across the 
whole population. Consequently the final empirical chapter seeks to highlight the 
importance of inequality to the gender differential and place the UK's position in a much 
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7.1 Introduction 
The issue of wage inequality and its importance to the UK gender wage gap has been a 
recurring thème throughout this thesis. Blau and Kahn (1992) initially highlighted that 
wage inequality is a fundamental component of the gender wage differential with this 
being confirmed by the earlier findings in this thesis. Inequality reflects the wage penalty 
for being below average in the labour market and as women tend to have less éducation, 
less work expérience, as well as being more likely to be employed in low paying 
occupations, it disproportionately affects them. 
This chapter makes use of 11 of the 12 pre-1995 EU members, Germany being excluded 
as the absence of a regional variable prevents the séparation of East and West Germany 
and hence the estimation of meaningful earnings functions. By taking advantage of the 
greater comparability within the ECHP data set it is possible to place the level of UK 
inequality in a much wider context. The analysis takes account of the whole of thc EU, 
highlighting what would happen to the UK gender differential if the wage distribution 
was similar to thèse other countries. 
7.2 Data 
The analysis makes use of wave 3 (1996) of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), a large longitudinal database incorporating 60,500 nationally représentative 
households, approximately 130,000 adults, across the 12 member states in 1994. This 
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data set is particularly attractive, not just because of its panel structure and the large 
number of countries included, but because it is the only example of a cross-country data 
set where the same questionnaire is applied in each country, consequently making cross-
country comparisons far easier and more meaningful. 4 Previously available data sets, 
such as PACO, have taken existing national data sets and as far as possible harmonised 
the variables within those data sets. Clearly using the same variables as the starting point 
is less likely to lead to any data problems. 
7.3 Method 
ln an attempi to achieve consistency with the analysis in Chapter 5, as far as the data 
allows, earnings functions identical to those used previously are estimated separately by 
gender for each of the 11 countries. The variables used are as follows; 
Expérience. A potential expérience term created by subtracting the age 
at which the individual started their working life from their current age. 
Expérience2. The square of the expérience term. 
HED. A dummy variable to identify those with higher level of 
éducation. Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (1SCED) 
codes, it equates to those with a university degree or a vocational qualification of a 
comparable standard. 
SED. Again based on the ISCED coding, a dummy variable for 
those with the second stage of secondary éducation as their highest level of éducation. 
4
 For a complete description of the data the officiai documentation is reproduced in Appendix 7.1 
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These two éducation dummies imply that those with no former éducation beyond the first 
stage of secondary éducation are the base group, which equates to the end of compulsory 
éducation for most countries. 
Public Sector. A dummy variable for those employed in the public 
sector. 
Married. 1 = legally married, 0 = not married. 
Unit >50 but <500. Is for those people employed in medium 
sized firms with between 50 and 500 employées. 
Unit >500. Large firm employées where the firm size is above 
500 employées. This leaves those employed in small firms with less than 50 employées as 
the base group. 
Outsider. A proxy for those workers considered as outsiders in an 
internai labour market, this is judged to be those who have been with their current 
employer for less than 2 years. 
Insider. Dummy variable for those seen as insiders, more than 5 
years with their current employer. The intermediate category of tenure between 2 and 5 
years is the base group. 
The ECHP data set only allows for the broadest of sectoral differentiation, so Agriculture 
and ïndustry are dummies created to identify those sectors, with Services as the base 
group. However, unlike PACO, the ECHP data set includes an occupational variable, so 
dummies are created for the following catégories; 
Manager. Legislators, senior officiais and managers. 
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Professional. Professional occupations. 
Associate Professional. Technicians and associate Professionals. 
Clerks. Clerks. 
Service. Service workers and shop and market sales workers. 
Skilied Agricultural. Skilied agricultural and fishcry workers. 
Crafts. Craft and related trades workers. 
Semi-skilled. Plant and machine Operators and assemblers. 
Unskilled. Elementary occupations. Also used as the base 
group. 
Unfortunately with the ECHP data there is a lack of clarity in the définition of part-time 
employment, consequently the models used in this chapter are for full-timers only. As 
before the dépendent variable is the natural log of the gross hourly wage, in this case, for 
transparency and ease of comparison, the hourly wage has already been converted from 
the national currency into purchasing power parity ECUs. 
Earnings Functions are estimated for men and women separately, using the variables 
outlined above, in each country the most recent available year 1996 is used. From these 
the gender earnings differentials can be estimated, then analysed closely to establish the 
relative importance of the various factors outlined above. To quantify the impact of 
différences in characteristics, treatment and inequality décomposition analysis similar to 
that in Chapter 5 is applied. 
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Firstly a measure of discrimination can then be calculated using the Oaxaca (1973) 
method. Where the earnings functions are; In Wi =Zip + w, with Uj being a 
normally distributed error terni. The differential can then be decomposed into the portion 
explained by the model and its unexplained part, which is generally interpreted as the 
upper limit of discrimination, using the following method: 
lnWm -\nWf= (Zm -Z,)Pm + Z,(Pm -pf ) 
The subscripts m and f are to represent maies and females. The unexplained earnings 
differential (d) is then given by; d = exp(Zf(pm - Pf))-\. 
In order to deal with the possibility of sample sélection bias, covered in détail in Chapter 
4, the Heckman 2-step procedure (Heckman 1979) is applied. A probit model of 
participation is estimated in the followingform; Y* = Z / y +ei where Y;* is a 
latent variable associated with being employed, Z\ is a vector of déterminants of 
employment and y their associated parameters. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is then 
added to the wage équation as an additional explanatory variable. As before âge, âge 2 , 
household income, health, number of children, marriage and éducation are deemed to be 
the most important factors explaining labour market participation. 
To establish the impact of cross-country différences in characteristics and treatment 
décomposition analysis is applied, since the UK is the major focus of the thesis it is used 
as a benchmark for the EU, the décomposition results are then reported for each country 
in comparison to the UK. So the cross-country décomposition becomes; 
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D u k - DI - ( Z m u k — Zfuk)Pmuk " (Zmi — Zf i )pmj 
+ Zfuk(pmuk " Pfuk) " Zf i fpmi - (3fi) 
With D u k being the gender wage gap in the UK and D; being the gender wage gap in the 
comparison country. The first line is then equal to cross-country différences in relative 
productive characteristics and the second line being cross-country différences in the 
relative labour market treatment for women. 
As the major purpose of this chapter is to establish the extent of relative wage inequality 
in the UK, and its impact upon the cross-country wage gaps, the Juhn et al (1991) 
décomposition technique is applied, with once more the UK being used as the base 
country. The décomposition being; 
Dj-Dk =(ÔZj-ÔZk)(5k +ÔZj(PJ-f3k) + (ô¥j-Ô¥k)c7k +SVJÌOJ - c r A ) 
With, as shown in Chapter 5, ternis 2 and 4 being the overall impact of différences in 
inequality. 
7.4 Results 
As a starting point for the discussion of EU wide relative gender wage gaps the key 
results and statistics are recorded and ranked ordinally. Table 7.1 below summarises the 
main results from the earnings functions and their related décompositions, the rankings, 
from highest to lowest for the means and from narrowest to widest when relating to the 
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Table 7.1 Key Indicators 
Maie M e a n 
Ecus p/h 
Female M e a n 
Ecus p/h 
F/M Rat io W a g e G a p 
Ecus p/h 
Expla ined 
% of Total Gap 
Unexpla ined 
Ecus p/h % of Fem. M e a n 
D e n m a r k 7.514(6) 6.028 (4) 0.81 (7=) 1.486 (6) 40.90% (3) 0.88 (2) 14.6% (2) 
Nether lands* 8.345 (3) 6.352 (3) 0.76 (11) 1.993(10) 45.10% (2) 1.09 (6) 17.2% (4) 
Belg ium 8.491 (2) 6.813(2) 0.82 (5=) 1.678 (8) 20.30% (8) 1.34(10) 19.6% (7) 
L u x e m b o u r g * 11.641 (1) 9.378 (1) 0.78 (10) 2 .263(11) 50.90% (1) 1.11(7) 11.8% (1) 
France 7.632 (5) 5.995 (6) 0.81 (7=) 1.637 (7) 21.50% (7) 1.29 (9) 21.4% (8) 
U K 7.969 (4) 6 .013(5) 0.80 (9) 1.956 (9) 25.70% (4) 1.45(11) 24.2% (9) 
1 re land 7.033 (7) 5.812(7) 0.84 (2=) 1.221 (4) 16.70% (9) 1.02(4) 17.5% (5) 
I taly 6.738 (8) 5.385 (8) 0.82 (5=) 1.353 (5) 23.60% (6) 1.03 (5) 19.2% (6) 
G r e e c e 5.305(10) 4 .434(10) 0 .89(1) 0.871 (2) -32.50% (10) 1.15(8) 26% (10) 
Spain 6.292 (9) 5.211 (9) 0.83 (4) 1.081 (3) 23.90% (5) 0.82 (1) 15.8% (3) 
Portuga l * 4.154(11) 3.429 (11) 0.84 (2=) 0 .725(1) •39.00% (11) 1.01 (3) 29.5% (11) 
* For thèse countries where the IMR is significant (Heckman 1979) the final selectivity component is included 
as part of the unexplained terni (Neuman & Oaxaca 1998). 
wage gap, are displayed in brackets. The first two columns show the mean wage by 
country for men and women respectively in ecus per hour. The overall distribution is 
fairly wide with, for both genders, the lowest mean wage being only around l / 3 r d of the 
highest. The two countries concemed are however particularly extrême cases, with the 
female mean wage in the highest paying country, Luxembourg, greater than the mean 
wage for maies in any other country. Plus the male mean wage in Portugal, the lowest 
paying country, lower than the female mean wage in ail other countries. Ignoring thèse 
two outliers gives an overall distribution which is much narrower, with the mean wage in 
Greece, the next lowest payer after Portugal, being around 2/3rds of the mean wage in 
Belgium, the next highest payer after Luxembourg, for both men and women. The 
rankings of countries average wages are largely consistent across gender, with the highest 
three and the lowest three being the same in both cases. There is however a certain 
amount of movement amongst the middle ranking countries, with the most significant 
being Danish female wages which are two places higher than the Danish ranking for the 
average male wage. 
Focusing on the gender wage gap it is expressed in absolute terms through the différence 
in average earnings per hour, and in relative terms through the ratio of the female mean 
wage to the male mean wage. One would expect thèse rankings to be sensitive to the size 
of the mean wage, with a similar absolute wage gap being much smaller in relative terms 
for the higher paying nations. However the rankings are reasonably consistent across the 
two measures, with only Ireland and Belgium changing their position by more than one 
place. It is fairly safe to conclude that the lower paying nations have the smallest wage 
gaps, since the five nations with the lowest mean male wage have the five lowest wage 
gaps, both in absolute and relative terms. The female/male ratios are fairly tightly 
grouped, with the exception of Greece who have a gender wage gap of only 11%, ail of 
the countries lie within 76% and 84% of their maie mean. From the perspective of the UK 
the relative size of the gender wage gap is consistent with previous estimâtes. Kingsmill 
(2003) and Barth et al (2002) report différences in the mean wages of men and women 
for a number of European countries, with both finding that the UK had the widest gender 
differential with the exception of the Netherlands. In neither case did they record results 
for Luxembourg, the other nation with a larger wage gap. 
Moving to the final three columns, the first one shows the percentage of the wage gap 
that is explained by gender différences in characteristics. These all resuit from the Oaxaca 
(1973) décompositions which are discussed in gênerai below. For référence the füll 
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décompositions are shown country by country in Appendix 7.3 to Appendix 7.13, along 
with a more detailed discussion of each country's results. The most striking results are for 
Greece and Portugal where, despite having the two narrowest wage gaps, there is 
évidence of significant labour market inefficiencies. Women have more favourable 
endowments of productive characteristics but are still being paid less than the men. The 
last two columns give a measure of the potential extent of gender discrimination both in 
absolute and relative terms, the first one showing the actual monetary cost of this wage 
penalty and the second its size relative to their mean wage. Using the relative measure as 
an indicator of the extent of discrimination would suggest that it is the lowest in 
Luxembourg, Denmark and Spain. Whilst in Greece and Portugal the négative impact of 
the labour market inefficiencies is confirmed as there estimâtes of discrimination are the 
highest in relative terms. 
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Table 7.2 Variable Significance Summary 
Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France UK Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal 
Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. 
Constant +4 ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ +4 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Exp. ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Exp* 
- - - - - - - -
-- --
- - - - - - - -
--
HED ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 44 44 44 44 44 4+ 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
S E D ++ 4 44 44 44 4 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Public -- 44 44 44 44 4 44 44 
Marr ied ++ ++ 44 44 ++ 4 4 44 44 4 4 44 44 44 
Manager ++ ++ ++ 44 + + ++ ++ 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 4 44 44 
Prof. ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Ass.Prof . ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 4+ 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 4 44 44 +4 44 44 
Clerks + ++ 44 ++ ++ 44 4 44 44 44 44 44 44 +4 44 44 




Crafts + ++ 44 44 
Semiski l l 44 44 44 44 -
50-500 ++ + 44 ++ ++ + 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 +4 44 44 44 44 44 44 
>500 ++ + • ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 +4 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Outsider 
- -










Insider 4 ++ + ++ 4 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Agric -
- - - -
-
- - -
Industry ++ 4 44 44 4 44 44 44 
IMR -
-
4 44 44 
4 4 and + denotes positive and significant al the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
-- and - denotes negative and significant at the 5% and 10% levels respeciively. 
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In an attempt to achieve a deeper understanding of these wage gaps earnings functions 
are estimated by country for each gender separately, a summary of the variable 
significance is given above in Table 7.2, with a tuli table of the descriptive statistics 
appearing in Appendix 7.2. Looking at the overall significance of the variables shows 
that the earnings functions display the anticipated features. The experience terms 
along with the education dummies are predominantly positive and significant, whilst 
the squared experience terms are always negative and only insignificant on odd 
occasions. The Manager, Professional, Associate Professional and Clerks 
occupational dummies are almost always positive and significant, but those in the 
remaining four categories arc rarely able to raise their wages significantly above those 
of unskilled workers. There is clear evidence of workers extracting rent from their 
employers, with large and medium sized employers almost unfailingly showing 
positive and significant returns. Also there is some support for the presence of internal 
labour markets, with the outsider term being negative and significant in all cases 
except within the UK and Luxembourg. The results from the insider dummy arc less 
strong, but they are positive and significant in the majority of cases. Finally the 
differential treatment of married men and women, identified in Chapter 5, is also seen 
to be present across most of the rest of the EU. The married dummy is positive and 
significant for men in all cases excepting Belgium, whilst for women it is in the 
majority of cases insignificant. Consequently most of the features displayed earlier in 
the earnings functions for the UK and Germany are shown to be present across the 
rest of the EU. 
The analysis thus far has been broadly observational. The key objectives of this 
chapter are firstly, to establish how women in the UK differ from the rest of the EU in 
terms of their relative skill endowments. Secondly, how the UK labour market 
performs in remunerating womcn for thèse skills and finally, to establish the extent 
and impact of wage inequality. The first two of thèse issues are addressed by 
subtracting each country's Oaxaca (1973) décomposition from the UK's 
décomposition, the results of this bcing shown in Table 7.3, with for référence the full 
décompositions being reported by country in Appendices 7.2 - 7.12. 
Table 7.3 Oaxaca (1973) Décompositions Vs. UK 







Log Wage Gap 
Denmark -0.0312 0.0386 0.0075 0.2183 
Netherlands -0.1102 0.0668 -0.0433 0.2691 
Belgium 0.0172 0.0072 0.0245 0.2013 
Luxembourg 0.1075 -0.1324 -0.0248 0.2506 
France 0.0125 0.0012 0.0137 0.2121 
Ireland 0.0293 0.0246 0.054 0.1718 
ltaly 0.0117 0.0182 0.03 0.1958 
Greece 0.0938 0.0218 0.1156 0.1102 
Spain 0.0134 0.0254 0.0389 0.1869 
Portugal 0.1819 -0.126 0.056 0.1698 
UK 0.2258 
Négative values indicate where women in that country are in a poorer position 
compared to women in the UK, obviously positive values suggest a stronger position. 
For example the First row of Table 7.5 reveals that Danish women are on average 
.0312 log points worse off as a resuit of their relative endowment of characteristics, as 
well as benefiting to the tune of .0386 log points due to lower levels of estimated 
discrimination. Overall Danish women are on average .0075 log points better off than 
their UK counterparts, this being equal to the Danish gender wage gap subtracted 
from the UK one. 
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Taking an overview of Table 7.3 indicates that the decentralised and deregulated 
labour market leads to some fairly poor outcomes for UK women. We already know 
from Table 7.2 that the UK has one of the widest wage gaps, being exceeded only by 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. However these results also show that the relative 
endowment of labour market characteristics is only seen to be worse in Denmark and 
the Netherlands. In addition the UK has the highest levels of estimated discrimination, 
with the exceptions of Luxembourg and Portugal. 
The third major objective is to highlight the impact of wage inequality and reveal to 
what extent UK women are disadvantaged relative to the rest of the EU. This being 
achieved by applying the Juhn et al (1991) decompositions, with the results of this 
process summarized in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Juhn et al (1991) Decompositions Vs. UK 
C o u n t r y Term 1 
(ôZj -




Charac te r i s t i cs 
(Term 1 + Term 
3) 
I nequa l i t y 
(Term 2 + 
Term 4) 
T o t a l 
Denmark 0.012 -0.041 -0.019 0.056 -0.007 0.015 0.008 
Netherlands -0.101 0.006 0.001 0.066 -0.1 0.072 -0.043 
Belgium -0.002 0.023 -0.035 0.04 -0.037 0.063 0.025 
Luxembourg 0.092 0.019 -0.197 0.065 -0.105 0.084 -0.025 
France 0.046 -0.027 -0.048 0.049 -0.002 0.022 0.014 
Ireland 0.068 -0.034 -0.024 0.049 0.044 0.015 0.054 
Italy -0.007 0.017 -0.027 0.045 -0.034 0.062 0.03 
Greece 0.063 0.048 0.001 0.02 0.064 0.068 0.116 
Spain 0.038 -0.028 -0.019 0.044 0.019 0.016 0.039 
Portugal 0.153 0.042 -0.181 0.055 -0.028 0.097 0.056 
Term 1 reflects differences in observed characteristics, term 2 prices paid to these 
characteristics, term 3 is the unobserved characteristics and term 4 their prices. 
Characteristics records the overall impact of the observed and unobserved 
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characteristics, whilst inequality is the effects of cross-country différences in their 
relative priées. UK women fair much better as a resuit of their unobserved 
characteristics, using their endowments and the maie coefficients places them on 
average at 38.6% within the maie residual distribution. This is the highest position of 
ail the countries, with only Greece and the Netherlands equalling it, indicating that 
thèse 3 countries have the smallest gender differential in terms of the endowment of 
characteristics not observed within the model. 
When the effects of both sets of characteristics (Terms 1 and 3) are combined it 
reveals that UK women are quite well placed in terms of their relative endowment, 
being bettered only by Ireland, Greece and Spain. However the combination of terms 
2 and 4 paints a much poorer picture for the UK. Without fail ail of the other 
countries' women fair better as a resuit of inequality, indicating that the penalty for 
being below average is greater than in any other EU country. The findings from 
Chapter 5 revealed that the end to rising inequality had played a key rôle in the 
narrowing of the UK gender wage gap during the 1990's. However when this is 
placed within an EU-wide context it is clear that the UK position is still relatively 
poor. Applying UK. levels of inequality to the other countries widens their wage gaps 
by between 1 and 9 perceritage points. Consequently if the UK could achieve a wage 
distribution similar to most of the other EU countries this would imply a significantly 
smaller gender wage gap. 
Unfortunately it has to be accepted that this conclusion can only be reached as a resuit 
of simply accepting the results from the décomposition analysis. The earlier 
discussion in Chapter 2 highlights the limitations of the Juhn et al technique, 
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particularly how the divisions between each of the four terms are somewhat blurred. 
The possibility of labour market discrimination affecting any one of the four 
decomposed terms to a greater or lesser degree means that thèse findings need to be 
tempered by a note of caution. 
Even if thèse findings are accurate and the wider UK gender wage gap results from 
greater inequality, for a number of reasons this may stili prove difficult to address. 
Firstly, it may not be that straightforward a task to narrow the wage distribution. It is 
most likely that the greater inequality in the UK results from the lower coverage of 
collective bargaining and given the current politicai climate within the UK it is 
unlikely that actions seeking to widen its coverage would gain widespread popularity. 
Sccondly it is also possible that policics targeting wage inequality may not have the 
anticipated impact upon the gender wage gap, for example Robinson (2002) finds that 
the implcmentation of the national minimum wage in the UK has only had a 
negligible effect upon the pay differential. 
In addition it must also be noted that policies narrowing the wage distribution, i.e. 
minimum wage législation or extending the coverage of collective bargaining, can 
only ever have a limited impact upon the differential. Factors such as higher éducation 
and expérience, the occupational ségrégation and lower female status within 
occupations, among others, are the causes of the wage differential. The lcvcl of 
inequality merely détermines the size of that gap. Seeking to narrow the distribution is 
in effect approaching the problem from the wrong direction and is the équivalent of 
treating the Symptoms rather than the cause. In order to gain the increased 
productivity from making more effective use of the female labour resource legislatore 
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need to address those factors mcntioned above, especially the occupational 
ségrégation and lower female status within occupations. The most effective way of 
achieving this would be to remove any gender bias within the recruitment and 
promotion processes. Once this has been achieved, assuming that it can be donc 
through législation, the level of inequality is incidental and has no negative impact 
upon the gender wage gap or productivity. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to place the UK in an EU widc context in terms of its gender 
wage gap, as well as the impact of inequality upon that wage gap. Cross-country 
décomposition techniques revealed that the UK had one of the largest gender wage 
gaps in the EU being exceeded only by the Netherlands and Luxembourg. It also 
showed that UK women are fairly poorly placed in terms of their relative endowment 
of productive characteristics, although their position significantly improves when 
factors unobserved within the model are considered. Wage inequality was confirmed 
as being crucial to the size of the wage gap, with UK women operating within the 
most unequal distribution and suffering a penalty between 1 and 9 percentage points 
in comparison to the other countries. 
Overall this is a worrying feature since it implies that the UK is poorly placed, in 
comparison to its major trading partners, in terms of its ability to make more effective 
use of its scarce female labour resource. This is likely to become increasingly 
important as démographie changes reduce the pool of available labour. Consequently 
failure to make more effective use of female labour is likely to have a negative impact 
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upon growth in the future, hence policies addressing this problem arc required as a 
mattcr of urgency. 
Finally, however, it was pointed out that although inequality is important to the size of 
the wage gap it should not become the primary target for policy. Narrowing the wage 
distribution may well have some impact upon the size of the diffcrcntial, but it does 
not address the causes. Consequently policies targeting the actual causes, issues such 
as equity in recruitment and promotions are far more likely to have a long-term 






This thesis set out to undertake a broad analysis of gender wage differentials and 
discrimination particularly within the UK but also making comparisons with other EU 
countries. The limitations of existing cross-country and inter-temporal research were 
highlighted and thèse were improved upon by making use of the greater comparability 
within the PACO and ECHP data sets. Using predominantly décomposition analysis 
the three empirical chapters pointed to a number of important conclusions. 
The initial empirical analysis focussed upon the UK and used Germany as the basis 
for cross-country analysis. There was implicit évidence of wage discrimination being 
présent, with the unexplained term being a major component of the wage gap. There 
was also some évidence of men having more skills. This then became one of the 
major sources of the strong wage gap narrowing in the 1990's, as women closed the 
skills gap during a period of static inequality. Additionally, this more favourable 
gender skills mix was the cause of the UK wage gap being marginally smaller than in 
Germany. Although the effects were largely offset by German women being more 
favourably treated within their labour market. 
When decomposed inter-temporally it was revealed in both countries that sample 
sélection changes had a large narrowing effect upon the wage gap in both countries. 
In Germany this was shown to result from rising unemployment disproportionately 
affecting unskilled women, however within the UK the reasons were initially less 
obvious. Chapter 6 set out to explore the underlying causes of thèse changes in 
selectivity using a combination of décomposition and ordered probit analysis. This 
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required separating the employed sample into those employed at the start of the period 
of study and those who had found employment since. From this some évidence of 
fairer treatment for women remaining in employment was found in both countries. 
However the key finding was that for the UK the strong wage gap narrowing was 
atmost entirely due to a more effective skills mix from those women finding 
employment after 1991. This was viewed as resulting from the relationship between 
technical change, labour skill and the nature of tasks. With non-routine tasks it is 
more difficult to replace labour with technology and this led to an increase in labour 
demand for a wide range of 'female' jobs. 
The final empirical chapter then used ten other countries as comparators against the 
UK in order to place the UK gender pay performance in a much wider context. The 
analysis revealed no discernible relationship between the type of bargaining regime 
and the size of the wage gap or the extent of discrimination. Furthermore the UK was 
shown to have the highest level of wage inequality of ali the countries considered. 
The results revealing that the UK gap is widened by between 1 and 9 percentage 
points compared to the other countries. 
The introduction to this thesis highlighted the cruciai link between narrowing the 
gender wage gap and making more effective use of under utilised female labour. It 
also outlined four major areas having a key impact upon the size of the gender wage 
gap. These being pre-entry factors, participation, unequal treatment and the wage 
distribution, with the most important contribution of this work being how the findings 
outlined above relate to thèse four areas. 
Clearly for the UK pre-entry factors and the wider wage distribution have been shown 
to have the biggest impact upon the gender wage gap. With the more favourable 
gender skill mix having narrowed the wage gap signifìcantly. Whilst, at the same 
time, the high level of wage inequality widens the UK gap in comparison to the rest of 
the EU. However the scope for further narrowing of the wage gap through these 
routes are somewhat limited. Firstly, the former, to a large extent, results from girls 
outperformìng boys educationally during the late 1980*s and 1990's. Unfortunately 
this says as much about the failure of boys as it does about girls' successes. 
Consequently on efficiency grounds it is more important to address the issue of 
disaffected boys than allow the lop-sided educational outeomes to gradually narrow 
the wage gap. Secondly, wage inequality has been shown to be a Symptom rather than 
the cause of the gender wage gap, as a result any policy addressing this will only have 
a superficial effect. Zabalza and Arrufat (1985) argued that the equal opportunities 
législation of the mid 1970's led to a one-off narrowing of the gender differential and 
had little subséquent impact, reducing inequality is likely to be the équivalent of this. 
It has been argued that the most effective policies addressing the gender wage gap are 
those promoting female participation (Kingsmill 2003). The conventional wisdom 
being that women work less over their lifetimes due to childcarc and domestic 
responsibilities. This allows men to build up more extensive work expérience and 
hence carn more. Therefore if you enable women to match male work expérience it 
should have a positive effect upon the wage gap. Unfortunately this thesis says little 
about the likely impact of policies influencing participation, this is left to future 
research sincc it requires more complex analysis using the panel structure of the data. 
The construction of detailed work historiés from panel data sets longer than those that 
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currently exist for European countries wouid allow for more précise estimation of the 
effects of career breaks, hence indicating the likely effectiveness of participation 
policies. However this thesis does at least observe that despite the UK having the 
highest female participation rates in the EU it has one of the widest wage gaps. 
Suggesting that the relationship between participation and wage differentials may not 
be as straightforward as others imply, in fact promoting participation may, at least 
initially, widen the wage gap as low-skilled women who previously could not obtain 
childcare return to paid employment. 
Thcrefore it is clear that the most potentially fruitful target for future wage gap 
narrowing is that of differential treatment within the labour market. Despite over 
thirty years of equal opportunities législation it still remains that women are less 
likely to be employed than equally qualified men and when they are employed their 
earnings are on average significantly lower than similar men. Although diffïcult to 
measure within the data used in this thesis the implication is that women tend to be 
employed in lower status occupations and at lower seniority levels than men with 
similar skills and qualifications. This view being supported by the inverse relationship 
between the gender differential and its unobserved component. As observed in the 
UK, as the wage gap falls so does the proportion explained by measurable 
productivity différences. Consequently, although the closing of the gender skills gap 
in the 1990's is to be welcomed, the root causes of the differential still remain. As a 
resuit, until society is able to de-gender human resource décisions within 
organisations, and gender becomes unimportant in appointments, promotions and 
work-based training. The gender wage gap will still remain at a significant level and a 
large proportion of the potential gains will be denied to the UK economy. 
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From the outset this thesis set out to establish the most significant causal factors 
behind any narrowing of the gender wage gap. Potential causes were grouped into one 
of four broad catégories, those influencing pre-entry factors, those compressing the 
wage distribution, those promoting female participation and finally those seeking to 
achieve fairer treatment for women in the labour market. The empirical findings were 
then interpreted from the perspective of each type of factor. 
For the UK over the period considered pre-entry factors were shown to be crucial to 
the strong wage gap narrowing. Unfortunately this does not indicate that policies in 
this area will continue to deliver réductions in the gender differential since they reflect 
changes in demand relative to supply for différent types of labour. It is pcrfcctly 
plausible that similar pre-entry factors in subséquent periods, coupled with less 
favourable labour demand shifts, could equally deliver a future widening of the 
gender wage gap. As technology advances and it becomes more effective at carrying 
out non-routine tasks, the gains made during the 1990's could be reversed in future 
décades. Furthcrmore the strong educational performance by girls compared to boys 
raises as many issues relating to maie under-performance as it does about female 
improvements. Consequently even though the wage gap may be narrowing it does not 
necessarily suggest that it will continue to narrow in the future. 
It was also shown that the greater level of wage inequality in the UK compared to 
other EU nations was an important component of the UK's gender wage gap. 
Narrowing the wage distribution to the same level as any of the other EU nations 
would close the UK's gap significantly. However once more this is not viewed as a 
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particularly lucrative source of future narrowing in the gender wage gap. Firstly, on 
practical grounds, it is difficult to envisage government policies that target a 
narrowing of the wage distribution gaining support within the current liberal free 
market dominated political environment in the UK.. But secondly, and more 
importantly, because it addresses the symptoms rather than the causes of the problem. 
With the level of inequality reflecting the penalty of being below average and/or 
disadvantaged within the labour market. Narrowing the wage distribution simply 
reduces this penalty without addressing the issues of lower female capital 
accumulation and discrimination. 
Finally, it is the conventional wisdom, that a large element of the gender wage gap 
results from higher levels of male work experience, consequently if female 
participation is promoted over time the experience gap and the wage gap will narrow. 
However the evidence suggests that increased female participation draws large 
numbers of low-skilled women into employment, this has an immediate negative 
impact upon the earnings differential. With this being likely to persist in subsequent 
periods as the extent of crowding into 'female' occupations increases. Hence any 
initiatives seeking to promote female participation, at least in the short to medium 
term, are just as likely to widen the wage gap as narrow it. 
Overall reducing gender inequalities prior to labour market entry, the extent of wage 
inequality and raising female participation are laudible objectives and should be 
welcomed in most cases. However in isolation they fail to deliver the key objective of 
a smaller gender wage gap. Consequently the only way to ensure a significant 
improvement in the gender wage is to meaningfully address the issues of female 
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disadvantage in recruitment, promotion and wage setting decisions. Therefore 
addressing transparency in pay and the make up of selection panels etc. as argued for 
in the Kingsmill Review (Kingsmill 2003) are of fundamental importance. In their 
absence the success of improvements in pre-entry and participation factors ensure that 
there are more women in the labour market, with these in the main being better 
qualified that their predecessors. However they are being released into a labour 
market that treats them unfairly. Hence until a position is reached where these key HR 
decisions are de-gendered then the UK economy will always be failing to make the 
best use of its female labour resource. 
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b l l o w i n g w a y : 
f e c h n i c a l i s s u e s : 
I . T h e L u x e m b o u r g w a y o f d a t a s t o r a g e a n d n a m i n g c o n v e n t i o n s w e r e a d o p t e d , 
w h i c h m e a n s : 
T h e v a r i a b l e n a m e s a r e c o n s t a n t e x c e p t f o r a y e a r i n d i c a t o r . 
T h e f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i n d i c a t e s t h e l e v e l o f i n f o r m a t i o n : ( P = P e r s o n , G = I n c o m e 
G r o u p ( L u x e m b o u r g a n d L o r r a i n e ) , H = H o u s e h o l d 
T h e d a t a a r e s t o r e d a s S P S S - f i l e s . F o r e a c h c o u n t r y a n d e a c h y e a r o n e f i l e f o r indiv iduáis 
i n c l u d i n g c h i l d r e n ) , a n d o n e f i l e f o r h o u s e h o l d s w a s c r e a t e d . F o r L u x e m b o u r g a n d L o r r a i n e 
a f i l e f o r i n c o m e g r o u p s w a s c r e a t e d f o r e a c h y e a r a s w e l l . T h e f i l e n a m e s c o n t a i n 
n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e y e a r , t h e c o u n t r y a n d t h e l e v e l o f i n f o r m a t i o n ( h o u s e h o l d , i n c o m e g r o u p , 
>r i n d i v i d u a l ) . 
n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t t h e r e a r e c r o s s - y e a r f i l e s c o n t a i n i n g t i m e i n d e p e n d e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . 
I. V a r i a b l e s w e r e r e c o d e d o r catégor ies w e r e r e g r o u p e d i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n c o m m o n 
- v a r i a b l e s f o r t h e di f férent c o u n t r i e s . T h i s i n c l u d e s a l s o t h e r e c o d i n g o f m i s s i n g 
v a l u e s . 
ï. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s s u p p l i e d o n t h e l o w e s t p o s s i b l e l e v e l , w h i c h m e a n s t h e m o s t d e t a i l e d 
e v e l . 
rhe i n c o m e v a r i a b l e s a r e a l s o a g g r e g a t e d t o h i g h e r levéis ( i n c o m e g r o u p , h o u s e h o l d ) , i n 
> r d e r t o s u p p l y c o m p a r a b l e v a r i a b l e s w h e n t h e l e v e l o f i n f o r m a t i o n w a s di f férent i n t h e 
J i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . 
deal ly the analys is c a n be per formed as fo l lows: 
Dnce a p rogram for data analysis has been wr i t ten for o n e country, it can be run for 
:he other countr ies in the s a m e w a y (if ail the informat ion is avai lable in ail the 
countries; see exp lanat ions be low) . 
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3 PACO Database Definition 
5.1 General Remarks 
ntroduct ion 
fhe PACO DATA BASE contains harmonized and consistent variables and identical data structures 
br each country included. It can therefore increase the accessibility and use of panel data for 
esearch. The PACO DATA BASE can be used to case comparative cross-national and longitudinal 
esearch and to study processes and dynamics of policy issues such as labour forcé participadon, 
ncome distribution, poverty, problems of the elderly and so on. 
'ACÓ DATA BASE 
3 A C O a d d s va lué t o t h e o r i g i n a l p a n e l d a t a b y c r e a t i n g C o m p a t i b i l i t y a n d C o m p a r a b i l i t y . 
rhe p r o c e s s o f m a k i n g d a t a c o m p a r a b l e i s r e a l i z e d b y c r e a t i n g h a r m o n i z e d a n d c o n s i s t e n t 
/ a r i a b l e s a n d f i l e s . T h e P A C O D a t a B a s e c o n t a i n s c o m p a r a b l e v a r i a b l e s t r a n s f o r m e d 
a c c o r d i n g t o a c o m m o n p l a n a n d w a s b u i l t b y u s i n g s t a n d a r d i z e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
; l a s s i f i c a t i o n s w h e r e a v a i l a b l e . I n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e s e f i l e s i s a v a i l a b l e ( a ) f o r h o u s e h o l d s a n d 
n d i v i d u a l s o n t h e m i c r o l e v e l , ( b ) f o r s i n g l e y e a r s a n d ( c ) a s l o n g i t u d i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . S u c h 
i c o m p a r a t i v e a p p r o a c h r e s u l t s i n a ( c o m m o n ) P A C O D a t a B a s e , c u r r e n t l y c o n t a i n i n g t h e 
j a t a f r o m s e v e n c o u n t r i e s ( a d d i t i o n a l c o u n t r i e s b e i n g i n c l u d e d l a t e r ) . A l l f i l e s a r e h e l d i n a 
e l a t i o n a l D a t a B a s e S t r u c t u r e . T h e d a t a a r e s t o r e d a s s y s t e m f i l e s f o r t h e s t a t i s t i c a l 
j a c k a g e S P S S f o r W i n d o w s : c o n t a i n i n g i d e n t i c a l v a r i a b l e ñames , l a b e l s , va lúes a n d d a t a 
s t r u c t u r e s . E a c h c o u n t r y f i l e i s a d e q u a t e l y a n o n y m i z e d a n d c a n t h e r e f o r e b e r a t e d a s a 
D u b l i c u s e f i l e . T h e c o m p l e t e d a t a b a s e h a s a s i z e o f 2 5 0 M B a n d i s a v a i l a b l e o n C D - R o m . 
Advantages of PACO 
rhe P A C O a p p r o a c h - u s i n g h i g h l y s t a n d a r d a r i z e d v a r i a b l e s a n d f i l e s - f a c i l i t a t e s t h e 
a n a l y s i s o f c r o s s - n a t i o n a l p a n e l d a t a : a ) M a c r o Utilities e n a b l e t h e u s e r t o r e t r i e v e a n d t o 
n a t c h t h e P A C O d a t a m o r e e a s i l y . b ) T h e P A C O d a t a s t r u c t u r e a l l o w s t o w r i t e g l o b a l 
a n a l y s e s p r o g r a m s . c ) S t a n d a r d a n a l y s e s p r o g r a m s c a n b e r u n f o r d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s a n d 
d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s w i t h n o n e e d t o m o d i f y t h e u n d e r l y i n g S P S S ( M a c r o ) p r o g r a m s . d ) T h e 
Drocessing o f P A C O f i l e s i s e a s i e r t h a n a n a l y s i n g t h e o r i g i n a l p a n e l s t u d i e s . e ) T h e 
e s e a r c h e r h a s n o t t o b e f a m i l i a r i z e d w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a n e l ' s d a t a o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
v l o r e o v e r , t h e P A C O u s e r h a s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p r o c e s s i n g t h o s e o r i g i n a l v a r i a b l e s i n t h e 
D a n e l s t u d i e s t h a t h a v e n o t b e e n m a d e c o m p a r a b l e . T h e r e s e a r c h e r c a n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y 
a c c e s s o r i g i n a l v a r i a b l e s f r o m o r i g i n a l p a n e l s t u d i e s a n d t h e h a r m o n i z e d v a r i a b l e s f r o m t h e 
P A C O D A T A B A S E . 
Documentaron 
VÜ 
: a c h P A C O v a r i a b l e i s fully d o c u m e n t e d i n c l u d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e a l g o r i t h m s u s e d i n 
- a r i a b l e créat ion a n d a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e c o m p a r a t i v e r e l i a b i l i t y o f e a c h v a r i a b l e . T h i s 
l o c u m e n t a t i o n c a n b e f i n d i n t h e n a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e d o c u m e n t a t i o n ( n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h i s 
3 A C O U s e r g u i d e ) . 
" h e P A C O D A T A B A S E c a n b e l i n k e d w i t h a c o l l e c t i o n o f m a c r o d a t a . A s e t o f m a c r o 
v a r i a b l e s w e r e e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h e E U R O S T A T C D o f y e a r 1 9 9 3 a n d o t h e r Statistical 
t o u r c e s . T h e m a c r o d a t a i s a c c e s s i b l e f r o m S P S S a n d c a n b e m a t c h e d w i t h t h e P A C O 
i l e s . 
" h e r e l e v a n t p a r t s o f t h e M I S S O C p u b l i c a t i o n s a b o u t S o c i a l S e c u r i t y h a v e b e e n c o m p i l e d 
i n d i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e P A C O D o c u m e n t a t i o n s y s t e m . T h e a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n a l l o w s t o 
i n k o r i g i n a l v a r i a b l e s f r o m n a t i o n a l p a n e l s t u d i e s w i t h t h e M I S S O C d a t a ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d 
t i s p o s s i b l e t o r e t r i e v e t h e M I S S O C i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t s e l e c t e d P A C O v a r i a b l e s . T h e 
d I S S O C - P A C O l i n k e n a b l e s t h e interprétat ion o f r e s u l t s f r o m c r o s s - n a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h w i t h 
h e P A C O D A T A B A S E . 
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3. 2 Définition of Units 
3) Déf ini t ion of H o u s e h o l d s 
\ h o u s e h o l d c o n s i s t s o f a l i p e r s o n s w h o l i v e t o g e t h e r i n a d w e l l i n g u n i t ( h o u s e , a p a r t m e n t , 
g r o u p of r o o m s o r s i n g l e room). P e r s o n s w i t h i n a h o u s e h o l d c a n be r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r o r 
l o t . I n c l u d e d are u n m a r r i e d c o u p l e s , i f t h e c o u p l e i s l i v i n g i n a f a i r l y p e r m a n e n t 
a r r a n g e m e n t . A h o u s e h o l d m a y c o n s i s t s o f m o r e t h a n o n e f a m i l y , i f t h e p e r s o n s a r e r e l a t e d 
0 e a c h o t h e r . E x c l u d e d are l o d g e r s , c o n v e n t i o n a l r o o m m a t e s , o r emp loyées w h o s h a r e t h e 
îous ing u n i t . 
3) Déf ini t ion of I n c o m e groups 
n a h o u s e h o l d i n w h i c h s e v e r a l p e r s o n s h a v e i n d i v i d u a i i n c o m e , di f férent e c o n o m i e 
a r r a n g e m e n t s a r e p o s s i b l e . A n I n c o m e g r o u p i s a g r o u p o f p e r s o n s w i t h i n a h o u s e h o l d w h o 
: o n s t i t u t e a n e c o n o m i e u n i t b e c a u s e t h e y s h a r e t h e i r i n c o m e s . T h e c o n c e p t i s p u t i n t o 
s f f e c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s t r i c t r u l e s a n d a c c o r d i n g t o r e s p o n s e s f r o m h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r s 
n t h e i n t e r v i e w . 
s x a m p l e s : 
• If a h o u s e h o l d c o n s i s t s o f a c o u p l e w i t h m i n o r c h i l d r e n w i thout o w n i n c o m e s t h a n t h e r e i s 
u n l y o n e i n c o m e g r o u p i n t h e h o u s e h o l d , b e c a u s e i t i s a p r i o r i a s s u m e d t h a t p a r t n e r s i n a 
l o u s e h o l d s h a r e t h e i r i n c o m e s . 
• i f a h o u s e h o l d c o n s i s t s o f a c o u p l e w i t h o n e a d u l t c h i l d r e n w i th o w n i n c o m e t h a n t h e r e 
Tiay b e t w o i n c o m e g r o u p s : T h e f i r s t i n c o m e g r o u p i s a s s e m b l e d b y t h e p a r n e r s o f t h e 
: o u p l e , t h e s e c o n d i n c o m e g r o u p b y t h e a d u l t c h i l d r e n . 
R i e c o n c e p t o f I n c o m e g r o u p s i s o r i g i n a l l y o n l y u s e d w i t h i n t h e F r e n c h ( L o r r a i n e , E S E M L ) 
D a n e l a n d t h e L u x e m b o u r g p a n e l ( P S E L L ) . 
D u e t o t h e d a t a s t r u c t u r e o f t h e A m e r i c a n P S I D f i l e s s o m e i n c o m e v a r i a b l e s a r e o n l y 
a v a i l a b l e a s a s u m f o r h e a d a n d s p o u s e t o g e t h e r , o t h e r i n c o m e v a r i a b l e s a r e a v a i l a b l e o n l y 
as a s u m f o r a i l o t h e r f a m i l y m e m b e r s ( n o t h e a d o r s p o u s e ) . F o r t h o s e t y p e o f v a r i a b l e s t w o 
a r t i f i c i a l i n c o m e g r o u p s h a v e b e e n c r e a t e d . 
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VPPENDIX 5.2 Cross-sectional Décomposition UK 1997 
Variable fi Maie B Female Maie Mean Female Mean Expiai ned Unexplained 
Constant 1.331 1.321 0.000 0.009 
Expérience 0.044 0.030 18.989 20.433 -0.064 0.297 
Expérience 2 
-0.001 -0.001 492.666 563.664 0.053 -0.108 
Education 1 
-0.213 -0.079 0.121 0.133 0.003 -0.018 
Education 3 0.115 0.105 0.163 0.137 0.003 0.001 
Education 4 0.281 0.311 0.461 0.385 0.021 -0.012 
Part-time 0.011 -0.153 0.027 0.367 -0.004 0.060 
Public Sector 0.054 0.257 0.194 0.377 -0.010 -0.076 
Large Firm 0.077 -0.025 0.197 0.179 0.001 0.018 
Small Firm 
-0.127 -0.136 0.414 0.518 0.013 0.005 
Married 0.097 0.031 0.575 0.596 -0.002 0.040 
Agriculture 
-0.183 0.085 0.015 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 
Mining 0.227 0.272 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.000 
Utilities 0.181 0.076 0.014 0.007 0.001 0.001 
Construction 
-0.021 0.231 0.058 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
Services 
-0.174 -0.146 0.159 0.222 0.011 -0.006 
Transport 
-0.029 0.141 0.085 0.036 -0.001 -0.006 
Finance 0.245 0.220 0.133 0.138 -0.001 0.003 
Community 0.001 -0.108 0.206 0.449 0.000 0.049 
Insider 0.010 0.059 0.321 0.329 0.000 -0.016 
Outsider 
-0.160 -0.124 0.429 0.416 -0.002 -0.015 
Total 0.021 0.223 0.244 
X 
Var iable P* 
(Cot ton 
1988) 
Expla lned Maie 








R a n s o m 
1994) 
Expla ined Maie 
O v e r p a y m 
ent 
Female 
U n d e r p a y m 
ent 
Constant 1.326 0.000 0.005 0.005 1.326 0.000 0.004 0.005 
Expérience 0.037 -0.053 0.139 0.148 0.037 -0.053 0.142 0.145 
Expérience 2 -0.001 0.046 -0.048 -0.054 -0.001 0.046 -0.049 -0.052 
Education 1 -0.146 0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.141 0.002 -0.009 -0.008 
Education 3 0.110 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.110 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Education 4 0.296 0.022 -0.007 -0.006 0.296 0.022 -0.007 -0.006 
Part-time -0.072 0.024 0.002 0.030 -0.135 0.046 0.004 0.007 
Public Sector 0.156 -0.029 -0.020 -0.038 0.181 -0.033 -0.024 -0.029 
Large Firm 0.026 0.000 0.010 0.009 0.029 0.001 0.009 0.010 
Small Firm -0.132 0.014 0.002 0.002 -0.132 0.014 0.002 0.002 
Married 0.064 -0.001 0.019 0.020 0.063 -0.001 0.020 0.019 
Agriculture -0.049 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.105 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Mining 0.250 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.128 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.147 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Construction 0.106 0.006 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Services •0.160 0.010 -0.002 -0.003 -0.161 0.010 -0.002 -0.003 
Transport 0.057 0.003 -0.007 -0.003 0.024 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
Finance 0.233 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.234 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
Commun ity -0.054 0.013 0.011 0.024 -0.059 0.014 0.012 0.022 
Insider 0.034 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 0.035 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 
Outsider -0.142 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 -0.142 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 
Tota l 0 .059 0 .074 0.111 0.244 0.070 0 .082 0 .092 0.244 
APPENDIX 5.3 Probit Estimâtes of Participation. UK 1997 
Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -2.89 -12.5 
Age 0.191 13.7 36.86 
Age2 -0.003 -14.0 1508.74 
Education 1 -0.292 -4.3 0.18 
Education 3 -0.203 -3.0 0.15 
Education 4 -0.035 -0.6 0.33 
Married 0.032 0.6 0.55 
No. of Kids -0.253 -9.9 0.89 
Child under 5 -0.491 -7.6 0.18 
Poor Health -0.669 -8.4 0.09 
Household Income 0.0002 11.7 1590.3 





Restricted Log-like. -2612.2 
Maie 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -2.25 -9.7 
Age 0.145 10.5 36.57 
Age2 -0.002 -11.6 1488.5 
Education 1 -0.147 -2.0 0.16 
Education 3 -0.197 -2.9 0.19 
Education 4 0.092 1.5 0.39 
Married 0.167 2.7 0.52 
No. of Kids -0.162 -6.3 0.81 
Child under 5 0.096 1.3 0.16 
Poor Health -0.526 -5.5 0.06 
Household Income 0.0002 12.4 1707.3 





Restricted Log-like. -2347.2 
\ P P E N D I X 5.4 Selectivity Corrected Decomposition. UK 1997 
Variable 6 Male 8 Female Male Mean Female Mean Explained Unexplained 
Constant 2.466 1.692 0.000 0.774 
Experience 
-0.002 0.013 18.989 20.433 0.003 -0.307 
Experience 2 0.0005 -0.0002 492.666 563.664 -0.034 0.378 
Education 1 
-0.175 -0.033 0.121 0.133 0.002 -0.019 
Education 3 0.208 0.129 0.163 0.137 0.006 0.011 
Education 4 0.106 0.267 0.461 0.385 0.008 -0.062 
Part-time 0.184 -0.081 0.027 0.367 -0.062 0.097 
Public Sector 0.019 0.253 0.194 0.377 -0.003 -0.088 
Large Firm 0.060 -0.026 0.197 0.179 0.001 0.015 
Small Firm 
-0.108 -0.124 0.414 0.518 0.011 0.008 
Married 
-0.046 0.010 0.575 0.596 0.001 -0.034 
Agriculture 
-0.081 0.119 0.015 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
Mining 0.169 0.243 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.000 
Utilities 0.174 0.087 0.014 0.007 0.001 0.001 
Construction 
-0.026 0.220 0.058 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
Services 
-0.127 -0.137 0.159 0.222 0.008 0.002 
Tran sport 
-0.045 0.119 0.085 0.036 -0.002 -0.006 
Finance 0.151 0.194 0.133 0.138 -0.001 -0.006 
Community 0.030 -0.099 0.206 0.449 -0.007 0.058 
Insider 0.019 0.058 0.321 0.329 0.000 -0.013 
Outsider 
-0.119 -0.108 0.429 0.416 -0.002 -0.005 
Total -0.072 0.802 0.730 
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'PËNDIX 5.5: Cross-sectional Décomposition. Germany 1996 
/ariable B Maie Ì Female Maie Mean Female Mean Explained Unexplained 
Constant 2.681 2.424 1.000 1.000 0.000 
0.257 
expérience 0.Û30 0.037 20.710 19.973 0.022 -0.127 
expérience2 
-0.001 -0.001 540.269 513.581 -0.017 0.057 
•ducation 1 0.078 0.057 0.038 0.037 0.00003 0.001 
éducation 3 0.123 0.156 0.648 0.627 0.003 -0.021 
éducation 4 0.392 0.456 0.217 0.203 0.006 -0.013 
Part-time 0.159 -0.074 0.021 0.274 -0.040 0.064 
jblic Sector 0.005 0.070 0.247 0.392 -0.001 -0.025 
.arge Firm 0.098 0.133 0.545 0.468 0.008 -0.016 
îmall Firm 
-0.175 -0.127 0.170 0.252 0.014 -0.012 
Married 0.108 -0.072 0.715 0.658 0.006 0.118 
\griculture 
-0.150 -0.129 0.018 0.017 -0.0002 -0.0003 
Mining 
-0.057 ' 0.500 0.011 0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 
Utilities 0.124 0.209 0.019 0.008 0.001 -0.001 
•onstruclion 0.031 0.014 0.127 0.024 0.003 0.0004 
Services 
-0.128 -0.056 0.082 0.183 0.013 -0.013 
Transport 
-0.072 -0.080 0.076 0.049 -0.002 0.0004 
Finance 0.074 0.159 0.051 0.085 -0.003 -0.007 
;ommuntiy 
-0.004 0.057 0.204 0.438 0.Q01 -0.027 
ist Germany 
-0.414 -0.318 0.195 0.311 0.048 -0.030 
Total 0.062 0.205 0.267 
Var iable B* 
(Cot ton 
1988) 
Expla ined M a i e 






( O a x a c a 
& 






U n d e r p a y m 
ent 
Constant 2.560 0.000 0.121 0.136 2.575 0.000 0.106 
0.151 
Expérience 0.033 0.025 -0.062 -0.067 0.033 0.024 
-0.057 -0.072 
expérience 2 
-0.001 -0.018 0.028 0.030 -0.001 -0.018 0.025 
0.033 
Education 1 0.068 0.00003 0.0004 0.0004 0.070 0.000 0.000 
0.000 
Education 3 0.139 0.003 -0.010 -0.011 0.137 0.003 
-0.009 -0.012 
Education 4 0.422 0.006 -0.006 -0.007 0.417 0.006 -0.005 
-0.008 
Part-time 0.049 -0.012 0.002 0.034 -0.036 0.009 
0.004 0.011 
ublic Sector 0.035 . -0.005 -0.008 -0.013 0.038 -0.005 
-0.008 -0.013 
_arge Firm 0.114 0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.111 0.009 -0.007 
-0.010 
Small Firm 
-0.152 0.013 -0.004 -0.006 -0.154 0.013 
-0.004 -0.007 
Married 0.023 0.001 0.060 0.062 0.035 0.002 0.052 
0.070 
Agriculture 
-0.140 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.143 0.000 0.000 
0.000 
Mining 0.205 0.002 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.038 0.0Q0 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.164 0.002 -0.001 -0.0004 0.142 0.002 
0.000 -0.001 
instruction 0.023 0.002 0.001 0.0002 0.029 0.003 
• 0.000 0.000 
Services 
-0.094 0 0 0 9 -0.003 -0.007 -0.096 0.010 
-0.003 -0.007 
Transport 
-0.076 -0.002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.074 -0.002 
0.000 0.000 
Finance 0.114 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.111 -0.004 -0.002 
-0.004 
community 0.025 -0.006 -0.006 -0.014 0.025 -0.006 
-0.006 -0.014 
ist Germany 
-0.369 0.043 -0.009 -0016 -0.374 0.043 
-0.008 -0.017 
Total 0 .067 0 .092 0 .109 0.261 0.087 0 .080 
0.100 0.267 
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'PENDIX 5.6 Probit Estimâtes of Participation. Germany 1996 
maie 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -3.25 -12.4 
Age 0.159 10.5 38.28 
Age2 -0.002 -10.7 1609.6 
Education 1 -0.277 -2.8 0.08 
Education 3 0.093 1.6 0.60 
Education 4 0.068 0.9 0.14 
Married -0.429 -7.8 0.66 
No. of Kids -0.170 -6.5 0.82 
Child under 5 -0.742 -10.3 0.14 
Poor Health -0.281 -3.8 0.08 
Dusehold Income 0.0002 23.4 4485.4 





istricted Log-like. -3113.9 
île 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -3.067 -11.3 
Age 0.122 7.9 38.66 
Age2 -0.001 -7.8 1639.6 
Education 1 0.041 0.4 0.05 
Education 3 0.106 1.5 0.65 
Education 4 -0.253 -2.9 0.17 
Married -0.093 -1.5 0.63 
No. of Kids -0.004 -0.1 0.77 
Child under 5 0.283 4.0 0.14 
Poor Health -0.333 -4.3 0.08 
ousehold Income 0.0002 27.8 4658.0 





îstricted Log-like. -3048.0 
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PPENDIX 5.7 Selectivity Corrected Décomposition. Germany 1996 
Variable p Maie p Female Maie Mean Female Mean Explained Unexplained 
Constant 3.767 2.996 0.000 0.771 
expérience 
-0.018 0.008 20.710 19.973 -0.013 -0.522 
expérience 2 0.0004 -0.0001 540.269 513.581 0.012 0.283 
Education 1 
-0.038 0.138 0.038 0.037 0.000 -0.007 
Education 3 
-0.012 0.082 0.648 0.627 0.000 -0.058 
Education 4 0.215 0.339 0.217 0.203 0.003 -0.025 
Part-time 0.245 0.002 0.021 0.274 -0.062 0.067 
ublic Sector 0.043 0.066 0.247 0.392 -0.006 -0.009 
.arge Firm 0.063 0.110 0.545 0.468 0.005 -0.022 
Small Firm 
-0.079 -0.115 0.170 0.252 0.007 0.009 
Married 0.002 -0.021 0.715 0.658 0.000 0.015 
Agriculture 
-0.082 -0.097 0.018 0.017 0.000 0.000 
Mining 
-0.022 0.448 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.023 0.200 0.019 0.008 0.000 -0.001 
construction 0.031 -0.030 0.127 0.024 0.003 0.002 
Services 
-0.117 -0.045 0.082 0.183 0.012 -0.013 
Transport 
-0.092 -0.074 0.076 0.049 -0.003 -0.001 
Finance 
-0.023 0.099 0.051 0.085 0.001 -0.010 
Community 
-0.043 0.042 0.204 0.438 0.010 -0.037 
ast Germany 
-0.297 -0.251 0.195 0.311 0.034 -0.014 
Total 0.002 0.426 0.428 
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PPENDIX 5.8 Cross-country Decomposition. Germany 1996/UK 1997 
Var lab le Male m e a n 
(Germany) 




p ma le (UK) Male m e a n 
(UK) 
F e m . M e a n 
(UK) 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.000 1.000 3.767 2.466 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Experience 20.710 19.973 -0.018 -0.002 18.989 20.433 -0.004 -0.012 
:xperience z 540.269 513.581 0.0004 0.0005 492.666 563.664 0.047 -0.001 
Education 1 0.038 0.037 -0.038 -0.175 0.121 0.133 -0.002 0.000 
Education 3 0.648 0.627 -0.012 0.208 0.163 0.137 -0.001 -0.005 
Education 4 0.217 0.203 0.215 0.106 0.461 0.385 -0.006 0.002 
Part-time 0.021 0.274 0.245 0.184 0.027 0.367 0.016 -0.015 
ublic Sector 0.247 0.392 0.043 0.019 0.194 0.377 0.001 -0.004 
.arge Firm 0.545 0.468 0.063 0.060 0.197 0.179 0.004 0.000 
Smali Firm 0.170 0.252 -0.079 -0.108 0.414 0.518 -0.002 -0.002 
Married 0.715 0.658 0.002 -0.046 0.575 0.596 -0.004 0.003 
^griculture 0.018 0.017 -0.082 -0.081 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.000 
Mining 0.011 0.001 -0.022 0.169 0.009 0.004 0.001 -0.002 
Utilities 0.019 0.008 0.023 0.174 0.014 0.007 0.001 -0.002 
onstruction 0.127 0.024 0.031 -0.026 0.058 0.006 -0.001 0.006 
Services 0.082 0.183 -0.117 -0.127 0.159 0.222 0.005 -0.001 
Transport 0.076 0.049 -0.092 -0.045 0.085 0.036 0.001 -0.001 
Finance 0.051 0.085 -0.023 0.151 0.133 0.138 -0.004 0.006 
Dommunity 0.204 0.438 -0.043 0.030 0.206 0.449 0.000 0.017 
st Germany 0.195 0.311 -0.297 0 0 0 0.000 0.034 
Insider 0 0 0.000 0.019 0.321 0.329 0.000 0.000 
Outsider 0 0 0 -0.119 0.429 0.416 0.002 0.000 
0.520 0.692 -0.923 -1.396 0.530 0.572 0.181 -0.081 
Total 0.233 -0.058 
Term 1 = (SZj - 5Z k )p k 
Term2 = 5 Z j ( p j - p k ) 
Term 3 = (Sy/j - Sy/k)<jk = (.363 - .675).382 = -.119 
Term 4 = Sy/j (ą - o*) = .363(.296 - .382) = -.031 
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PPENDIX 5.9 1991 Results UK 
Maie Female 
Variable Mean Coefficient t-ratio Mean Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 1.178 30.1 1.194 29.4 
Expérience 19.982 0.040 13.0 20.944 0.021 7.3 
Expérience2 543.8 -0.001 -10.4 591.2 -0.0004 -6.0 
Education 1 0.183 -0.182 -5.7 0.205 -0.133 -4.5 
Education 3 0.157 0.080 2.7 0.103 0.104 3.3 
Education 4 0.413 0.276 11.3 0.343 0.305 13.1 
Part-time 0.020 0.008 0.1 0.377 -0.133 -6.5 
3ublic Sector 0.201 0.024 0.6 0.381 0.255 8.2 
Large Firm 0.220 0.063 2.6 0.158 0.005 0.2 
Small Firm 0.391 -0.095 -4.4 0.524 -0.145 -6.9 
Married 0.665 0.094 4.2 0.642 0.009 -0.4 
Agriculture 0.016 -0.284 -3.8 0.005 -0.345 -2.7 
Mining 0.020 0.218 3.2 0.004 0.200 1.4 
Utilities 0.026 0.195 3.3 0.006 0.329 2.8 
Construction 0.061 -0.027 -0.6 0.006 0.056 0.5 
Services 0.133 -0.095 -3.1 0.202 -0.098 -3.1 
Transport 0.094 -0.029 -0.8 0.028 0.067 1.2 
Finance 0.109 0.240 7.3 0.127 0.260 7.5 
Community 0.195 0.013 0.3 0.467 -0.131 -3.6 
Insider 0.359 -0.012 -0.5 0.279 0.008 0.3 
Outsider 0.357 -0.126 -5.4 0.408 -0.123 -5.7 
)ep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 1.714 1.393 
tandard Dev. 0.515 0.497 
)bservations 2149 2153 
R-squared 0.333 0.315 
RSS 380.2 364.0 
Log-Like -1188.1 -1141.7 
" and * represents significante al the 5% and 10% levels respeclively. 
tt rcportcd t-ratios arc bascd upon Whilc's hctcrosccdastic consistent standard errors. 
rie above table reports the earnings function estimates for the UK in 1991. Not surprisingly most of 
e features displayed in 1997 were also present in the earlier year, part-time and public sector 
nployment have negative and positive impaets respectively upon female earnings, whilst neither 
is a significant effect upon male wages. Both marriage and large firm employment display a wage 
emium for men but no significant impact for women, small firm employment impaets negatively 
xviii 
ion male and female earnings but the penalty is larger for women. Finally there is again higher 
turns from potential experience for the men. 
Dwever there has been a few interesting changes across the two years. Firstly in 1997 the returns 
3m education did not appear to favour either gender, but in 1991 all three of the education 
immies show better returns for women. In addition Education 1 is negative and significant in both 
ses, having been insignificant in 1997, indicating that in the earlier year there was a wage penalty 
r those not completing formal education. There are no significant returns from being an insider, 
hich is to be expected due to the flexibility of the UK labour market, (Brookes et al 2002), but by 
•97 there are positive and significant returns for female insiders. Suggesting, for women at least, 
though the reasons aren't clear, a reduction in the level of flexibility. 
'age Gap Decompositions: UK 1991 
B a n Ln Wage (Male) 









Oaxaca (1973) Cotton (1988) Oaxaca & Ransom 
(1994) 
cplained 0.038 12% 0.073 23% 0.088 27% 
lexplained 0.283 88% 0.248 77% 0.233 73% 
ale Overpayment 0.107 33% 0.118 37% 
male Underpayment 0.141 44% 0.115 36% 
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Cross-sectional Decomposition. UK 1991 
/ariable ß Male ß Female Male Mean Female Mean Explained Unexplained 
Constant 1.178 1.194 0.000 -0.017 
Expérience 0.040 0.021 19.982 20.944 -0.038 0.389 
xperience 2 
-0.001 -0.0004 543.773 591.180 0.032 -0.177 
ducation 1 
-0.182 -0.133 0.183 0.205 0.004 -0.010 
ducation 3 0.080 0.104 0.157 0.103 0.004 -0.003 
ducation 4 0.276 0.305 0.413 0.343 0.019 -0.010 
Part-time 0.008 -0.133 0.020 0.377 -0.003 0.053 
jblic Sector 0.024 0.255 0.201 0.381 -0.004 -0.088 
.arge Firm 0.063 0.005 0.220 0.158 0.004 0.009 
îmall Firm 
-0.095 -0.145 0.391 0.524 0.013 0.026 
Married 0.094 0.009 0.665 0.642 0.002 0.055 
agriculture 
-0.284 -0.345 0.016 0.005 -0.003 0.0003 
Mining 0.218 0.200 0.020 0.004 0.003 0.0001 
Utilities 0.195 0.329 0.026 0.006 0.004 -0.001 
onstruction 
-0.027 0.056 0.061 0.006 -0.001 -0.0005 
Services 
-0.095 -0.098 0.133 0.202 0.007 0.0005 
Transport 
-0.029 0.067 0.094 0.028 -0.002 -0.003 
Finance 0.240 0.260 0.109 0.127 -0.004 -0.002 
Community 0.013 -0.131 0.195 0.467 -0.003 0.067 
Insider 
-0.012 0.008 0.359 0.279 -0.001 -0.006 
Outsider 
-0.126 -0.123 0.357 0.408 0.006 -0.001 
Total 0.038 0.283 0.321 
jrning to the wage decomposition, the wage gap of 28.2% is in the region of 20% explained by 
fferences in characteristics. This explained term is greater than in 1997 which concurs with Black 
al (1999), who find that as the wage gap narrows the proportion unexplained rises. Irrespective of 
e method chosen there is clear evidence of both male overpayment and female underpayment 
:ing present. 
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PPEND1X 5.10 Probit Estimâtes for Participation. UK 1991 
rniale 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -2.389 -10.7 
Age 0.169 12.7 36.9 
Age2 -0.002 -13.4 1507.5 
Education 1 -0.279 -4.7 0.25 
Education 3 -0.139 -1.9 0.11 
Education 4 -0.075 -1.4 0.32 
Married -0.078 -1.4 0.62 
No. of Kids -0.244 -10.2 0.93 
Child under 5 -0.707 -11.5 0.20 
Poor Health -0.395 -4.9 0.08 
ousehold Income 0.0002 10.8 1298.4 





estricted Log-like. -2773.3 
[aie 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -1.590 -7.4 
Age 0.105 8.3 36.30 
Age2 -0.001 -8.9 1469.0 
Education 1 -0.328 -4.9 0.22 
Education 3 -0.111 -1.6 0.16 
Education 4 -0.120 -2.1 0.39 
Married 0.338 5.4 0.59 
No. of Kids -0.174 -7.3 0.88 
Child under 5 -0.017 -0.2 0.17 
Poor Health -0.516 -5.3 0.05 
ousehold Income 0.0002 9.3 1379.9 





estricted Log-like. -2534.0 
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PPEND1X 5.11 Sclectivity Corrected Decomposition. UK 1991 
/ariable 6 Male 8 Female Male Mean Female Mean Explained UnexplaJned 
Constant 2.163 1.461 0.000 0.702 
Experience 0.015 0.010 19.982 20.944 -0.014 0.102 
xperience 2 
-0.0001 -0.0001 543.773 591.180 0.003 0.037 
Iducation 1 0.014 -0.099 0.183 0.205 0.000 0.023 
Iducation 3 0.129 0.113 0.157 0.103 0.007 0.002 
Iducation 4 0.261 0.284 0.413 0.343 0.018 -0.008 
Part-time 0.118 -0.070 0.020 0.377 -0.042 0.071 
jblic Sector 0.007 0.240 0.201 0.381 -0.001 -0.089 
.arge Firm 0.039 0.008 0.220 0.158 0.002 0.005 
5mall Firm -0.094 -0.144 0.391 0.524 0.012 0.026 
Married 
-0.093 0.019 0.665 0.642 -0.002 -0.072 
^gr¡culture 
-0.259 -0.328 0.016 0.005 -0.003 0.000 
Mining 0.161 0.186 0.020 0.004 0.003 0.000 
Utilities 0.130 0.325 0.026 0.006 0.003 -0.001 
onstruction 
-0.019 0.048 0.061 0.006 -0.001 0.000 
Services 
-0.097 -0.094 0.133 0.202 0.007 -0.001 
Transport 
-0.060 0.059 0.094 0.028 -0.004 -0.003 
Finance 0.170 0.244 0.109 0.127 -0.003 -0.009 
community 0.008 -0.116 0.195 0.467 -0.002 0.058 
Insider 
-0.003 0.002 0.359 0.279 0.000 -0.001 
Outsider 
-0.110 -0.121 0.357 0.408 0.006 0.004 
Total -0.012 0.846 0.833 
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PPENDIX 5.12 Inter-temporal Décomposition. UK 1991-1997 
Variable Maie m e a n 
1991 
F e m . m e a n 
1991 
p maie 1991 p m a i e 1997 M a i e m e a n 
1997 
F e m . M e a n 
1997 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.000 1.000 2.163 2.466 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 19.982 20.944 0.015 -0.002 18.989 20.433 -0.001 -0.016 
Experience2 543.773 591.180 -0.0001 0.0005 492.666 563.664 0.011 0.026 
Education 1 0.183 0.205 0.014 -0.175 0.121 0.133 0.002 -0.004 
Education 3 0.157 0.103 0.129 0.208 0.163 0.137 0.006 -0.004 
Education 4 0.413 0.343 0.261 0.106 0.461 0.385 -0.001 0.011 
Part-time 0.020 0.377 0.118 0.184 0.027 0.367 -0.003 0.023 
ublic Sector 0.201 0.381 0.007 0.019 0.194 0.377 0.000 0.002 
_arge Firm 0.220 0.158 0.039 0.060 0.197 0.179 0.003 -0.001 
Small Firm 0.391 0.524 -0.094 -0.108 0.414 0.518 0.003 -0.002 
Married 0.665 0.642 -0.093 -0.046 0.575 0.596 -0.002 -0.001 
Agriculture 0.016 0.005 -0.259 -0.081 0.015 0.006 0.000 -0.002 
Mining 0.020 0.004 0.161 0.169 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.000 
Utilities 0.026 0.006 0.130 0.174 0.014 0.007 0.002 -0.001 
lonstruction 0.061 0.006 -0.019 -0.026 0.058 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Services 0.133 0.202 -0.097 -0.127 0.159 0.222 0.001 -0.002 
Transport 0.094 0.028 -0.060 -0.045 0.085 0.036 -0.001 -0.001 
Finance 0.109 0.127 0.170 0.151 0.133 0.138 -0.002 0.000 
Dommunity 0.195 0.467 0.008 0.030 0.206 0.449 -0.001 0.006 
Insider 0.359 0.279 -0.003 0.019 0.321 0.329 0.002 -0.002 
Outsider 0.357 0.408 -0.110 -0.119 0.429 0.416 0.008 0.000 
k 0.580 0.599 -1.227 -1.396 0.530 0.572 -0.031 -0.003 
Total -0.003 0.029 
Term 1 = (SZj - ôZ k )p\ 
Term 2 = ÔZj(pj - Pw) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - 5yk)ak = (.800 - .675).382 = 0.047 
Term 4 = Syj (oj - a*) = .800(.387 - .382) = 0.004 
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PPENPIX 5.13 Cross-sectional Décomposition. Germany 1991 
Variable BMale P Female Maie Mean Female Mean Explained Unexplained 
Constant 2.642 2.459 0.000 0.183 
Expérience 0.025 0.024 20.316 19.282 0.026 0.015 
Expérience2 
-0.001 -0.001 531.665 . 493.947 -0.020 0.006 
Education 1 0.014 0.033 0.036 0.048 -0.00017 -0.001 
Education 3 0.129 0.139 0.680 0.633 0.006 -0.006 
Education 4 0.335 0.421 0.178 0.168 0.003 -0.015 
Part-time 0.225 -0.012 0.013 0.236 -0.050 0.056 
ublic Sector 
-0.071 0.064 0.239 0.378 0.010 -0.051 
_arge Firm 0.058 0.041 0.594 0.490 0.006 0.008 
Small Firm 
-0.146 -0.145 0.143 0.217 0.011 0.000 
Marrisd 0.060 -0.048 0.756 0.685 0.004 0.074 
Agriculture 
-0.175 -0.017 0.033 0.020 -0.0024 -0.0031 
Mining 
-0.007 0.104 0.020 0.004 0.000 -0.0005 
Utilities 0.157 0.083 0.023 0.005 0.003 0.000 
instruction 0.040 0.072 0.122 0.016 0.004 -0.0005 
Services 
-0.174 -0.087 0.072 0.193 0.021 -0.017 
Transport 
-0.078 -0.021 0.075 0.050 -0.002 -0.0029 
Finance 0.115 0.121 0.033 0.065 -0.004 0.000 
Community 0.014 0.034 0.166 0.375 -0.003 -0.008 
ast Germa ny 
-0.639 -0.600 0.316 0.372 0.036 -0.014 





















Constant 2.563 0.000 0.079 0.104 2.569 0.000 0.073 0.110 
Expérience 0.025 0.026 0.007 0.008 0.025 0.026 0.006 0.009 
Expérience' 
-0.001 -0.020 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.020 0.003 0.004 
Education 1 0.022 -0.00027 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.022 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Education 3 0.133 0.006 -0.003 -0.004 0.133 0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
Education 4 0.372 0.004 -0.007 -0.008 0.369 0.003 -0.006 -0.009 
Part-time 0.123 -0.027 0.001 0.032 0.017 -0.004 0.003 0.007 
'ublic Sector -0.013 0.002 -0.014 -0.029 -0.004 0.001 -0.016 -0.026 
Large Firm 0.051 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.052 0.005 0.004 0.005 
Small Firm -0.145 0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.145 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Married 0.013 0.001 0.035 0.042 0.014 0.001 0.035 0.042 
Agriculture -0.107 -0.0015 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.132 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Mining 0.041 0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.125 0.002 0.001 0.0002 0.147 0.003 0.000 0.000 
construction 0.054 0.006 -0.002 -0.0003 0.043 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Services 
-0.137 0.017 -0.003 -0.010 -0.129 0.016 -0.003 -0.008 
Transport 
-0.053 -0.001 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.057 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
Finance 0.118 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.118 -0.004 0.000 0.000 




robit Estimâtes of Participation. Germany 1991 
emale 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -3.284 -14.6 
Age 0.169 12.5 37.2 
Age2 -0.002 -12.5 1530.8 
Education 1 0.008 0.1 0.06 
Education 3 0.074 1.5 0.60 
Education 4 0.106 1.6 0.14 
Marhed -0.447 -8.8 0.68 
No. of Kids -0.118 -5.2 0.87 
Child under 5 -0.381 -6.6 0.18 
Poor Health -0.172 -2.5 0.08 








estri cted Log-like. -3603.4 
laie 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant -3.650 -17.5 
Age 0.204 17.1 37.4 
Age2 -0.003 -16.8 1550.9 
Education 1 0.018 0.2 0.04 
Education 3 -0.059 -1.0 0.67 
Education 4 -0.230 -3.3 0.18 
Marhed 0.389 7.6 0.65 
No. of Kids -0.055 -2.8 0.84 
Child under 5 -0.017 -0.2 0.17 
Poor Health -0.516 -5.3 0.05 
Household Income 0.0002 9.3 1379.9 





ïestricted Log-like. -3631.6 
x x v 
electivity Corrected Décomposition. Germany 1991 
Var iable Maie F e m a l e Maie M e a n F e m a l e M e a n Expla ined Unexp la ined 
Constant 2.838 3.126 0.000 -0.288 
Expérience 0.016 -0.009 20.316 19.282 0.017 0.484 
Experience2 
-0.0003 0.0002 531.665 493.947 -0.012 -0.267 
Education 1 
-0.003 0.025 0.036 0.048 0.000 -0.001 
Education 3 0.128 0.058 0.680 0.633 0.006 0.045 
Education 4 0.349 0.272 0.178 0.168 0.003 0.013 
Part-time 0.230 0.069 0.013 0.236 -0.051 0.038 
Public Sector 
-0.071 0.064 0.239 0.378 0.010 -0.051 
Large Firm 0.058 0.026 0.594 0.490 0.006 0.016 
Small Firm 
-0.145 -0.138 0.143 0.217 0.011 -0.001 
Married 0.024 0.011 0.756 0.685 0.002 0.009 
Agriculture 
-0.175 0.007 0.033 0.020 -0.002 -0.004 
Mining 
-0.005 0.077 0.020 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.159 0.010 0.023 0.005 0.003 0.001 
Construction 0.042 0.039 0.122 0.016 0.004 0.000 
Services 
-0.172 -0.093 0.072 0.193 0.021 -0.015 
Transport 
-0.078 -0.011 0.075 0.050 -0.002 -0.003 
Finance 0.113 0.052 0.033 0.065 -0.004 0.004 
Community 0.015 0.023 0.166 0.375 -0.003 -0.003 
iast Germany 
-0.638 -0.418 0.316 0.372 0.036 -0.082 
Tota l 0.044 -0.106 -0.062 
XXVI 
Maie Female 
Variable Mean Coefficient t-ratio Mean Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 2.642 74.4 2.459 56.4 
Expérience 20.316 0.025 8.3 19.282 0.024 6.8 
Expérience2 531.665 -0.001 -7.5 493.947 -0.001 -6.3 
Education 1 0.036 0.014 0.3 0.048 0.033 0.7 
Education 3 0.680 0.129 5.2 0.633 0.139 4.9 
Education 4 0.178 0.335 11.2 0.168 0.421 11.3 
Part-time 0.013 0.225 3.4 0.236 -0.012 • -0.5 
Public Sector 0.239 -0.071 -2.2 0.378 0.064 2.0 
Large Firm 0.594 0.058 3.2 0.490 0.041 1.9 
Small Firm 0.143 -0.146 -5.9 0.217 -0.145 -5.3 
Married 0.756 0.060 3.1 0.685 -0.048 -2.1 
Agriculture 0.033 -0.175 -4.1 0.020 -0.017 -0.2 
Mining 0.020 -0.007 -0.1 0.004 0.104 0.7 
Utilities 0.023 0.157 3.1 0.005 0.083 0.6 
Construction 0.122 0.040 1.6 0.016 0.072 0.9 
Services 0.072 -0.174 -5.8 0.193 -0.087 -3.0 
Transport 0.075 -0.078 -2.0 0.050 -0.021 -0.4 
Finance 0.033 0.115 2.7 0.065 0.121 2.9 
Community 0.166 0.014 0.4 0.375 0.034 0.9 
East Germany 0.316 -0.639 -37.9 0.372 -0.600 -25.9 
3ep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 2.861 2.587 
Standard Dev. 0.494 0.497 
Observations 2488 1885 
R-squared 0.47 0.349 
RSS 319.8 303.1 
Log-Like -978.0 -952.3 
** and * rcprcscnts significancc at thc 5% and 10% lcvcls respectivcly. 
# rcportcd t-ralios arc bascd upon Whilc's hctcrosccdastic consistent siandard errors. 
he earnings functions are then re-estimated using the 1991 data, the results are reproduced in table 
)ove. As with 1996 women benefit from public sector employment, however on this occasion it is 
3 t so clear cut that the public sector is a disproportionately high source of 'good' jobs for women. 
he female coefficient being insignificant, whilst for men their coefficient is negative and 
gnificant. Both genders display a premium from employment in large firms, but with the male 
•emium being clearly higher. There is also a wage penalty from small firm employment for both 
en and women, with the two coefficients being virtually identical. 
xx vii 
s in 1996 employers appear to view marriage as a much clearer motivational signal for men, with it 
iving a positive and significant impact upon the male wage. Finally, as with 1996, there is a clear 
sadvantage to being employed in East Germany. However for both men and women the coefficient 
around twice the size of its 1996 value, indicating that the graduai process of integration has 
irrowed the gap between East and West German wages. 
rage Gap Decompositions: Germany 1991 
Ban Ln Wage (Male) 
Ban Ln Wage (Female) 
age Gap 







Oaxaca (1973) Cotton (1988) Oaxaca & Ransom 
(1994) 
cplained 0.049 18% 0.056 21% 0.076 28% 
lexplained 0.224 82% 0.217 79% 0.198 72% 
ale Overpayment 0.090 33% 0.086 31% 
jmale Underpayment 0.127 46% 0.112 41% 
timing to the decompositions of the wage gap, irrespective of the chosen method of décomposition, 
ound a quarter of the 24% gap is explained by différences in characteristics. Both female 
ìderpayment and male overpayment are important contributors to the remaining unexplained 
)rtion, however which is the most significant is dépendent upon which weighting factor is used. 
nce again différences in the intercept terms are the dominant factor within the décomposition, 
though not to such a large extent as in 1996. However over 85% of the unexplained term is stili 
isigned to this single élément. 
xxviii 
Male Female 
Variable Mean Coefficient t-ratio Mean Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 2.838 20.4 3.126 49.0 
Experience 20.316 0.016 2.4 19.282 -0.009 -2.1 
Experience2 531.66 -0.0003 -2.0 493.95 0.0002 2.3 
Education 1 0.036 -0.003 -0.1 0.048 0.025 0.5 
Education 3 0.680 0.128 5.2 0.633 0.058 2.1 
Education 4 0.178 0.349 11.1 0.168 0.272 7.3 
Part-time 0.013 0.230 3.5 0.236 0.069 2.9 
Public Sector 0.239 -0.071 -2.2 0.378 0.064 2.1 
Large Firm 0.594 0.058 3.2 0.490 0.026 1.2 
Small Firm 0.143 -0.145 -5.9 0.217 -0.138 -5.3 
Married 0.756 0.024 0.8 0.685 0.011 0.5 
Agriculture 0.033 -0.175 -4.1 0.020 0.007 0.1 
Mining 0.020 -0.005 -0.1 0.004 0.077 0.6 
Utilities 0.023 0.159 3.1 0.005 0.010 0.1 
Construction 0.122 0.042 1.7 0.016 0.039 0.5 
Services 0.072 -0.172 -5.8 0.193 -0.093 -3.4 
Transport 0.075 -0.078 -2.0 0.050 -0.011 -0.2 
Finance 0.033 0.113 2.7 0.065 0.052 1.3 
Community 0.166 0.015 0.4 0.375 0.023 0.7 
East Germany 0.316 -0.638 -37.9 0.372 -0.418 -16.3 
X 0.606 -0.160 -1.5 0.766 -0.564 -13.8 
3ep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 2.861 2.587 
Standard Dev. 0.494 0.497 
Observations 2488 1885 
R-squared 0.473 0.41 
RSS 319.5 275.1 
Log-Li ke -976.9 -860.7 
** and * represents significale at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
# reported t-ratios are based upon White's heteroscedastic consistent standard errore. 
XXIX 
i P P E N D I X 5.14 Inter-temporal Décomposition. Germany 1991-1996 
Variable Maie m e a n 
1991 
F e m . m e a n 
1991 
p maie 1991 p maie 1996 Maie m e a n 
1996 
F e m . M e a n 
1996 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.000 1.000 2.838 3.767 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 20.316 19.282 0.016 -0.018 20.710 19.973 -0.005 0.035 
Experience2 531.665 493.947 -0.0003 0.0004 540.269 513.581 0.005 -0.029 
Education 1 0.036 0.048 -0.003 -0.038 0.038 0.037 0.000 0.000 
Education 3 0.680 0.633 0.128 -0.012 0.648 0.627 0.000 0.007 
Education 4 0.178 0.168 0.349 0.215 0.217 0.203 -0.001 0.001 
Part-time 0.013 0.236 0.230 0.245 0.021 0.274 0.007 0.003 
Public Sector 0.239 0.378 -0.071 0.043 0.247 0.392 0.000 0.016 
Large Firm 0.594 0.490 0.058 0.063 0.545 0.468 0.002 0.000 
Small Firm 0.143 0.217 -0.145 -0.079 0.170 0.252 -0.001 0.005 
Married 0.756 0.685 0.024 0.002 0.715 0.658 0.000 0.002 
Agriculture 0.033 0.020 -0.175 -0.082 0.018 0.017 -0.001 -0.001 
Mining 0.020 0.004 -0.005 -0.022 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.023 0.005 0.159 0.023 0.019 0.008 0.000 0.002 
Construction 0.122 0.016 0.042 0.031 0.127 0.024 0.000 0.001 
Services 0.072 0.193 -0.172 -0.117 0.082 0.183 0.002 0.007 
Transport 0.075 0.050 -0.078 -0.092 0.076 0.049 0.000 0.000 
Finance 0.033 0.065 0.113 -0.023 0.051 0.085 0.000 -0.004 
Community 0.166 0.375 0.015 -0.043 0.204 0.438 -0.001 -0.012 
East Germany 0.316 0.372 -0.638 -0.297 0.195 0.311 -0.018 0.019 
X 0.606 0.766 -0.160 -0.923 0.520 0.692 -0.010 -0.122 
Total -0.020 -0.071 
Term 1 - (ÔZj - 5Zk)Pk 
Term2 = 5Zj(pj-p k ) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - 5\f/k)uk = (.566 - .363).296 = 0.060 
Term 4 = o> y (OJ - = .566(360 - .296) = 0.037 
XXX 
ppendix 6.1. 
1996 Germany: Female 
1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total % 
1-dec. 56 29 19 13 10 6 4 1 1 1 140 
2-dec. 18 22 21 5 15 8 4 2 1 2 98 
3-dec. 12 16 28 22 15 14 4 1 1 0 113 
4-dec. 11 11 26 34 18 9 5 4 1 2 121 
5-dec. 13 3 6 25 33 18 8 5 1 1 113 
6-dec. 8 4 4 13 28 30 21 7 2 3 120 
7-dec. 4 3 3 8 9 27 19 11 4 1 89 
8-dec. 2 2 1 2 3 5 9 27 15 3 69 
9-dec. 1 1 0 0 3 1 8 9 12 5 40 
10-dec. 1 0 1 1 2 2 0 2 5 13 27 
Total 126 91 109 123 136 120 82 69 43 31 930 
1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total % 
1-dec. 40 .000 20.714 13.571 9.286 7.143 4.286 2.857 0.714 0.714 0.714 100 15.054 
2-dec. 18.367 22 .449 21.429 5.102 15.306 8.163 4.082 2.041 1.020 2.041 100 10.538 
3-dec. 10.619 14.159 24.779 19.469 13.274 12.389 3.540 0.885 0.885 0.000 100 12.151 
4-dec. 9.091 9.091 21.488 28.099 14.876 7.438 4.132 3.306 0.826 1.653 100 13.011 
5-dec. 11.504 2.655 5.310 22.124 29.204 15.929 7.080 4.425 0.885 0.885 100 12.151 
6-dec. 6.667 3.333 3.333 10.833 23.333 25.000 17.500 5.833 1.667 2.500 100 12.903 
7-dec. 4.494 3.371 3.371 8.989 10.112 30.337 21.348 12.360 4.494 1.124 100 9.570 
8-dec. 2.899 2.899 1.449 2.899 4.348 7.246 13.043 39.130 21.739 4.348 100 7.419 
9-dec. 2.500 2.500 0.000 0.000 7.500 2.500 20.000 22.500 30 .000 12.500 100 4.301 
10-dec. 3.704 0.000 3.704 3.704 7.407 7.407 0.000 7.407 18.519 48 .148 100 2.903 
Total 13.548 9.785 11.720 13.226 14.624 12.903 8.817 7.419 4.624 3.333 100 100 
1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total 
1-dec. 23 .391 16.169 15.881 12.371 12.723 8.976 4.954 2.548 1.459 1.529 100 
2-dec. 16.858 13.243 15.037 13.229 15.455 11.696 6.264 3.785 2.175 2.258 100 
3-dec. 13.810 '11.589 16.049 16.626 16.341 12.501 6.719 3.521 1.541 1.303 100 
4-dec. 12.713 10.420 15.830 18.012 15.899 11.749 6.386 4.574 2.294 2.122 100 
5-dec. 12.588 7.437 10.617 17.438 18.510 14.203 8.660 6.007 2.572 1.967 100 
6-dec. 10.059 5.840 7.612 14.187 18.021 17.702 11.749 8.000 3.841 2.988 100 
7-dec. 8.250 5.452 6.587 11.614 15.770 18.317 13.850 11.214 5.968 2.977 100 
8-dec. 5.517 4.194 3.637 5.728 9.208 10.918 14.184 22.941 16.666 7.006 100 
9-dec. 5.253 3.438 2.820 5.203 9.511 11.505 14.346 19.499 17.256 11.169 100 
10-dec. 6.018 2.750 4.747 6.545 10.476 8.491 6.881 11.573 16.361 26.158 100 
1 0.115 0.115 0.000 
2 0.091 0.074 0.018 
3 0.102 0.071 0.031 
4 0.107 0.056 0.051 
5 0.099 0.041 0.058 
6 0.106 0.034 0.072 
7 0.082 0.019 0.063 
8 0.057 0.018 0.040 
9 0.036 0.005 0.031 
10 0.021 0.000 0.021 
B. l .= 0.817 Up= 0.433 D o w n = 0.385 
xxxi 
1996 G e r m a n y : Male 
991 1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total % 
1-dec. 22 12 18 16 7 5 5 2 0 0 87 
2-dec. 7 14 11 12 10 3 3 1 1 0 62 
3-dec. 7 7 11 12 12 7 3 2 3 0 64 
4-dec. 3 4 10 19 16 16 13 6 3 1 91 
5-dec. 10 8 10 28 30 31 19 12 2 1 151 
6-dec. 8 4 9 31 37 70 47 17 3 2 228 
7-dec. 5 5 5 18 21 60 59 50 12 6 241 
8-dec. 3 2 1 4 13 27 52 68 34 6 210 
9-dec. 0 3 2 5 2 5 22 42 77 31 189 
10-dec. 3 1 0 0 2 3 7 5 28 79 128 
Total 68 60 77 145 150 227 2 3 0 205 163 126 1451 
1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total % 
1-dec. 25 .287 13.793 20.690 18.391 8.046 5.747 5.747 2.299 0.000 0.000 100 5.996 
2-dec. 11.290 22.581 17.742 19.355 16.129 4.839 4.839 1.613 1.613 0.000 100 4.273 
3-dec. 10.938 10.938 17.188 18.750 18.750 10.938 4.688 3.125 4.688 0.000 100 4.411 
4-dec. 3.297 4.396 10.989 20.879 17.582 17.582 14.286 6.593 3.297 1.099 100 6.272 
5-dec. 6.623 5.298 6.623 18.543 19.868 20.530 12.583 7.947 1.325 0.662 100 10.407 
6-dec. 3.509 1.754 3.947 13.596 16.228 30.702 20.614 7.456 1.316 0.877 100 15.713 
7-dec. 2.075 2.075 2.075 7.469 8.714 24.896 24.481 20.747 4.979 2.490 100 16.609 
8-dec. 1.429 0.952 0.476 1.905 6.190 12.857 24.762 32.381 16.190 2.857 100 14.473 
9-dec. 0.000 1.587 1.058 2.646 1.058 2.646 11.640 22.222 40 .741 16.402 100 13.025 
10-dec. 2.344 0.781 0.000 0.000 1.563 2 344 5.469 3.906 21.875 61 .719 100 8.822 
Total 4.686 4.135 5.307 9.993 10.338 15.644 15.851 14.128 11 .234 8.684 100 100 
1 -dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total 
1-dec. 11.708 10.342 14.146 17.786 14.546 12.760 9.891 5.668 2.639 0.515 100 
2-dec. 9.344 10.528 12.903 17.898 15.808 13.337 10.137 5.981 3.270 0.793 100 
3-dec. 8.266 8.069 11.053 16.763 15.315 15.235 11.723 7.533 4.642 1.401 100 
4-dec. 5.418 5.227 7.866 14.808 14.757 18.800 15.311 10.449 5.101 2.263 100 
5-dec. 6.035 5.425 7.925 14.958 14.781 19.208 15.567 10.281 4.138 1.682 100 
6-dec. 4.672 3.834 5.974 13.464 14.188 22.013 17.879 11.725 4.242 2.010 100 
7-dec. 3.545 3.012 4.194 10.088 11.484 20.145 19.459 16.188 7.971 3.914 100 
8-dec. 2.488 2.203 2.512 6.725 8.387 16.557 19.973 20.971 14.048 6.135 100 
9-dec. 1.488 1.921 1.707 3.984 4.636 8.904 15.174 19.819 24 .575 17.790 100 
10-dec. 2.482 1.604 1.183 2.252 2.920 5.102 9.080 10.037 23.382 41 .959 100 
1 0.053 0.053 0.000 
2 0.038 0.034 0.004 
3 0.039 0.032 0.007 
4 0.053 0.042 0.012 
5 0.089 0.053 0.036 
6 0.123 0 .056 0.066 
7 0.134 0.047 0.087 
8 0.114 0.029 0.085 
9 0.098 0.023 0.075 
10 0.051 0.000 0.051 
B . I . - 0 .793 Up= 0.369 D o w n = 0.423 
xxxii 
1996 UK: Female 
991 1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total % 
1-dec. 62 34 21 18 11 13 4 3 1 1 168 
2-dec. 56 57 26 25 11 5 1 7 3 1 192 
3-dec. 28 41 43 32 17 11 12 3 1 2 190 
4-dec. 11 31 29 36 26 9 4 4 1 3 154 
5-dec. 2 12 19 33 41 21 17 5 5 4 159 
6-dec. 8 9 4 10 24 31 18 9 4 4 121 
7-dec. 2 4 2 4 6 24 15 30 5 3 95 
8-dec. 3 2 3 5 5 9 16 23 19 7 92 
9-dec. 1 6 2 1 2 11 3 29 37 19 111 
10-dec. 3 2 2 4 2 0 1 7 16 20 57 
Total 176 198 151 168 145 134 91 120 92 64 1339 
1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total % 
1-dec. 36.905 20.238 12.500 10.714 6.548 7.738 2.381 1.786 0.595 0.595 100 12.547 
2-dec. 29.167 29 .688 13.542 13.021 5.729 2.604 0.521 3.646 1.563 0.521 100 14.339 
3-dec. 14.737 21.579 22.632 16.842 8.947 5.789 6.316 1.579 0.526 1.053 100 14.190 
4-dec. 7.143 20.130 18.831 23.377 16.883 5.844 2.597 2.597 0.649 1.948 100 11.501 
5-dec. 1.258 7.547 11.950 20.755 25.786 13.208 10.692 3.145 3.145 2.516 100 11.875 
6-dec. 6.612 7.438 3.306 8.264 19.835 25.620 14.876 7.438 3.306 3.306 100 9.037 
7-dec. 2.105 4.211 2.105 4.211 6.316 25.263 15.789 31.579 5.263 3.158 100 7.095 
8-dec. 3.261 2.174 3.261 5.435 5.435 9.783 17.391 25.000 20.652 7.609 100 6.871 
9-dec. 0.901 5.405 1.802 0.901 1.802 9.910 2.703 26.126 33 .333 17.117 100 8.290 
10-dec. 5.263 3.509 3.509 7.018 3.509 0.000 1.754 12.281 28.070 35 .088 100 4.257 
Total 13.144 14.787 11.277 12.547 10.829 10.007 6.796 8.962 6.871 4.780 100 100 
1 -dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total 
1-dec. 22 .869 19.593 13.378 13.442 10.005 8.415 4.616 4.081 1.993 1.608 100 
2-dec. 22.764 21 .089 14.130 13.990 9.292 6.642 3.810 4.077 2.507 1.699 100 
3-dec. 17.011 19.134 14.549 14.903 11.056 8.464 5.452 5.213 2.256 1.962 100 
4-dec. 13.799 18.169 14.713 16.403 13.150 8.235 5.659 4.610 2.768 2.493 100 
5-dec. 7.595 12.957 11.783 15.251 15.348 12.308 8.449 8.112 4.537 3.660 100 
6-dec. 8.390 10.409 8.087 11.692 14.266 15.377 10.341 11.012 6.046 4.381 100 
7-dec. 5.942 7.080 5.260 8.161 10.837 15.547 12.931 17.055 11.144 6.043 100 
8-dec. 5.189 6.900 5.257 7.200 7.985 12.925 10.258 19.301 15.698 9.287 100 
9-dec. 5.027 6.314 4.075 5.543 5.904 9.686 8.025 19.255 21.943 14.228 100 
10-dec. 6.565 7.631 5.842 7.437 5.464 6.002 4.710 15.837 22.095 18.418 100 
1 0.097 0.097 0.000 
2 0.113 0.081 0.033 
3 0.121 0.070 0.051 
4 0.096 0.042 0.054 
5 0.101 0.044 0.057 
6 0.076 0.029 0.048 
7 0.062 0.024 0.037 
8 0.055 0.017 0.038 
9 0.065 0.012 0.053 
10 0.035 0.000 0.035 






3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total 
1-dec. 9 15 10 12 7 3 6 3 2 2 69 
2-dec. 5 7 23 13 11 7 1 2 1 3 73 
3-dec. 6 15 18 17 7 5 10 4 1 0 83 
4-dec. 5 15 30 16 19 12 10 5 1 1 114 
5-dec. 7 6 15 14 20 24 20 8 5 4 123 
6-dec. 4 8 11 23 23 23 26 11 7 2 138 
7-dec. 2 3 10 12 16 27 51 33 6 8 168 
8-dec. 7 3 6 5 7 15 42 44 41 8 178 
9-dec. 3 2 3 6 7 10 19 57 66 36 209 
10-dec. 0 2 3 3 5 8 4 10 49 94 178 
Total 4 8 7 6 129 121 122 134 189 177 179 158 1333 
1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total % 
1-dec. 13.043 21.739 14.493 17.391 10.145 4.348 8.696 4.348 2.899 2.899 100 5.176 
2-dec. 6.849 9.589 31.507 17.808 15.068 S.589 1.370 2.740 1.370 4.110 100 5.476 
3-dec. 7.229 18.072 21.687 20.482 8.434 6.024 12.048 4.819 1.205 0.000 100 6.227 
4-dec. 4.386 13.158 26.316 14.035 16.667 10.526 8.772 4.386 0.877 0.877 100 8.552 
5-dec. 5.691 4.878 12.195 11.382 16.260 19.512 16.260 6.504 4.065 3.252 100 9.227 
6-dec. 2.899 5.797 7.971 16.667 16.667 16 .667 18.841 7.971 5.072 1.449 100 10.353 
7-dec. 1.190 1.786 5.952 7.143 9.524 16.071 30.357 19.643 3.571 4.762 100 12.603 
8-dec. 3.933 1.685 3.371 2.809 3.933 8.427 23.596 24.719 23.034 4.494 100 13.353 
9-dec. 1.435 0.957 1.435 2.871 3.349 4.785 9.091 27.273 31.579 17.225 100 15.679 
10-dec. 0.000 1.124 1.685 1.685 2.809 4.494 2.247 5.618 27.528 52.809 100 13.353 
Total 3.601 5.701 9.677 9.077 9.152 10.053 14.179 13.278 13.428 11.853 100 100 
1-dec. 2-dec. 3-dec. 4-dec. 5-dec. 6-dec. 7-dec. 8-dec. 9-dec. 10-dec. Total 
1-dec. 6.020 10.863 18.798 14.304 12.272 10.092 11.167 7.366 4.661 4.456 100 
2-dec. 5.888 11.867 18.398 15.448 12.213 10.229 11.621 6.155 4.209 3.972 100 
3-dec. 5.652 10.987 19.240 14.787 12.452 10.559 12.696 7.668 3.467 2.491 100 
4-dec. 5.534 10.490 17.751 14.907 12.513 11.382 13.454 7.454 3.801 2.715 100 
5-dec. 4.456 7.806 12.840 12.572 12.166 12.575 16.263 10.174 6.387 4.761 100 
6-dec. 4.125 7.134 13.210 11.923 12.424 12.954 16.698 10.949 6.438 4.146 100 
7-dec. 3.214 4.803 8.949 9.412 10.227 12.789 20.330 14.661 9.443 6.171 100 
8-dec. 3.047 3.785 6.367 7.038 7.566 10.182 18.435 18.710 15.837 9.033 100 
9-dec. 2.446 2.599 4.570 4.908 5.711 8.038 14.462 18.990 21 .797 16.479 100 
10-dec. 1.206 2.023 3.472 3.849 4.639 6.209 7.367 13.031 24.997 33.207 100 
1 0.049 0.049 0.000 
2 0.048 0.045 0.003 
3 0.050 0.040 0.010 
4 0.073 0.044 0.029 
5 0.081 0.046 0.035 
6 0.090 0.040 0.051 
7 0.100 0.038 0.062 
8 0.109 0.033 0.075 
9 0.123 0.026 0.097 
10 0.089 0.000 0.089 
B. l .= 0.812 Up= 0.361 D o w n = 0.451 
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ppendix 6.2. Earnings Functions: Germany (Short term) 
ermany: Short term 1991 
Maie Female 
Variable Mean Coefficient t-ratio Mean Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 1.00 2.54" 36.5 1.00 2.48" 34.33 
Expérience 23.34 0.03" 5.2 20.82 0.02" 3.11 
Expérience2 699.34 -0.001" -4.9 595.36 -0.0004" -3.05 
Education 1 0.05 0.01 0.1 0.07 0.04 0.71 
Education 3 0.64 0.13" 3.5 0.59 0.14" 3.04 
Education 4 0.16 0.33" 6.4 0.12 0.39" 5.34 
Part-time 0.01 0.16 1.1 0.23 -0.0002 -0.003 
Public Sector 0.22 -0.08 -1.5 0.33 0.12" 2.06 
Large Firm 0.57 0.07" 2.2 0.44 0.004 0.11 
Smali Firm 0.19 -0.12" -2.5 0.27 -0.14" -2.98 
Married 0.73 0.09" 2.6 0.65 -0.06* -1.74 
Agriculture 0.03 -0.10 -1.5 0.01 0.23 1.56 
Utilities 0.02 0.28" 4.2 0.00 0.09 1.56 
Construction 0.12 0.04 0.9 0.01 -0.11 -1.03 
Services 0.09 -0.19" -2.8 0.21 -0.07 -1.33 
Transport 0.08 -0.07 -1.0 0.05 0.03 0.32 
Finance 0.04 0 .21" 3.3 0.06 0.16" 2.22 
Community 0.17 0.08 1.4 0.36 -0.01 -0.20 
îast Germany 0.18 -0.64" -18.3 0.19 -0.52" -12.07 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 2.908 2.612 
Standard Dev. 0.497 0.508 
Observations 997 759 
R-squared 0.39 0.212 
RSS 150.4 154.4 
Log-Like -471.8 -472.6 
D-W Stat. 1.85 1.94 
reusch-Pagan 217.5 91.88 
** and * rcprcscnis significancc at thc 5% and 10% le vcls respect i vel y. 
XXXV 
lermany: Short term 1996 
Variable Mean 
Maie 
Coefficient t- ratio Mean 
Fe maie 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 1.00 2.68" 22.1 1.00 2.58" 25.0 
Expérience 14.71 0.03" 3.9 16.29 0.02" 2.7 
Expérience2 331.85 -0.001" -3.2 373.09 -0.001" -2.6 
Education 1 0.03 -0.02 -0.1 0.03 0.17 1.3 
Education 3 0.67 0.07 0.7 0.67 0.08 1.2 
Education 4 0.24 0.44" 3.7 0.17 0.37" 4.4 
Part-time 0.03 0.01 0.1 0.33 0.01 0.2 
Public Sector 0.24 0.08 0.9 0.39 0.12* 1.8 
Large Firm 0.47 0 .11" 2.5 0.38 0.15" 2.6 
Smali Firm 0.23 -0.16" -2.3 0.36 -0.07 -1.2 
Ma med 0.49 0.04 0.8 0.58 -0.14" -2.5 
Agriculture 0.01 -0.23" -2.1 0.02 -0.53** -2.8 
Utilities 0.03 -0.01 0.0 0.00 0.20 0.9 
Construction 0.11 -0.14* -1.6 0.04 -0.07 -0.7 
Services 0.13 -0.15" -2.0 0.18 -0.17" -2.0 
Transport 0.09 -0.24" -2.7 0.03 -0.38" -2.2 
Finance 0.08 0.03 0.4 0.09 0.05 0.4 
Community 0.20 -0.23" -2.3 0.47 -0.04 -0.5 
ïast Germany 0.13 -0.17" -2.2 0.18 -0.13" -2.2 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 3.061 2.794 
standard Dev. 0.523 0.53 
Observations 400 466 
R-squared 0.296 0.209 
RSS 76.7 103.2 
Log-Like -237.3 -310.1 
D-W Stat. 1.87 2.02 
Ireusch-Pagan 77.5 92.9 
** and * represents significance ot Ihe 5% and 10% Icvcls respectively. 
xxxvi 
ippendix 6.3. Inter-temporal Décomposition Germany 1991-1996 
lermany 1991 
Var iable p Ma ie 0 Female M a i e M e a n Female Mean B* Oaxaca & 
R a n s o m (1994) 
Exp la ined Maie 
Overpay 
m e n t 
Female 
U n d e r p a y 
m e n t 
Constant 2.544 2.477 1.000 1.000 2.511 0.000 0.032 0.035 
Expérience 0.028 0.019 23.339 20.825 0.024 0.061 0.099 0.110 
Expérience 2 -o.oot -0.0004 699.343 595.365 -0.0005 -0.052 -0.047 -0.054 
Education 1 0.006 0.043 0.051 0.074 0.027 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Education 3 0.129 0.142 0.642 0.594 0,134 0.006 -0.003 -0.005 
Education 4 0.331 0.391 0.161 0.116 0.351 0.016 -0.003 -0.005 
Part-time 0.161 0.000 0.013 0.232 0.019 -0.004 0.002 0.004 
^ublic Sector -0.081 0.117 0.225 0.328 0.010 -0.001 -0.020 -0.035 
Large Firm 0.071 0.004 0.573 0.439 0.043 0.006 0.016 0.017 
Smali Firm -0.118 -0.144 0.189 0.273 -0.130 0.011 0.002 0.004 
Married 0.092 -0.065 0.732 0,653 0.018 0.001 0.054 0.054 
Agriculture -0.101 0.227 0.033 0.013 -0.042 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
Utilities 0.276 0.095 0.020 0.003 0.179 0.003 0.002 0.000 
construction 0.038 -0.112 0.122 0.013 0.018 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Services -0.186 -0.067 0.088 0.208 -0.111 0.013 -0.007 -0.009 
Transport -0.068 0.028 0.080 0.050 -0.029 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
Finance 0.207 0.164 0.038 0.062 0.189 -0.004 0.001 0.002 
Community 0.080 -0.013 0.165 0.365 0.039 -0.008 0.007 0.019 
est Germany -0.643 -0.522 0.180 0.194 -0.595 0.008 -0.009 -0.014 
Tota l 0 .056 0 .122 0.117 0.296 
xxxvii 
iermany 1996 
Var iable B Ma ie B Female Maie M e a n Female Mean B* Oaxaca & 
R a n s o m (1994) 
Expla ined Maie 
Overpay 
m e n t 
F e m a l e 
U n d e r p a y 
m e n t 
Constant 2.685 2.580 1.000 1.000 2.624 0.000 0.061 0.044 
Expérience 0.034 0.025 14.705 16.292 0.030 -0.047 0.070 0.079 
Expérience 2 -0.001 -0.001 331.850 373.094 -0.001 0.025 -0.011 -0.014 
Education 1 -0.019 0.174 0.028 0.028 0.110 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
Education 3 0.072 0.076 0.673 0.670 0.075 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Education 4 0.438 0.365 0.235 0.172 0.390 0.025 0.011 0.004 
Part-time 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.328 0.009 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
'ublic Sector 0.075 0.116 0.238 0.388 0.100 -0.015 -0.006 -0.006 
Large Firm 0.109 0.151 0.473 0.376 0 1 2 4 0.012 -0.007 -0.010 
Small Firm -0.159 -0.069 0.230 0.365 -0.108 0.014 -0.012 -0.014 
Married 0.044 -0.141 0.485 0.575 -0.045 0.004 0.043 0.055 
Agriculture -0.229 -0.530 0.008 0.021 -0.301 0.004 0.001 0.005 
Utilities -0.007 0.196 0.025 0.004 0,074 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Construction -0.135 -0.071 0.105 0.043 -0.110 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 
Services -0.150 -0.169 0.125 0.182 -0.158 0.009 0.001 0.002 
Transport -0.242 -0.376 0.085 0.034 -0.270 -0.014 0.002 0.004 
Finance 0.028 0.052 0.075 0.094 0.034 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Community . -0.234 -0.039 0.203 0.468 -0.114 0.030 -0.024 -0.035 
ast Germany -0.170 -0.127 0.128 0.182 -0.143 0.008 -0.003 -0.003 
Total 0.047 0.115 0.105 0.266 
xxxviii 
Variable M a i e m e a n 
1991 
F e m . m e a n 
1991 
0 m a i e 1991 B m a ł e 1996 M a l e m e a n 
1996 
F e m . M e a n 
1996 
Term 1 Term 2 
Constant 1.000 1.000 2.544 2.685 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.339 20.825 0.028 0.034 14.705 16.292 0.141 -0.015 
Experience2 699.343 595.365 -0.001 -0.001 331.850 373.094 -0.093 0.008 
Education 1 0.051 0.074 0.006 -0.019 0.028 0.028 0.000 -0.001 
Education 3 0.642 0.594 0.129 0.072 0.673 0.670 0.003 0.003 
Education 4 0.161 0.116 0.331 0.43B 0.235 0.172 -0.008 -0.005 
Part-time 0.013 0.232 0.161 0.009 0.025 0.328 0.001 -0.033 
3ublic Sector 0.225 0.328 -0.081 0.075 0.238 0.388 0.004 0.016 
Large Firm 0.573 0.439 0.071 0.109 0.473 0.376 0.004 -0.005 
Small Firm 0.189 0.273 -0.118 -0.159 0.230 0.365 -0.008 -0.003 
Marri ed 0.732 0.653 0.092 0.044 0.485 0.575 0.007 0.004 
Agriculture 0.033 0.013 -0.101 -0.229 0.008 0.021 -0.008 0.003 
Utilities 0.020 0.003 0.276 -0.007 0.025 0.004 0.000 0.005 
Construction 0.122 0.013 0.038 -0.135 0.105 0.043 -0.006 0.019 
Services 0.088 0.208 -0.186 -0.150 0.125 0.182 0.009 0.004 
Transport 0.080 0.050 -0.068 -0.242 0.085 0.034 0.005 0.005 
Finance 0.038 0.062 0.207 0.028 0.075 0.094 0.000 -0.004 
Community 0.165 0.365 0.080 -0.234 0.203 0.468 -0.015 -0.063 
iast Germany 0.180 0.194 -0.643 -0.170 0.128 0.182 -0.007 0.007 
Total 0.029 -0.056 
Term 1 = (ÔZj - 8Z k )p k 
Term2 = 5Zj(Pj-p k ) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - ôy/k)(jk = (.629 - .425).441 = 0.089 
Term 4 = ô\f/j (ą - oj = .629(392 - .441) = -0.033 
xxxix 
ppendix 6.4. Earnings Functions: UK. (Short terni) 
K: Short term 1991 
Male Female 
Variable Mean Coefficient t-ratio Mean Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 1.00 -0.21 -1.0 1.00 -0.63" -3.51 
Experience 23.73 0.05" 10.2 22.60 0.02" 3.37 
Experience2 751.13 -0 .001" -8.0 689.93 -0.0002 -1.58 
Education 10.82 0.12" 6.4 10.93 0.16" 10.32 
Part-time 0.03 0.12 0.6 0.40 -0.14" -4.06 
Public Sector 0.18 0.07 1.1 0.34 0.22" 4.24 
Large Firm 0.20 0.09" 2.2 0.17 0.04 0.842 
Small Firm 0.44 -0.08" -2.1 0.54 -0.15" -4.47 
Married 0.66 0.10" 2.7 0.62 0.07" 1.97 
Ag riculture 0.01 -0.29" -2.8 0.003 -0.40* -1.92 
Utilities 0.03 0.24" 4.1 0.01 0.44" 4.65 
Construction 0.08 -0.02 -0.4 0.01 -0.11 -0.38 
Services 0.14 -0.15" -2.6 0.21 -0.10" -2.19 
Transport 0 .10 -0.10" -1.6 0.03 0.11 1.29 
Finance 0.09 0.19" 2.9 0.13 0.24" 4.30 
Community 0.18 -0.07 -0.9 0.45 -0.11" -1.82 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 1.666 1.345 
Standard Dev. 0.549 0.521 
Observations 934 899 
R-squared 0.279 0.305 
RSS 202.6 169.2 
Log-Like -611.6 -524.9 
D-W Stat. 1.89 2 
Ireusch-Pagan 225 57.5 
** and * represents signìfìcance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
JK: Short term 1996 
Variable Mean 
Maie 
Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Female 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 1.00 1.09" 10.1 1.00 1.60" 14.40 
Expérience 23.36 0.04" 4.1 23.65 -0.002 -0.25 
Expérience2 671.56 -0.0004" -2.6 671.22 0.0002 1.06 
Education 3.79 0.02" 3.9 4.30 0 .01" 3.01 
Part-time 0.11 -0.15" -2.1 0.29 -0.19" -3.67 
Public Sector 0.22 0.37" 5.9 0.29 0.35** 5.45 
Large Firm 0.18 0 .11" 2.3 0.18 0.07 1.38 
Small Firm 0.46 -0.07* -1.8 0.51 -0.09" -2.29 
Married 0.43 0.07* 1.9 0.49 0.09** 2.35 
Agriculture 0.01 -0.19* -1.9 0.01 -0.24* -1.60 
Utilities 0.01 0.29** 2.8 0.01 0.09 1.27 
Construction 0.03 0.08 0.7 0.02 0.08 0.64 
Services 0.21 -0.20" -3.7 0.23 -0.12" -2.20 
Transport 0.06 -0.02 -0.4 0.05 -0.01 -0.08 
Finance 0.15 0.19" 3.1 0.15 0 .21" 3.29 
Community 0.26 -0.22** -3.4 0.35 -0.15" -2.11 
Dep. Variable Ln Wage Ln Wage 
Mean 1.714 1.614 
Standard Dev. 0.569 0.59 
Observations 926 1001 
R-squared 0.199 0.175 
RSS 239.9 287.3 
Log-Like -688.6 -795.7 
D-W Stat. 1.9 1.94 
3reusch-Pagan 113.8 67.7 
** and * represenis significance al the 5% and 10% levels respeclively. 
ppendix 6 . 5 . Inter-temporal Decomposition: UK 1991-1996 
K 1991 
Yar iable 8 M a ł e 0 F e m a l e Małe M e a n Female M e a n 8* Oaxaca & 
R a n s o m (1994) 
Expla ined Małe 
Overpay 
ment 
F e m a l e 
U n d e r p a y 
m e n t 
Constant -0.215 -0.633 1.000 1.000 -0.452 0.000 0.237 0.181 
acperience 0.049 0.017 23.728 22.596 0.034 0.038 0.358 0.378 
zxperience 2 -0.001 0.000 751.133 689.931 0.000 -0.030 -0.214 -0.225 
Education 0.117 0.160 10.816 10.934 0.142 -0.017 -0.273 -0.202 
Part-time 0.120 -0.140 0.031 0.402 -0.132 0.049 0.008 0.003 
ublic Sector 0.066 0.223 0.183 0.340 0.158 -0.025 -0.017 -0.022 
.arge Firm 0.091 0.039 0.202 0.169 0.068 0.002 0.005 0.005 
Smali Firm -0.080 -0.151 0.438 0.543 -0.119 0.013 0.017 0.017 
Married 0.098 0.067 0.662 0.622 0.082 0.003 0.011 0.009 
ftgriculture -0.288 -0.403 0.013 0.003 -0.311 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.244 0.442 0.026 0.007 0.300 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
onstruction -0.021 -0.111 0.082 0.007 -0.024 -0.002 0.000 0.001 
Services -0.147 -0.105 0.139 0.208 -0.122 0.008 -0.003 -0.004 
Transport -0.098 0.107 0.101 0.031 -0.026 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 
Finance 0.188 0.241 0.092 0.130 0.218 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 
jommunity -0.068 -0.109 0.177 0.448 -0.094 0.025 0.005 0.007 
Tota l 0 .058 0.123 0.140 0.321 
K 1996 
Yar iable 0 M a ł e 0 F e m a l e Małe M e a n Female M e a n B* Oaxaca & 
R a n s o m (1994) 
Expla ined Małe 
Overpay 
m e n t 
Female 
U n d e r p a y 
m e n t 
Constant 1.086 1.602 1.000 1.000 1.336 0.000 -0.250 -0.266 
Experience 0.036 -0.002 23.356 23.651 0.017 -0.005 0.450 0.443 
Experience z 0.000 0.000 671.557 671.220 0.000 0.000 -0.206 -0.190 
Education 0.016 -0.013 3.789 4.299 0.002 -0.001 0.051 0.066 
Part-time -0.147 -0.185 0.112 0.291 -0.172 0.031 0.003 0.004 
ubiic Sector 0.374 0.350 0.224 0.292 0.362 -0.025 0.003 0.004 
.arge Firm 0.109 0.070 0.181 0.180 0.090 0.000 0.003 0.004 
Smali Firm -0.070 -0.091 0.464 0.510 -0.080 0.004 0.005 0.005 
Married 0.073 0.089 0.434 0.495 0.081 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
Agriculture -0.186 -0.236 0.013 0.009 -0.201 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Utilities 0.289 0.093 0.010 0.008 0.158 0.000 0.001 0.001 
onstruction 0.083 0.084 0.033 0.022 0.083 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Services -0.195 -0.124 0.207 0.228 -0.162 0.003 -0.007 -0.009 
Transport -0.024 -0.006 0.060 0.046 -0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Finance 0.186 0.214 0.147 0.148 0.199 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
^ommunity -0.220 -0.153 0.263 0.351 -0.190 0.017 -0.008 -0.013 
Total 0.019 0.039 0.042 0.0998 
xlii 
Variable M a i e m e a n 
1991 
F e m . m e a n 
1991 
p maie 1991 6 m a i e 1996 Maie m e a n 
1996 
F e m . M e a n 
1996 
Term 1 Term 2 
Constant 1.000 1.000 -0.215 1.086 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.728 22.596 0.049 0.036 23.356 23.651 0.051 0.015 
Experience2 751.133 689.931 -0.001 0.000 671.557 671.220 -0.026 -0.022 
Education 10.816 10.934 0.117 0.016 3.789 4.299 0.006 -0.012 
Part-time 0.031 0.402 0.120 -0.147 0.112 0.291 0.028 -0.099 
Public Sector 0.183 0.340 0.066 0.374 0.224 0.292 -0.033 0.048 
Large Firm 0.202 0.169 0.091 0.109 0.181 0.180 0.003 -0.001 
Small Firm 0.438 0.543 -0.080 -0.070 0.464 0.510 0.004 0.001 
Married 0.662 0.622 0.098 0.073 0.434 0.495 0.007 0.001 
Agriculture 0.013 0.003 -0.288 -0.186 0.013 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
Utilities 0.026 0.007 0.244 0.289 0.010 0.008 0.005 -0.001 
Construction 0.082 0.007 -0.021 0.083 0.033 0.022 0.005 -0.008 
Services 0.139 0.208 -0.147 -0.195 0.207 0.228 0.009 -0.003 
Transport 0.101 0.031 -0.098 -0.024 0.060 0.046 -0.001 -0.005 
Finance 0.092 0.130 0.188 0.186 0.147 0.148 -0.007 0.000 
Community 0.177 0.448 -0.068 -0.220 0.263 0.351 0.040 -0.041 
Total 0.092 -0.127 
Term 1 = (5Zj - 5Z k)pk 
Te rm2 = 5Zj(Pj-p k ) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - ôy/k)ak = (.749 - . 186).513 = 0.289 
Term 4 = ó>y (aj - o*) = .749(.469 - .513) = -0.033 
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Í T R O D U C T I O N 
. 1 . 
{few words about the ECHP... 
i 1 9 9 1 , E u r o s t a t , t h e S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t i e s , s e t u p a T a s k F o r c e o n 
l o u s e h o l d I n c o m e s in o r d e r t o r e s p o n d t o t h e s t r o n g d e m a n d f o r i n f o r m a t i o n o n h o u s e h o l d a n d 
i d i v i d u a l i n c o m e . T h e T a s k F o r c e w a s m a n d a t e d t o a s s e s s , t o g e t h e r w i t h E U M e m b e r S t a t e s , t h e 
i c o m e d a t a in r e g i s t e r s a n d e x i s t i n g n a t i o n a l h o u s e h o l d s u r v e y s , a n d t o c h e c k w h e t h e r t h e 
i va i l ab le o u t p u t s c o u l d b e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y h a r m o n i s e d ex-post. 
i f te r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h i s " o u t p u t a p p r o a c h " , t h e d e c i s i o n w a s t a k e n t o l a u n c h a s p e c i f i c E U s u r v e y , 
i e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y H o u s e h o l d P a n e l ( E C H P ) , t o a d o p t a n i n p u t - o r i e n t e d a p p r o a c h r a t h e r 
i a n s t r i c t l y t r y t o h a r m o n i s e e x i s t i n g o u t p u t s . A l t h o u g h t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w a s d e s i g n e d c e n t r a l l y a t 
i u r o s t a t , in c l o s e c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e M e m b e r S t a t e s , it a l l o w e d f o r s o m e f l ex i b i l i t y f o r a d a p t a t i o n 
3 n a t i o n a l s y s t e m s . . 
' h e E C H P f o r m s t h e r e f o r e t h e m o s t c l o s e l y c o - o r d i n a t e d c o m p o n e n t o f t h e E u r o p e a n s y s t e m o f 
o c i a l s u r v e y s . It h a s b e e n g i v e n a c e n t r a l p l a c e in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o m p a r a b l e s o c i a l s t a t i s t i c s 
i c r o s s M e m b e r S t a t e s o n i n c o m e ( i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l t r a n s f e r s e t c . ) , l a b o u r , p o v e r t y a n d s o c i a l 
i x c l u s i o n , h o u s i n g , h e a l t h , a s w e l l a s v a r i o u s o t h e r s o c i a l i n d i c a t o r s c o n c e r n i n g l i v i ng c o n d i t i o n s o f 
i r i va te h o u s e h o l d s a n d p e r s o n s . T h e m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l a n d m u l t i - p u r p o s e n a t u r e o f t h e s u r v e y a l s o 
m a b l e s t h e s t u d y o f t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e s e d i m e n s i o n s . 
' h e l o n g i t u d i n a l , ' p a n e l ' d e s i g n o f t h e E C H P m a k e s it p o s s i b l e t o f o l l o w u p a n d i n t e r v i e w t h e s a m e 
e t o f p r i v a t e h o u s e h o l d s a n d p e r s o n s o v e r s e v e r a l c o n s e c u t i v e y e a r s . In c o n t r a s t t o a c r o s s -
e c t i o n a l s u r v e y , it s u p p l i e s d a t a o n E U s o c i a l d y n a m i c s i .e. it p r o v i d e s i n f o r m a t i o n o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
m d t r a n s i t i o n s o v e r t i m e a t t h e m i c r o l e v e l . 
iCHP data a re co l lec ted by "Nat iona l Data Col lect ion Uni ts" - " N D U s " , e i ther N a t i o n a l S t a t i s t i c a l I n s t i t u t e s 
N S I s ) o r r e s e a r c h c e n t r e s d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o u n t r y ( s e e a n n e x 6 f o r a d d r e s s e s o f N D U s ) . In t h e 
rs t w a v e ( in 1 9 9 4 ) a s a m p l e o f s o m e 6 0 , 5 0 0 n a t i o n a l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h o u s e h o l d s - i .e. 
i p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 a d u l t s a g e d 1 6 y e a r s a n d o v e r - w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d in t h e t h e n 1 2 M e m b e r 
i t a t e s . A u s t r i a ( i n 1 9 9 5 ) a n d F i n l a n d ( 1 9 9 6 ) h a v e j o i n e d t h e p r o j e c t s i n c e t h e n . F r o m 1 9 9 7 
i n w a r d s , s i m i l a r d a t a i s a v a i l a b l e f o r S w e d e n . In f a c t , E C H P U D B v a r i a b l e s w e r e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e 
¡wedish L i v i n g C o n d i t i o n s S u r v e y a n d a r e n o w i n c l u d e d i n t h e E C H P U D B . In w a v e 2 , E U - 1 3 
a m p i e s t o t a l l e d s o m e 6 0 , 0 0 0 h o u s e h o l d s a n d 1 2 9 , 0 0 0 a d u l t s . 
: o r t h e f o u r t h w a v e o f t h e E C H P , i .e. in 1 9 9 7 , t h e o r i g i n a l E C H P s u r v e y s w e r e s t o p p e d in t h r e e 
o u n t r i e s , n a m e l y G e r m a n y , L u x e m b o u r g a n d in t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m . In t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , e x i s t i n g 
l a t i ona l p a n e l s w e r e t h e n u s e d a n d c o m p a r a b l e d a t a w e r e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e G e r m a n a n d U K 
.u rvey b a c k f r o m 1 9 9 4 o n w a r d s , a n d f o r t h e L u x e m b o u r g s u r v e y b a c k f r o m 1 9 9 5 o n w a r d s , 
l o n s e q u e n t l y t w o s e t s o f d a t a a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e y e a r s 1 9 9 4 t o 1 9 9 6 f o r G e r m a n y a n d t h e U K , 
m d 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 f o r L u x e m b o u r g . 
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Eurosta t r e c o m m e n d s t h e u s e o f t h e o r i g i n a l E C H P d a t a f o r a n y a n a l y s i s c o v e r i n g o n l y t h e y e a r s 
9 9 4 - 1 9 9 6 f o r c o u n t r i e s w i t h t w o d i f f e r e n t d a t a s e i s f o r t h e s a m e y e a r . H o w e v e r , f o r l o n g i t u d i n a l 
m a l y s i s c o v e r i n g m o r e y e a r s , t h e c o n v e r t e d d a t a s e t s s h o u l d b e u s e d . 
: o r a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e E C H P m e t h o d o l o g y a n d q u e s t i o n n a i r e s , p l e a s e s e e " T h e E u r o p e a n 
^ o m m u n i t y H o u s e h o l d P a n e l ( E C H P ) : V o l u m e 1 - S u r v e y m e t h o d o l o g y a n d I m p l e m e n t a t i o n " a n d 
T h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y H o u s e h o l d P a n e l ( E C H P ) : V o l u m e 1 - S u r v e y q u e s t i o n n a i r e s : 
V a v e s 1 - 3 " - T h e m e 3 , S e r i e s E , E u r o s t a t , O P O C E , L u x e m b o u r g , 1996. 
.2. 
" h e n e e d f o r a l o n g i t u d i n a l u s e r s ' datábase 
Since t h e f i r s t E C H P r e s u l t s b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e , t h e r e h a s b e e n a n i n c r e a s i n g d e m a n d f r o m i n s i d e 
i n d o u t s i d e t h e C o m m i s s i o n f o r E C H P b a s e d s t a t i s t i c s . M a n y r e s e a r c h e r s a n d o t h e r u s e r s h a v e 
l i so e x p r e s s e d s t r o n g i n t e r e s t in h a v i n g d i r e c t a c c e s s t o t h e d a t a . In v i e w o f t h i s , E u r o s t a t d e c i d e d 
D d e v e l o p , t o g e t h e r w i t h N D U s , a s e t o f r u l e s a l l o w i n g f o r e a s i e r d i r e c t a c c e s s t o " a n o n y m i s e d " 
E C H P m i c r o - d a t a , w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i s i n g b o t h t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f d a t a c o n f i d e n t i a t i t y a n d t h e 
' a l u e o f t h e d a t a . 
n t h i s c o n t e x t , E u r o s t a t p r o p o s e d t o N D U s in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 7 t o créate a u s e r f r i e n d l y a n d w i d e l y 
l o c u m e n t e d " l o n g i t u d i n a l u s e r s ' datábase" ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e " u s e r s ' datábase" o r 
¡imply " U D B " ) t h a t w o u l d m e e t v a r i o u s " o b j e c t i v e a n o n y m i s a t i o n c r i t e r i a " . B y " o b j e c t i v e " , it is m e a n t 
h a t o n c e t h e s e c r i t e r i a a r e a p p l i e d t o t h e v a r i o u s E C H P f i l e s , t h e r e s h o u l d b e n o r i s k t h a t a n 
n d i v i d u a l s t a t i s t i c a l u n i t c o u l d b e i d e n t i f i e d t h r o u g h "a l l t h e m e a n s t h a t m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y b e u s e d b y 
i t h i r d p a r t y t o i d e n t i f y t h e s a i d s t a t i s t i ca l u n i t " ( E U C o u n c i l r e g u l a t i o n N° 3 2 2 / 9 7 o f 1 7 / 2 / 9 7 o n 
c o m m u n i t y s t a t i s t i c s , a l s o r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e ' S t a t i s t i c a l L a w ' ) . 
3 r o v i d e d t h a t a l l o f t h e s e a n o n y m i s a t i o n c r i t e r i a a r e m e t , E C H P d a t a s h o u l d t h u s b e c o n s i d e r e d a s 
n o n - c o n f i d e n t i a l " in t h e s e n s e o f t h e " S t a t i s t i c a l L a w " . H o w e v e r , it i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t d i r e c t a c c e s s t o 
¡uch a n o n y m i s e d m i c r o - d a t a b e r e s t r i c t e d b y m e a n s o f c o n t r a c t s s t i p u l a t i n g t h e s t r i c t c o n d i t i o n s o f 
ise a n d access (see sec t ion 3 o n c o n t r a c t s ; s e e a l s o t h e r e l a t e d c o n t r a c t t h a t l i nks u s e r s a n d / o r u s e r s ' 
j r g a n i s a t i o n s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d E u r o s t a t , o n t h e o t h e r ) . 
t is c l e a r l y in t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e E C H P p r o j e c t t o b e w i d e l y u s e d a n d v i s i b l e t h r o u g h i n t e r e s t i n g a n d 
i s e f u l a n a l y s e s a n d p u b l i c a t i o n s . In t h i s r e s p e c t E u r o s t a t w o u l d l i ke t o t h a n k a l l n a t i o n a l E C H P 
>ar tners f o r s u p p o r t i n g t h i s m a j o r b r e a k t h r o u g h i n E C H P d a t a a v a i l a b i l i t y . 
Euros ta t w o u l d b e g r a t e f u l if u s e r s c o u l d i n f o r m t h e E C H P t e a m o f a n y e r r o r s a n d o m i s s i o n s f o u n d 
n t h e d a t a o r in t h e d o c u m e n t a r o n . A n y i n f o r m a t i o n , c o m m e n t s o r s u a a e s t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r 
m o r o v e m e n t w o u l d b e w e l c o m e . 
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H E ECHP DATA 
: o r e a c h w a v e o f t h e E C H P , a c o d e b o o k , a s w e l l a s a l is t o f v a r i a b l e s a r e a v a i l a b l e ( w a v e 1 : 
J o c . P A N . 1 5 ; w a v e 2 : D o c . P A N . 3 0 ; w a v e 3 : D o c . P A N . 6 5 ; w a v e 4 : D o c . P A N . 8 1 ; w a v e 5 : 
íoc.PAN. 9 7 ; w a v e 6 : D o c . P A N . 1 1 2 ; w a v e 7 : D o c . P A N . 1 5 1 ; w a v e 8 : D o c . P A N . 1 5 9 ) . T h e s e 
l o c u m e n t s c o n t a i n t h e " C o m m u n i t y " q u e s t i o n w o r d i n g a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a r i a b l e ñames 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e v a r i a b l e s ) w h i c h a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r d a t a p r o c e s s i n g . N a t i o n a l q u e s t i o n n a i r e s a r e 
l a s e d o n t h i s c o m m o n versión. 
' h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d b y m e a n s o f t h e s e q u e s t i o n n a i r e s is c h e c k e d b y t h e N a t i o n a l D a t a 
o l l e c t i o n U n i t s ( N D U s ) a n d b y E u r o s t a t . N D U s p r o v i d e E u r o s t a t w i t h t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e i n t e r v i e w s , 
"h is i n f o r m a t i o n i s s t o r e d i n t h e s o - c a l l e d ' P r o d u c t i o n ' d a t a b a s e ( P D B ) . B a s e d o n t h i s P D B , a n 
m o n y m i s e d u s e r - f r i e n d l y l o n g i t u d i n a l u s e r d a t a b a s e ( U D B ) is c o n s t r u c t e d . 
! . 1 . 
' h e ' P r o d u c t i o n ' d a t a b a s e ( P D B ) 
' h e P D B c o n s i s t s o f m i c r o - d a t a f i l e s t h a t a r e s e n t t o E u r o s t a t in a f o r m a t t h a t i s v e r y cióse t o t h e 
[ U q u e s t i o n n a i r e . F o r e a c h w a v e t h e r e a r e f o u r c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l f i l e s ( D , H , R a n d P f i l e ) . 
di t h e w o r k r e l a t i n g t o d a t a c h e c k i n g ( b o t h c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n d l o n g i t u d i n a l ) i s d o n e i n t h i s 
i r o d u c t i o n datábase. 
: .2 . 
) a t a c h e c k i n g 
' h e d a t a h a s b e e n c h e c k e d a s t h o r o u g h l y a s p o s s i b l e , b o t h a t m i c r o a n d a g g r e g a t e d levéis, a n d 
j n g i t u d i n a l l y b e t w e e n w a v e s . H o w e v e r , f u r t h e r c h e c k i n g a n d r e f i n e m e n t s a r e r e q u i r e d . T h e E C H P 
> a d y n a m i c p r o j e c t , i .e. t h e d a t a a r e " n e v e r " c o m p l e t e l y f i n a l : p a n e l d a t a m u s t b e c o n t i n u o u s l y 
i p d a t e d u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d in s u b s e q u e n t w a v e s - it i s a n o n g o i n g b a c k w a r d s a n d f o r w a r d s 
i r o c e s s . T h e r e f o r e i t i s h o p e d t h a t u s e r s w i l l p r o m p t l y i n f o r m E u r o s t a t o f a n y e r r o r s f o u n d . 
. 3 . 
h e ' U s e r 1 datábase ( U D B ) 
"he P D B c o n t a i n s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d ' c o n f i d e n t i a l ' i n t e n m s o f t h e E U ' S t a t i s t i c a l l a w ' . I ts 
t r u c t u r e i s v e r y c o m p l e x a n d t h u s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i cu l t t o u s e o u t s i d e , b u t a l s o i n s i d e E u r o s t a t . T h i s 
i lso i n c r e a s e s t h e risk o f e r r o r s t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f t h e d a t a . F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , a c c e s s t o t h e 
•r ig inal d a t a h a d t o b e m o r e r e s t r i c t i v e t h a n w h a t w o u l d b e d e s i r a b l e t o e x p l o i t t h e f u l l p o t e n t i a l o f 
i e d a t a . 
l o w e v e r , i n v i e w o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g d e m a n d f o r E C H P d a t a , E u r o s t a t h a s c o n s t r u c t e d a n 
m o n y m i s e d u s e r - f r i e n d l y " l o n g i t u d i n a l u s e r s ' datábase", t h e E C H P U D B . 
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1.3.1. Anonymisation 
: o r c o n f i d e n t ! a l i t y reasons, t h e U D B n e e d s t o meet v a r i o u s " o b j e c t i v e a n o n y m i s a t i o n c r i t e r i a " a s 
l e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r . E u r o s t a t h a s d e v e l o p e d appropria t e a n o n y m i s a t i o n c r i t e r i a in c l o s e c o n s u l t a t i o n 
vi th t h e N D U s . P r o v i d e d t h a t a i l thèse c r i t e r i a a r e m e t . t h e E C H P d a t a c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d ' n o n -
: o n f i d e n t i a l ' i n t e r m s o f t h e ' S t a t i s t i c a l l a w ' a n d m a d e m o r e w i d e l y a v a i l a b l e . { s e e D o c . P A N . 1 0 5 f o r 
n o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e a n o n y m i s a t i o n o f E C H P d a t a ) . 
• l oweve r , a c c e s s t o s u c h a n o n y m i s e d m i c r o - d a t a st i l l n e e d s t o b e r e s t r i c t e d b y m e a n s o f c o n t r a c t s 
i t i pu l a t i ng t h e s t r i c t c o n d i t i o n s o f u s e ( s e e s e c t i o n 3 ' C o n t r a c t u a l A r r a n g e m e n t s ' ) . 
t . 3 .2 . User fhendliness 
" h e m a j o r c h a n g e s f r o m t h e ' P r o d u c t i o n ' t o t h e U s e r s ' d a t a b a s e a r e a s f o l l o w s : . A l i n k f i le w h i c h 
i l l o w s t r a c i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l s a c r o s s w a v e s h a s b e e n s e t u p . 
h e v a r i a b l e s h a v e b e e n fu l l y r e o r g a n i s e d , g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r a n d s t a n d a r d i s e d , w h i c h m e a n s t h a t 
h e y n o l o n g e r r e f l e c t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e . A n a l y t i c a l v a r i a b l e s d e r i v e d f r o m o r i g i n a l 
' a r i a b l e s h a v e also b e e n a d d e d . O n e i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e i s t h a t t h e v a r i a b l e n a m e s a r e n o w i d e n t i c a l 
n e a c h w a v e . 
Dr q u e s t i o n s a s k e d o n l y t o i n d i v i d u a l s i n t e r v i e w e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , o r t o t h o s e t h a t h a v e u n d e r g o n e 
i s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e s t n c e t h e p r e v i o u s w a v e ( e . g . in t h e i r l a b o u r f o r c e s t a t u s ) , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s 
o r w a r d e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g w a v e s , t h u s p e r m i t t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s o f e a c h 
v a v e . 
Here a r e 2 concrète i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f t h e différences b e t w e e n t h e h o u s e h o l d a n d p e r s o n a l f i l es i n t h e 
i r o d u c t i o n a n d u s e r s ' d a t a b a s e , a s w e l l a s s o m e s h o r t i n f o r m a t i o n o n i m p u t a t i o n a n d w e i g h t i n g : 
n t h e e m p l o y m e n t s e c t i o n o f t h e P D B , o n e l ist o f q u e s t i o n s is a s k e d t o p e o p l e w h o n o r m a l l y w o r k 
15 h o u r s a n d m o r e , a n d a n o t h e r o n e t o t h o s e w h o w o r k e d l e s s t h a n 1 5 h o u r s in a référence w e e k . 
U t h o u g h m o s t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a s k e d t o t h o s e t w o g r o u p s i s i d e n t i c a l , it is p r e s e n t e d i n t w o 
l i f f e ren t v a r i a b l e s i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n d a t a b a s e , r e f l e c t i n g t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h dépends 
>n t h e a m o u n t o f h o u r s w o r k e d , i .e. 1 5 h o u r s a n d m o r e o r l e s s t h a n 1 5 h o u r s . Thèse a r e c o m b i n e d 
n to a s i n g l e s e t o f v a r i a b l e s in t h e U D B c o v e r i n g b o t h g r o u p s o f r e s p o n d e n t s . 
n t h e U D B , i n c o m e c o m p o n e n t s h a v e b e e n d e f i n e d a t a h i g h e r l e v e l o f a g g r e g a t i o n t h a n t h e 
l e t a i l e d e n u m e r a t i o n g i v e n in t h e P D B . W h i l e t h e la t t e r i s r e q u i r e d t o o b t a i n a s complète a p i c t u r e 
>f t h e h o u s e h o l d i n c o m e a s p o s s i b l e , s u c h a d e g r e e o f détail i s n o t s u i t a b l e f o r a n a l y t i c a l p u r p o s e s , 
(Specially f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c o m p a r a t i v e c r o s s - c o u n t r y a n a l y s i s . T h e s a m e s t r u c t u r e i s f o l l o w e d a t 
h e h o u s e h o l d a n d p e r s o n l e v e l s . D e t a i l e d i t e m s o f i n c o m e s p e c i f i e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e a r e 
i g g r e g a t e d i n t o i n t e r m e d i a t e l e v e l c o m p o n e n t s f o r e a c h i n t e r v i e w e d p e r s o n in t h e h o u s e h o l d ; t h e y 
i r e a l s o c o n v e r t e d t o a n n u a l n e t a m o u n t s a s r e q u i r e d . 
d i s s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o n i n c o m e is i m p u t e d ( s e e D o c . P A N . 1 6 4 f o r d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n o f i m p u t a t i o n 
)f i n c o m e ) . E u r o s t a t w i s h e s t o t h a n k t h e S u r v e y R e s e a r c h C e n t e r a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n , a n d 
îpecifically D r R a g h u n a t h a n a n d D r S o l e n b e r g e r , f o r t h e i r s o f t w a r e f o r d a t a i m p u t a t i o n . 
xlix 
C H P U D S manual 
Weights t o b e a p p l i e d i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e d a t a h a v e b e e n a d d e d t o t h e b a s i c d a t a ( s e e A n n e x " f o r 
s h o r t d e s c r i p t i o n o f s a m p l e w e i g h t s a n d o n h o w t o u s e t h e s e w e i g h t s , a n d D o c . P A N . 1 6 5 f o r t h e 
o n s t r u c t i o n o f w e i g h t s ) . 
h e U D B c o n s i s t s o f t h e f o l l o w i n g d a t a f i l e s : 
. 3 . 3 . The country file 
h i s f i l e c o n t a i n s t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r e a c h w a v e a n d c o u n t r y : 
p o p u l a t i o n f i g u r e s ( n u m b e r o f prívate h o u s e h o l d s i n t h e c o u n t r y , n u m b e r o f p e r s o n s l i v i n g in 
r i v a t e h o u s e h o l d s , n u m b e r o f p e r s o n s a g e d 1 6 + l i v ing i n prívate h o u s e h o l d s ) f o r g r o s s i n g - u p a n d 
i o r d e r t o a g g r e g a t e o v e r c o u n t r i e s . 
p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r p a r i t i e s f o r c o n v e r t i n g n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s i n P P S 
e x c h a n g e r a t e s f o r c o n v e r t i n g n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s in E C U / E U R O 
h e c o u n t r y f i l e a l s o c o n t a i n s t h e f i x e d e x c h a n g e r a t e s f o r t h e ' E u r o z o n e ' c o u n t r i e s ( a f t e r 1 . 1 . 1 9 9 9 ) . 
. 3 . 4 . The longitudinal link-file 
i n c l u d e s d a t a f r o m a l l t h e w a v e s a n d a s s i g n s a r e c o r d t o e v e r y p e r s o n t h a t e v e r a p p e a r e d in t h e 
; C H P . T h e f i r s t s e c t i o n c o n t a i n s d a t a a s k e d o n l y o n c e ( w h e n t h e p e r s o n e n t e r e d t h e p a n e l o r w h e n 
e / s h e b e c a m e e l i g i b l e ) . T h e s e c o n d s e c t i o n , w h i c h i s r e p e a t e d in e a c h w a v e , c o n t a i n s a l l t h e 
íformation r e q u i r e d t o r e b u i l d t h e " l o n g i t u d i n a l s t a t u s " o f t h e p e r s o n f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g t o t h e e n d 
f t h e p a n e l , d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p e r s o n a l a n d h o u s e h o l d r e g i s t e r s . E a c h p e r s o n h a s a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
u m b e r ( P I D ) t h a t i s f i x e d a c r o s s w a v e s . 
. 3 . 5 . The four cross-sectional files for each wave 
. 3 . 5 . 1 . The "register file" 
c o v e r s a l l p e r s o n s c u r r e n t l y l i v i ng in h o u s e h o l d s w i t h a c o m p l e t e d h o u s e h o l d i n t e r v i e w in e a c h 
/ a v e . 
. 3 . 5 . 2 . The "relationship file" 
h a s b e e n d e r i v e d f r o m t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p m a t r i x in t h e h o u s e h o l d r e g i s t e r f i l e ( R - f i l e o f t h e P D B ) . I ts 
3Cords h a v e t h e f o r m a t " p e r s o n X h a s r e l a t i o n s h i p R w i t h p e r s o n Y " . It g i v e s a r e c o r d o f a l l p o s s i b l e 
s l a t i o n s h i p s o f e v e r y p e r s o n in a h o u s e h o l d . H e n e e , t h e r e i s o n e r e c o r d f o r e a c h p a i r o f p e r s o n s i n 
l e s a m e h o u s e h o l d , s p e c i f y i n g t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h e f o l l o w i n g r u l e i s u s e d in s p e c i f y i n g t h e 
a r i a b l e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o X , R a n d Y : 
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p is b e t w e e n a n a s c e n d a n t a n d a d e s c e n d a n t , 'R ' ( v a r i a b l e ' R e l a t i o n ' ) a l w a y s 
p e c i f i e s t h e d e s c e n d a n t s i d e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ( e . g . t h e c h i l d , g r a n d c h i l d e t c . ) . V a r i a b l e P I D 1 i s 
i e f i x e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n n u m b e r ( P I D ) o f t h e a s c e n d a n t , a n d v a r i a b l e P I D 2 is t h e f i x e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
u m b e r ( P I D ) o f t h e d e s c e n d a n t . 
i pa r t f r o m i ts m u c h s i m p l e r s t r u c t u r e t h a n t h e o r i g i n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p m a t r i x , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p f i l e h a s 
i e m a j o r a d v a n t a g e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a r e i d e n t i f i e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i r f i x e d P I D s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e w a v e -
l 
spécifie ' l i ne n u m b e r s ' in t h e m a t r i x , s o t h a t t h e c o n s i s t e n c y a n d évolution o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s c a n b e 
r a c e d o v e r w a v e s . 
ï.3.5.3. The "household file" 
rh i s f i l e c o n t a i n s o n e r e c o r d f o r e a c h h o u s e h o l d i n t e r v i e w . T h e i n f o r m a t i o n is g r o u p e d i n t o 7 
sec t ions . 
gênerai i n f o r m a t i o n 
démographie i n f o r m a t i o n 
h o u s e h o l d i n c o m e 
h o u s e h o l d f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n 
a c c o m m o d a t i o n 
d u r a b l e s , a n d 
c h i l d r e n . 
ï.3.5.4. T h e " p e r s o n a l f i l e " 
rh i s f i l e c o n t a i n s o n e r e c o r d f o r e a c h p e r s o n w i t h a c o m p l e t e d p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w . T h e i n f o r m a t i o n 
s g r o u p e d i n t o 1 3 s e c t i o n s : 
gênerai i n f o r m a t i o n 
démograph ie i n f o r m a t i o n 
c u r r e n t e m p l o y m e n t 
u n e m p l o y m e n t 
s e a r c h f o r a j o b 
p r e v i o u s j o b 
c a l e n d a r o f a c t i v i t i e s 
i n c o m e 
éducation a n d t r a i n i n g 
h e a l t h 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s 
m i g r a t i o n , a n d 
s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f l i f e . 
ï.3.6. Data description 
r h e d o c u m e n t ' E C H P U D S d e s c r i p t i o n o f v a r i a b l e s ' ( D o c . P A N . 1 6 6 ) l i s ts t h e v a r i a b l e s in t h e E C H P 
J D S . It a l s o p r o v i d e s t h e c o d e s a n d l a b e l s f o r thèse v a r i a b l e s , a s w e l l a s a n o v e r v i e w o f t h e 
l i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e w a v e s a n d t h e c o u n t r i e s . 
r h e d o c u m e n t ' E C H P U D S c o n s t r u c t i o n o f v a r i a b l e s ' ( D o c . P A N . 1 6 7 ) d e s c r i b e s t h e l i n k a g e 
j e t w e e n t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e v a r i a b l e s a n d t h e U D S v a r i a b l e s . 
) a t a is p r o v i d e d in c o m m a s e p a r a t e d v a l u e f i l e s ( C S V - f i l e s ) . 
li 
ECHPUDS marmai 
2 . 4 . S a m p l e s t r u c t u r e variables 
T o c o m p u t e s a m p l i n g e r r o r e , a t l e a s t t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r v a r i a b l e s a r e r e q u i r e d t o d e f i n e 
t h e s a m p l e s t r u c t u r e : 
H G O 0 4 : S a m p l e w e i g h t ( o r P G O 0 2 f o r p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w s , R G O 0 2 f o r t h e p o p u l a t i o n , 
e t c . ) 
H G O 0 5 : S t r a t u m 
H G O 0 6 : P r i m a r y s a m p l i n g u n i t s ( P S U ) 
H G O 0 7 : I n d i c a t o r o f w h e t h e r t h e P S U s w e r e s e l e c t e d w i t h i n s t r a t a s y s t e m a t i c a l l y f r o m 
a n o r d e r e d l is t , a n d if s o , t h e o r d e r o f sélection. 
A n a d d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e c o u l d b e t h e v a r i a b l e d e f i n i n g m a j o r d o m a i n s in t h e c o u n t r y f o r 
w h i c h s e p a r a t e s a m p l i n g e r r o r r e s u l t s m a y b e r e q u i r e d , e . g . m a j o r régions in t h e c o u n t r y 
s u c h a s N U T S 1 . 
A p a r t f r o m b e i n g u s e d f o r t h e w e i g h t i n g p r o c e d u r e ( d i s c u s s e d i n D O C . P A N . 1 6 5 ) , 
v a r i a b l e s H G O 0 5 - H G O 0 7 d e f i n e t h e e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e s a m p l e 
n e e d e d f o r t h e v a l i d c o m p u t a t i o n o f s a m p l i n g e r r o r s , w h i c h t a k e t h a t s t r u c t u r e i n t o 
a c c o u n t . Thèse v a r i a b l e s h a v e b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m o r i g i n a l v a r i a b l e s in t h e P D S D- f i le 
( e . g . f o r t h e 1 9 9 4 w a v e : D 0 1 P O I N T , D 0 1 N U T S 3 a n d D 0 1 S M S T 1 D 0 1 S M S T 4 ) , t o g e t h e r 
w i t h a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y N D U s a s n e c e s s a r y . S i n c e t h e o b j e c t i v e o f 
H G O 0 5 - H G O 0 7 is m e r e l y t o p r o v i d e s t r u c t u r a l i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e s a m p l e , w i t h n o 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e a c t u a l g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a t i o n s , t h e o r i g i n a l v a r i a b l e s h a v e b e e n 
a n o n y m i s e d t h r o u g h r a n d o m i s a t i o n . 
T h e s a m p l e s t r u c t u r e v a r i a b l e s H G O 0 5 - H G O 0 7 a r e s t r i c t l y d e f i n e d o n l y o n c e f o r a 
h o u s e h o l d , i .e. t h e f i r s t t i m e it a p p e a r s in t h e s u r v e y . Thèse h o u s e h o l d v a r i a b l e s a r e 
a s s i g n e d t o e a c h m e m b e r o f t h e h o u s e h o l d , a n d t h e n r e m a i n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e a c h 
p e r s o n e v e n if t h e p e r s o n m o v e s t o a différent l o c a t i o n o r t o a différent h o u s e h o l d in 
subséquent w a v e s . N e w ' n o n - s a m p l e * p e r s o n s e n t e r i n g a h o u s e h o l d r e c e i v e t h e 
v a r i a b l e s f r o m t h e s a m p l e p e r s o n s in t h e h o u s e h o l d . ( In t h e r a r e c a s e w h e n t h e 
h o u s e h o l d c o n t a i n s s a m p l e p e r s o n s f r o m m o r e t h a n o n e o r i g i n a l h o u s e h o l d , thèse 
v a r i a b l e s a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e p e r s o n w h o d e f i n e s t h e b a s i c p a r t ( D O i H H I D ) o f t h e 
h o u s e h o l d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n n u m b e r H I D = ( D O i H H I D * 1 0 0 ) + D O i S P L I T ) . 
M o s t E C H P s a m p l e s u s e t w o - s t a g e s a m p l e d e s i g n s , in w h i c h c a s e H G O 0 6 d e f i n e s t h e 
s a m p l e c l u s t e r s , a n d H G O 0 5 d e f i n e s t h e e x p l i c i t s t r a t a w i t h i n e a c h o f w h i c h t h e c l u s t e r s 
w e r e s e l e c t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y . M o s t E C H P s u r v e y s a l s o i n v o l v e t h e sélection o f P S U s 
w i t h s y s t e m a t i c s a m p l i n g f r o m o r d e r e d l i s t s , w h i c h a m o u n t s t o a d d i t i o n a l ' i m p l i c i f 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . V a r i a b l e H G O 0 7 i d e n t i f i e s t h e o r d e r in w h i c h t h e c l u s t e r s w e r e s e l e c t e d , s o 
t h a t t h i s f e a t u r e c a n b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t in s a m p l i n g e r r o r c o m p u t a t i o n s . T h e v a r i a b l e 
is g i v e n a ' n o t - a p p l i c a b l e ' c o d e ( -8 ) if s y s t e m a t i c s a m p l i n g w a s n o t i n v o l v e d . F o r s a m p l e s 
lii 
s e l e c t e d in a s i n g l e s t a g e ( d i r e c t s a m p l i n g o f h o u s e h o l d s o r p e r s o n s a s in D e n m a r k a n d 
I r e l a n d ) , a l i s a m p l e s t r u c t u r e v a r i a b l e s r e c e i v e t h e ' n o t - a p p l i c a b l e ' c o d e . 
liii 
A p p e n d i x 7.2 M e a n V a l u e s a n d O t h e r D e s c r i p t i v e S t a t i s t i c s 
Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France UK Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal 
Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. Maie Fem. 
Exp. 21.4 18.6 19.9 14.3 19.0 14.9 20.5 15.1 20.7 18.9 23.85 21.2 17.51 12.6 18.5 14.4 18.2 12.3 21.29 15.3 21.16 17.3 
E x p ' 600 476 521 303 468.8 309 525 333 547.5 475 709 586 455.9 265 477.1 317 473.6 244 614.8 359 639.3 456 
HED 0.32 0.35 0.17 0.21 0.36 0.49 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.36 0.20 0.31 0.04 0.06 
SED 0.44 0.42 0.60 0.53 0.36 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.43 0.40 0.54 0.40 0.47 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.15 
Public 0.06 0.29 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.08 
Married 0.54 0.49 0.69 0.39 0.72 0.63 0.73 0.52 0.66 0.56 0.72 0.58 0.55 0.41 0.68 0.56 0.71 0.59 0.71 0.53 0.66 0.66 
Manager 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Prof. 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.03 
Ass.Prof . 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.07 
Clerks 0.05 0.27 0.09 0.25 0.16 0.38 0.10 0.35 0.06 0.31 0.09 0.37 0.05 0.22 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.27 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.16 
Service 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.27 
Skil lag. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.02 0.004 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 
Crafts 0.26 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.34 0.20 0.31 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.36 0.18 
Semiski l l 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.07 
50-500 0.32 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.35 0.25 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.26 
>500 0.16 0.17 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.39 0.38 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.07 
Outsider 0.41 0.48 0.28 0.38 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.49 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.28 0.29 
Insider 0.45 0.38 0.57 0.40 0.64 0.57 0.62 0.49 0.63 0.57 0.58 0.48 0.47 0.34 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.44 0.54 0.43 0.56 0.51 
Agric 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.004 0.06 0.004 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.05 
Industry 0.48 0.25 0.39 0.16 0.52 0.26 0.52 0.12 0.52 0.27 0.46 0.28 0.52 0.27 0.56 0.40 0.49 0.30 0.50 0.22 0.51 0.33 
IMR 0.55 0.86 0.65 1.05 0.77 1.04 0.59 0.89 0.98 1.26 0.73 1.07 0.89 0.87 0.92 0.97 1.08 1.07 0.75 0.95 0.74 0.88 
No. Obs. 1056 618 1517 563 839 427 366 168 1320 652 994 471 953 520 1932 923 985 470 2042 785 1786 1028 
Avg.Wage 1.915 1.7 2.005 1.74 2.022 1.82 2.339 2.09 1.886 1.67 1.865 1.64 1.803 1.63 1.76 1.56 1.482 1.37 1.665 1.48 1.257 1.09 
W a g e Gap 0.218 0.269 0.202 0.25 0.212 0.225 0.172 0.196 0.11 0.187 0.17 
M/F Ratio 1.244 1.309 1.224 1.284 1.236 1.252 1.186 1.217 1.116 1.206 1.185 
liv 
A p p e n d i x 7 .3 D e n m a r k 
D e n m a r k - M a i e 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.254 18.34 
Expérience 0.035 8.25 21.39 
Expérience2 -0.001 -7.64 599.78 
Htgher Educ 0.186 4.51 0.32 
Secondary Ed. 0.106 3.25 0.44 
Public Sector -0.093 -2.00 0.08 
Married 0.081 2.82 0.54 
Manager 0.270 4.51 0.11 
Professional 0.255 4.16 0.14 
Associate Prof. 0.182 3.26 0.15 
Clerks -0.031 -0.45 0.05 
Service 0.013 0.18 0.04 
Skilled Agric 0.114 0.97 0.02 
Crafts 0.068 1.34 0.26 
Semi-skilled 0.031 0.59 0.14 
Unit >50&<500 0.116 4.14 0.32 
Unit >500 0.148 4.14 0.16 
Outsider -0.114 -3.00 0.41 
Insider -0.001 -0.02 0.45 
Agriculture -0.276 -3.32 0.04 
Industry 0.070 2.32 0.48 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.915 




Rest. Log-like. -696.8 
Durbin-Watson 1.84 
Denmark - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-rat io Mean 
Constant 1.269 12.91 
Expérience 0.021 3.37 18.65 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -2.69 475.61 
Higher Educ 0.169 3.00 0.35 
Secondar/ Ed. 0.044 0.91 0.42 
Public Sector 0.019 0.38 0.29 
Married 0.088 2.30 0.49 
Manager 0.301 2.23 0.02 
Professional 0.198 2.18 0.11 
Associate Prof. 0.192 2.43 0.25 
Clerks 0.128 1.71 0.27 
Service 0.094 1.14 0.16 
Skilled Agric. 0.137 0.78 0.01 
Crafts 0.225 1.80 0.03 
Semi-skilled 0.002 0.03 0.07 
Unit >50&<500 0.075 1.80 0.30 
Unit >500 0.091 1.81 0.17 
Outsider -0.218 -3.77 0.48 
Insider 0.103 1.82 0.38 
Agriculture -0.439 -2.83 0.02 
Industry -0.060 -1.19 0.25 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.697 




Rest. Log-like. -431.3 
Durbin-Watson 2.08 
O a x a c a ( 1 9 7 3 ) D e c o m p o s i t i o n - D e n m a r k 
Variat i le F e m . Coeff . F e m . M e a n Male Coeff. Ma le M e a n Expla ined Unexp la ined 
Constant 1.2688 1.0000 1.2540 1.0000 0.0000 -0.0148 
Experìence 0.0209 18.6456 0.0347 21.3911 0.0954 0.2591 
Experìence 2 -0.0004 475.6068 -0.0006 599.7794 -0.0777 -0.1242 
HED 0.1693 0.3544 0.1858 0.3182 -0.0067 0.0058 
SED 0.0439 0.4239 0.1063 0.4375 0.0014 0.0264 
Public Sector 0.0190 0.2913 -0.0933 0.0843 0.0193 -0.0327 
Married 0.0881 0.4887 0.0806 0.5360 0.0038 -0.0037 
Manager 0.3012 0.0227 0.2696 0.1089 0.0232 -0.0007 
Professional 0.1981 0.1133 0.2553 0.1420 0.0073 0.0065 
Associate Professional 0.1920 0.2540 0.1820 0.1515 -0.0187 -0.0025 
Clerks 0.1283 0.2702 -0.0308 0.0549 0.0066 -0.0430 
Service 0.0944 0.1553 0.0134 0.0388 -0.0016 -0.0126 
Skilled Agrìcultural 0.1369 0.0129 0.1141 0.0208 0.0009 -0.0003 
Crafts 0.2253 0.0275 0.0681 0.2585 0.0157 -0.0043 
Semi-skilled 0.0024 0.0696 0.0311 0.1439 0.0023 0.0020 
Unit >50 but <500 0.0753 0.2977 0.1159 0.3239 0.0030 0.0121 
Unit >500 0.0907 0.1748 0.1481 0.1572 -0.0026 0.0100 
Outsider -0.2184 0.4822 -0.1137 0.4081 0.0084 0.0505 
Insider 0.1031 0.3786 -0.0009 0.4545 -0.0001 -0.0394 
Agriculture -0.4392 0.0162 -0.2759 0.0436 -0.0076 0.0026 
Industry -0.0603 0.2476 0.0698 0.4830 0.0164 0.0322 
Tota l 0 .0892 0.1291 0 .2183 
There are lowcr rcturns for women from education, especially secondary, there are also 
lower retums for women from medium and large fimi employment. There is a smaller 
penalty for male Outsiders, but female insiders are actually better off with a higher 
premium. However ali of these are unimportant when compared to the impact of work 
experience. There are higher retums for men from experìence and this alone accounts for 
ali of the unexplained differential. 
Ivii 
Juhn et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Den mark 
Var iable Male m e a n 
UK 
F e m . 
m e a n 
U K 
6 m a l e U K fi m a l e 
D e n m a r k 
Male m e a n 
D e n m a r k 
F e m . 
m e a n 
D e n m a r k 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.25 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.03 21.39 18.65 -0.002 -0.026 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 599.7B 475.61 0.001 0.025 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.19 0.32 0.35 0.023 0.003 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.11 0.44 0.42 -0.010 0.006 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.29 -0.016 -0.002 
Marriod 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.08 0.54 0.49 0.008 -0.001 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.27 0.11 0.02 -0.001 0.012 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.11 -0.006 0.000 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.018 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.27 0.002 -0.034 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.001 0.000 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.000 -0.003 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.26 0.03 -0.003 -0.001 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.000 0.004 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.30 -0.004 -0.002 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.003 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.11 0 .41 0.48 0.001 -0.002 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.00 0.45 0.38 0.000 -0.001 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.28 0.04 0.02 0.001 -0.002 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 0.07 0.48 0.25 -0.004 -0.016 
Lambda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Tota l 0 .012 -0 .041 
Term 1 = (5Zj - 5Z k )Pk 
Term 2 = SZ/ft - (łw) 
Term 3 = (Sy - M M = (-289 - .336).385 = -0.019 
Term 4 = ó>;- ( 0 7 - o*) - .289(.581 - .385) = 0.013 
lviii 
A p p e n d i x 7 .4 N e t h e r l a n d s 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.375 15.05 
Experience 0.038 10.33 19.86 
Experi enee2 -0.001 -7.77 521.14 
Higher Educ. 0.204 5.56 0.17 
Secondary Ed. -0.011 -0.42 0.60 
Public Sector -0.012 -0.30 0.06 
Married 0.128 5.20 0.69 
Manager 0.226 4.55 0.15 
Professional 0.309 6.02 0.14 
Associate Prof. 0.185 3.85 0.17 
Clerks 0.139 2.66 0.09 
Service 0.088 1.56 0.06 
Skilled Agric. 0.020 0.19 0.01 
Crafts 0.010 0.20 0.21 
Semi-skilled 0.025 0.50 0.13 
Unit >50&<500 0.057 2.53 0.37 
Unit >500 0.130 5.33 0.28 
Outsider -0.140 -4.67 0.28 
Insider 0.040 1.39 0.57 
Ag riculture 0.011 0.13 0.02 
Industry 0.062 2.84 0.39 
Lambda -0.143 -1.72 0.65 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 2.005 




Rest. Log-like. -963.2 
Durbin-Watson 1.93 
N e t h e r l a n d s - M a l e 
Netherlands - Fem aie 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.309 10.82 
Expérience 0.024 3.72 14.31 
Expérience2 -0.0005 -2.70 303.33 
Higher Educ. 0.187 3.54 0.21 
Secondary Ed. 0.018 0.46 0.53 
Public Sector 0.070 1.48 0.16 
Married 0.106 2.63 0.39 
Manager 0.340 3.29 0.07 
Professional 0.386 4.00 0.12 
Associate Prof. 0.297 3.40 0.29 
Clerks 0.230 2.65 0.25 
Service 0.044 0.49 0.17 
Skilled Agric. 0.065 0.20 0.004 
Crafts 0.364 2.51 0.02 
Semi-ski lied 0.141 1.19 0.04 
Unit >50&<500 0.057 1.52 0.34 
Unit >500 0.136 3.37 0.27 
Outsider -0.166 -3.75 0.38 
Insider 0.116 2.65 0.40 
Agriculture -0.151 -0.88 0.01 
Industry -0.035 -0.74 0.16 
Lambda -0.134 -2.30 1.05 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.736 




Rest. Log-like. -356.6 
Durbin-Watson 2.08 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - Netherlands 
Var iable F e m . Coeff. F e m . M e a n Maie Coeff . Ma ie M e a n Expla ined Unexp la ined 
Constant 1.3087 1.0000 1.3751 1.0000 0.0000 0.0664 
Expérience 0.0243 14.3055 0.0377 19.8642 0.2096 0.1923 
Expérience 2 -0 0005 303.3322 -0.0007 521.1444 -0.1423 -0.0524 
HED 0.1869 0.2060 0.2036 0.1734 -0.0067 0.0035 
SED 0.0178 0.5293 -0.0112 0.6032 -0.0008 -0.0153 
Public Sector 0.0702 0.1599 -0.0123 0.0587 0.0012 -0.0132 
Married 0.1063 0.3890 0.1284 0.6935 0.0391 0.0086 
Manager 0.3403 0.0657 0.2257 0.1477 0.0185 -0.0075 
Professional 0.3858 0.1243 0.3089 0.1397 0.0048 -0.0096 
Associate Professional 0.2969 0.2895 0.1854 0.1688 -0.0224 -0.0323 
Clerks 0.2298 0.2540 0.1393 0.0903 -0.0228 -0.0230 
Service 0.0440 0.1705 0.0880 0.0600 -0.0097 0.0075 
Skilled Agricultural 0.0648 0.0036 0.0200 0.0145 0.0002 -0.0002 
Crafts 0.3641 0.0178 0.0096 0.2050 0.0018 -0.0063 
Semi-ski lied 0.1407 0.0355 0.0248 0.1259 0.0022 -0.0041 
Unit >50 but <500 0.0575 0.3375 0.0567 0.3672 0.0017 -0.0003 
Unit >500 0.1356 0.2735 0.1300 0.2835 0.0013 -0.0015 
Outsider -0.1661 0.3766 -0.1396 0.2762 0.0140 0.0100 
Insider 0.1160 0.4014 0.0397 0.5748 0.0069 -0.0306 
Agriculture -0.1507 0.0124 0.0112 0.0198 0.0001 0.0020 
Industry -0.0355 0.1599 0.0623 0.3929 0.0145 0.0156 
Tota l 0.1113 0.1096 0 .2209 
Lambda -0.1343 1.0508 -0.1426 0.6516 0.0569 -0.0087 0.0483 
Tota l 0 .1682 0.1009 0 .2691 
Ixi 
Décomposition of Wage Differentials with Selectivity Correction. 
Netherlands 1996 
Estimâtes of avcrage lambdas and associated coefficients, 















log w m - log w r Hxplained Unexplained Selectivity 
0.2691 0.168 (62.5%) 0.101 (37.5%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
0.113 (41.8%) 0.156 (58.2%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
0.121 (45.1%) 0.148 (54.9%) 0.000 (0.0%) 





There is a smaller penalty for maie outsiders, but similar to Denmark, female insiders 
have the larger coefficient. The estimâtes are adjusted for samplc sélection bias, and the 
resulting IMR variable has an important effect upon both the explained and unexplained 
components. Again ail of thèse are relatively unimportant in comparison to the impact of 
expérience, in this case it actually exceeds the total unexplained differential, with almost 
140% of the unexplained differential being assigned to differential returns to expérience. 
lxii 
Juhn et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Netherlands 
Var iab le Maie m e a n 
UK 
F e m . 
m e a n 
UK 
ß male UK 0 m a l e Neth . M a l e m e a n 
Neth . 
F e m . 
m e a n 
Neth . 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.38 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.04 19.86 14.31 -0.108 -0.035 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 521.14 303.33 0.066 0.037 
H ED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.024 0.001 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 -0.01 0.60 0.53 0.002 -0.003 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.16 -0.001 0.001 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.13 0.69 0.39 •0.021 -0.008 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.23 0.15 0.07 0.000 0.016 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.14 0.12 -0.003 0.000 
Associate Professional 0.07 0,07 0.29 0.19 0.17 0.29 0.022 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.25 -0.016 0.014 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.003 0.005 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.000 -0.002 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.000 0.010 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.000 0.004 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.06 0.37 0.34 -0.002 -0.003 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.13 0.28 0.27 -0.001 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.14 0.28 0.38 -0.003 -0.004 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.04 0.57 0.40 -0.003 -0.005 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.000 -0.009 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 0.06 0.39 0.16 -0.003 -0.014 
Lambda 0 0 0 -0.14 0.65 1.05 -0.057 0.000 
Tota l -0.101 0.006 
Term 1 = (ÖZj - ÖZk)ßk 
Term2 = 5 Z J ( ß j - ß k ) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - ôy^a* = (.289 - .285)354 = 0.001 
Term 4 = ôy/j ( 0 7 - 07J = ,289(.581 - .354) = 0.066 
lxiii 
Appendix 7.5 Bdgium 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.364 17.00 
Expérience 0.037 6.71 19.00 
Expérience2 -0.001 -6.80 468.85 
Higher Educ. 0.149 2.81 0.36 
Secondary Ed. -0.007 -0.17 0.36 
Public Sector 0.053 0.73 0.06 
Married 0.054 1.42 0.72 
Manager 0.130 1.78 0.08 
Professional 0.110 1.62 0.14 
Associate Prof. 0.142 2.15 0.12 
Clerks 0.062 1.05 0.16 
Service -0.111 -1.34 0.05 
Skilled Agric. -0.171 -0.75 0.01 
Crafts -0.047 -0.87 0.17 
Semi-skilled 0.068 1.15 0.12 
Unit >50&<500 0.175 4.64 0.27 
Unit >500 0.297 7.60 0.28 
Outsider -0.097 -1.77 0.23 
Insider 0.094 1.91 0.64 
Agriculture -0.013 -0.08 0.02 
tndustry 0.046 1.34 0.52 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 2.022 




Rest. Log-like. -627.2 
Durb in-Watson 2.01 
Belgium - Male 
Bel giù ni - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.354 12.00 
Experience 0.023 2.70 14.85 
Experience2 -0.0005 -2.23 309.14 
Higher Educ. 0.156 2.23 0.49 
Secondary Ed. 0.032 0.49 0.33 
Public Sector 0.066 0.77 0.08 
Married -0.028 -0.64 0.63 
Manager 0.231 1.75 0.04 
Professional 0.257 2.66 0.16 
Associate Prof. 0.126 1.36 0.16 
Clerks 0.164 2.00 0.38 
Service -0.056 -0.60 0.11 
Crafts -0.117 -0.81 0.03 
Semi-skilled 0.064 0.44 0.03 
Unit >50&<500 0.146 2.95 0.28 
Unit >500 0.165 2.98 0.21 
Outsider -0.237 -3.49 0.27 
Insider 0.101 1.59 0.57 
Ag riculture 0.155 0.36 0.00 
Industry 0.005 0.10 0.26 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.82 
Stan. Dev. 0.483 
Observations 427 
R-squared 0.277 
Log-li ke. -225.2 
Rest. Log-like. -294.4 
Durbin-Watson 1.91 
lxv 
Oaxaca (1973) Decompositìon - Belgi u m 
Var ìable F e m . Coeff. F e m . M e a n Male Coeff . Ma le M e a n Expla ined Unexp la ined 
Constant 1.3541 1.0000 1.3639 1.0000 0.0000 0.0099 
Experience 0.0231 14.8525 0.0370 19.0036 0.1537 0.2065 
Experience 2 -0.0005 309.1429 -0.0008 468.8486 -0.1292 -0.1017 
HED 0.1563 0.4941 0.1493 0.3623 -0.0197 -0.0035 
SED 0.0317 0.3326 -0.0071 0.3635 -0.0002 -0.0129 
Public Sector 0.0657 0.0796 0.0535 0.0560 -0.0013 -0.0010 
Married -0.0283 0.6276 0.0536 0.7235 0.0051 0.0514 
Manager 0.2307 0.0375 0.1300 0.0787 0.0054 -0.0038 
Professional 0.2569 0.1593 0.1098 0.1430 -0.0018 -0.0234 
Associate Professional 0.1257 0.1616 0.1423 0.1180 -0.0062 0.0027 
Clerks 0.1638 0.3841 0.0617 0.1597 -0.0138 -0.0392 
Service -0.0557 0.1148 -0.1105 0.0489 0.0073 -0.0063 
Skilled Agrìcultural 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1713 0.0083 -0.0014 0.0000 
Crafts -0.1173 0.0258 -0.0474 0.1692 -0.0068 0.0018 
Sem i-ski lied 0.0640 0.0258 0.0679 0.1192 0.0063 0.0001 
Unit >50 but <500 0.1459 0.2834 0.1754 0.2718 -0.0020 0.0084 
Unit >500 0.1649 0.2061 0.2966 0.2825 0.0227 0.0271 
Outsider -0.2366 0.2693 -0.0968 0.2265 0.0041 0.0377 
Insider 0.1013 0.5691 0.0945 0.6436 0.0070 -0.0039 
Agrìculture 0.1545 0.0023 -0.0128 0.0179 -0.0002 -0.0004 
Industry 0.0051 0.2646 0.0465 0.5173 0.0117 0.0109 
Tota l 0 .0408 0.1605 0 .2013 
There is a slightly higher return from higher education for women and more women 
having attained education at this level, 49% compared to 36%. Conversely there are 
higher retums for men from large firm employment and more favourable returns to male 
insiders and outsiders. Once more these factors are trivial in comparison to the impact 
experience, with in this case 2/3 of the unexplained wage gap being assigned to 
differential returns to experience. 
lxvi 
Juhri et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Belgium 
Var iable M a i e m e a n 
UK 
F e m . 
m e a n 
U K 
8 m a l e U K B m a i e 
B e l g i u m 
Maie m e a n 
Be lg ium 
F e m . 
m e a n 
Betq ium 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.36 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.04 19.00 14.85 -0.054 -0.033 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 468.85 309.14 0.029 0.049 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.15 0.36 0.49 0.032 0.006 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 -0.01 0.36 0.33 0.001 -0.002 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 -0.001 0.003 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.05 0.72 0.63 0.003 0.003 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.005 0.024 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.002 0.001 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.006 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.38 -0.004 -0.008 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 -0.11 0.05 0.11 0.001 -0.010 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.17 0.01 0.00 -0.001 0.000 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.17 0.03 -0.002 0.021 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.002 0.001 
Unit>50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.000 -0.001 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.30 0.28 0.21 -0.021 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.10 0.23 0.27 0.004 -0.001 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.09 0.64 0.57 0.002 -0.011 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.000 -0.009 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 0.05 0.52 0.26 -0.003 -0.011 
Lambda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Total -0.002 0 .023 
Term 1 = (ÔZj-ÔZ k)p k 
Terni 2 
Term 3 = (ôif/j- Ôiyi<)ak = = (.289 -.366).439 = -0.035 
Term 4 = <5y/y(cry- = ,289(.581 - .439) = 0.040 
lxvii 
A p p e n d i x 7 .6 L u x e m b o u r g 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.176 4.40 
Expérience 0.023 2.56 20.50 
Expérience2 -0.001 -2.13 524.98 
Higher Educ. 0.093 0.43 0.18 
Secondary Ed. -0.072 -0.44 0.26 
Public Sector 0.164 1.48 0.04 
Married 0.299 3.09 0.73 
Manager 0.394 3.54 0.07 
Professional 0.585 5.30 0.08 
Associate Prof. 0.392 3.96 0.15 
Clerks 0.299 3.00 0.10 
Service -0.012 -0.09 0.04 
Skilled Agric. -0.328 -1.27 0.02 
Crafts 0.047 0.55 0.29 
Semi-skilled 0.126 1.41 0.19 
Unit >50&<500 0.085 1.82 0.40 
Unit >500 0.156 2.85 0.23 
Outsider -0.081 -1.25 0.20 
Insider 0.112 1.99 0.62 
Agriculture -0.036 -0.17 0.02 
Industry 0.065 1.27 0.52 
Lambda 0.655 1.42 0.59 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 2.339 




Rest. Log-like. -258.9 
Durbin-Watson 1.93 
lxviii 
L u x e m b o u r g - M a l e 
Luxembourg - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.077 4.74 
Expérience 0.017 1.36 15.06 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -1.26 332.87 
Higher Educ. 0.026 0.22 0.14 
Secondary Ed. 0.141 1.59 0.41 
Public Sector 0.156 1.03 0.06 
Married 0.105 1.36 0.52 
Manager 0.761 3.58 0.04 
Professional 0.798 5.28 0.09 
Associate Prof. 0.384 2.80 0.13 
Clerks 0.452 3.84 0.35 
Service 0.173 1.40 0.18 
Crafts 0.232 1.19 0.04 
Semi-ski lied -0.058 -0.27 0.04 
Unit >50&<500 0.199 2.40 0.26 
Unit >500 0.305 2.83 0.13 
Outsider -0.237 -2.29 0.31 
Insider 0.139 1.52 0.49 
Agriculture 0.007 0.06 0.12 
Industry 0.372 1.69 0.89 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 2.089 




Rest. Log-like. -136.2 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 
Ixix 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - Luxembourg 
Var iab le F e m . C o e f l . F e m . M * a n Mate Cooff . Ma ie M e a n Exp la ined Unexp la insd 
Constant 1.0770 1.0000 1.1757 1.0000 0.0000 0.0987 
Expérience 0.0170 15.0595 0.0227 20.4973 0.1237 0.0869 
Expérience 2 -0.0004 332.8691 -0.0005 524.9836 -0.0977 -0.0383 
HED 0.0255 0.1429 0.0930 0.1803 0.0035 0.0096 
SED 0.1407 0.4107 -0.0715 0.2596 0.0108 -0.0872 
Public Sector 0.1563 0.0595 0.1640 0.0383 -0.0035 0.0005 
Married 0.1048 0.5238 0.2985 0.7295 0.0614 0.1015 
Manager 0.7611 0.0357 0.3943 0.0738 0.0150 -0.0131 
Professional 0.7985 0.0893 0.5849 0.0792 -0.0059 -0.0191 
Associate Professional 0.3843 0.1310 0.3925 0.1530 0.0087 0.0011 
Clerks 0.4518 0.3452 0.2991 0.0984 -0.0738 -0.0527 
Service 0.1729 0.1786 -0.0117 0.0355 0.0017 -0.0330 
Skilled Agricultural 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3281 0.0164 -0.0054 0.0000 
Crafts 0.2321 0.0417 0.0472 0.2869 0.0116 -0.0077 
Semi-sxilled -0.0583 0.0357 0.1263 0.1913 0.0196 0.0066 
Unit >50 but <500 0.1995 0.2619 0.0853 0.4016 0.0119 -0.0299 
Unit >500 0.3051 0.1250 0.1561 0.2350 0.0172 -0.0186 
Outsider -0.2367 0.3095 -0.0807 0.1967 0.0091 0.0483 
Insider 0.1390 0.4940 0.1123 0.6202 0.0142 -0.0132 
Agriculture 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0363 0.0246 -0.0009 0.0000 
Indusuy 0.0072 0.1190 0.0649 0.5219 0.0261 0.0069 
Tota l 0 .1473 0 .0473 0 .1946 
Lambda 0.3720 0.8918 0.6554 0.5916 -0.1968 0.2528 0 .0560 
Tota l -0 .0495 0 .3001 0 2 5 0 6 
lxx 
Décomposition of Wage Differentials with Selectivity Correction. 
Luxembourg 1996 
Estimâtes of average lambdas and associated coefficients, 












log w m - log w f Explained Unexplained Selectivity 
Oaxaca 0.2506 -0.05 (-19.8%) 0.300(119.8%) 0.000(0.0%) 
Option 1 0.380(151.7%) -0.130 (-51.7%) 0.000(0.0%) 
Option 2 0.127 (50.9%) 0.123 (49.1%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
Option 3 0.127 (50.9%) -0.130 (-51.7%) 0.253 ( 100.8%) 
There are higher returns from éducation for men, although women benefit from higher 
returns to medium and large firm employment, as well as a larger premium for female 
insiders. In terms of the unexplained wage gap, all of the usuai suspects play a key role, 
with 16%, 34% and 33% of this gap being due to expérience, marriage and the intercept 
term respectively. 
lxxi 
J u h n et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Luxembourg 
Var iable M a l e m e a n 
UK 
F e m . 
m e a n 
U K 
6 m a l e U K 8 m a l e Lux. Ma le m e a n 
Lux. 
F e m . 
m e a n Lux. 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.18 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.02 20.50 15.06 -0.062 0.006 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 524.98 332.87 0.034 0.012 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.004 0.011 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 -0.07 0.26 0.41 -0.005 -0.007 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.16 0.04 0.06 -0.002 0.007 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.30 0.73 0.52 -0.019 -0.032 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.39 0.07 0.04 0.017 0.002 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.58 0.08 0.09 0.009 -0.002 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.39 0.15 0.13 -0.009 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.35 -0.010 0.059 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.18 -0.001 -0.002 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.33 0.02 0.00 0.001 0.002 
Crafls 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.04 -0.002 0.003 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.04 -0.011 -0.003 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.09 0.40 0.26 -0.013 -0.002 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.16 0.24 0.13 -0.017 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.08 0.20 0.31 -0.003 0.000 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.11 0.62 0.49 -0.003 -0.012 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.000 -0.008 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 0.06 0.52 0.12 -0.014 -0.015 
Lambda 0 0 0 0.66 0.59 0.89 0.197 0.000 
Tota l 0.092 0.019 
Term 1 = (ÔZj - 8Z k )p k 
Term2 = 5Z J (P j -p k ) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - ó>*)o-fc = (.289 - .840).357 = -0.197 
Term 4 = <5y/y (ą - o*) = .289(.581 - .357) = 0.065 
lxxii 
A p p e n d i x 7 .7 F r a n c e 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.206 17.00 
Expérience 0.036 7.87 20.70 
Expérience2 -0.001 -7.16 547.48 
Higher Educ. 0.245 5.78 0.20 
Secondary Ed. 0.044 1.62 0.47 
Public Sector 0.016 0.24 0.03 
Married 0.048 1.78 0.66 
Manager 0.460 6.47 0.07 
Professional 0.452 6.18 0.07 
Associate Prof. 0.254 4.22 0.18 
Clerks 0.105 1.52 0.06 
Service 0.022 0.30 0.05 
Skilled Agric. -0.051 -0.32 0.02 
Crafts 0.042 0.73 0.26 
Semi-skilled 0.044 0.76 0.24 
Unit >50&<500 0.172 6.38 0.31 
Unit >500 0.246 7.72 0.20 
Outsider -0.323 -8.23 0.20 
Insider 0.018 0.54 0.63 
Agriculture 0.040 0.26 0.02 
Industry 0.047 1.78 0.52 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.886 




Rest. Log-like. -1044.9 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 
lxxiii 
F r a n c e - M a l e 
France - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.228 14.24 
Expérience 0.021 3.53 18.88 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -2.85 475.46 
Higher Educ. 0.310 5.96 0.27 
Secondary Ed. 0.105 2.66 0.42 
Public Sector 0.244 3.50 0.06 
Marri ed 0.012 0.36 0.56 
Manager 0.352 3.44 0.04 
Professional 0.247 2.56 0.06 
Associate Prof. 0.250 3.34 0.20 
Clerks 0.110 1.58 0.31 
Service -0.091 -1.28 • 0.19 
Skilled Agric. 0.083 0.38 0.01 
Crafts -0.072 -0.55 0.02 
Semi-skilled -0.035 -0.43 0.11 
Unit >50&<500 0.088 2.44 0.32 
Unit >500 0.176 3.46 0.12 
Outsider -0.382 -7.61 0.23 
Insider 0.062 1.45 0.57 
Agriculture -0.117 -0.66 0.01 
Industry -0.016 -0.37 0.27 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.674 




Re st. Log-like. -481.2 
Durbin-Watson 1.95 
lxxiv 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - France 
Var iable F e m . Coeff. F e m . M e a n Maie Coeff . M a l * M e a n Expla ined Unexp la lned 
Constant 1.2278 1.0000 1.2058 1.0000 0.0000 -0.0220 
Expérience 0.0213 18.8819 0.0358 20.6992 0.0651 0.2749 
Expérience 2 -0.0004 475.4555 -0.0007 547.4750 -0.0494 -0.1407 
HED 0.3102 0.2715 0.2449 0.1962 0.0184 -0.0177 
SED 0.1050 0.4233 0.0442 0.4697 0.0020 -0.0257 
Public Sector 0.2444 0.0583 0.0163 0.0295 -0.0005 -0.0133 
Married 0.0121 0.5613 0.0484 0.6614 0.0048 0.0204 
Manager 0.3517 0.0414 0.4595 0.0735 0.0147 0.0045 
Professional 0.2474 0.0552 0.4520 0.0735 0.0083 0.0113 
Associate Professional 0.2500 0.1979 0.2542 0.1765 -0.0054 0.0008 
Clerks 0.1096 0.3144 0.1054 0.0629 -0.0265 -0.0013 
Service -0.0913 0.1887 0.0218 0.0538 -0.0029 0.0213 
Skilled Agricultural 0.0827 0.0077 -0.0514 0.0167 -0.0005 -0.0010 
Crafts -0.0720 0.0184 0.0422 0.2568 0.0101 0.0021 
Semi-skilled -0.0354 0.1120 0.0437 0.2379 0.0055 0.0089 
Unit >50 but <500 0.0880 0.3236 0.1722 0.3114 -0.0021 0.0272 
Unit >500 0.1757 0.1242 0.2459 0.1962 0.0177 0.0087 
Outsider -0.3819 0.2347 -0.3225 0.2030 0.0102 0.0139 
Insider 0.0617 0.5675 0.0178 0.6318 0.0011 -0.0249 
Agriculture -0.1166 0.0107 0.0403 0.0152 0.0002 0.0017 
Industry -0.0161 0.2745 0.0474 0.5167 0.0115 0.0174 
Tota l 0 .0455 0.1665 0 .2121 
Women receive greater retums from higher éducation as well as there being more women 
benefiting, there are also positive returns for women in the public sector, whilst there are 
higher retums for men from large and medium sized firm employment. Expérience is 
once again the key factor in the unexplained wage gap with over three-quarters of it 
resulting from differential retums to expérience. 
lxxv 
Juhn et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. France 
Var iable Maie m e a n 
U K 
F e m . 
m e a n 
UK 
0 m a l e U K 0 maie 
France 
Maie m e a n 
France 
F e m . 
m e a n 
France 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.21 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.04 20.70 18.88 0.032 -0.029 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 547.48 475.46 -0.036 0.037 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.24 0.20 0.27 0.039 -0.002 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.04 0.47 0.42 -0.005 0.002 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.000 0.002 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.05 0.66 0.56 0.002 0.004 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.46 0.07 0.04 0.023 -0.004 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.45 0.07 0.06 -0.006 -0.001 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.005 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.31 -0.003 0.004 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.001 0.000 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.000 -0.001 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.26 0.02 -0.002 0.004 
Semi-sktlled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.11 -0.002 0.003 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.31 0.32 0.000 -0.001 
Unit >50D 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.25 0.20 0.12 -0.017 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.32 0.20 0.23 0.016 -0.019 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.02 0.63 0.57 0.001 -0.003 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.001 -0.010 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 0.05 0.52 0.27 -0.003 -0.012 
Lambda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Tota l 0 .046 -0 .027 
Term l = (ÔZj - 5Z k )p k 
Term 2 - 5Zj(Pj - p k ) 
Tcrm 3 = (ôyj - 8y*)ok = (.289 - .405).411 = -0.048 
Term 4 = 5y/j (a- - a*) = .289(.581 - .411) = 0.049 
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Appendix 7.8 United Kingdom 
Variable Coefficient t-rat i o Mean 
Constant 1.097 9.74 
Expérience 0.025 3.56 23.85 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -3.43 708.97 
Higher Educ. 0.220 3.83 0.30 
Secondary Ed. 0.024 0.52 0.35 
Public Sector -0.029 -0.29 0.04 
Married 0.075 1.62 0.72 
Manager 0.415 4.74 0.20 
Professional 0.241 2.47 0.14 
Associate Prof. 0.287 2.75 0.07 
Clerks 0.091 0.93 0.09 
Service 0.019 0.17 0.05 
Skilled Agric. -0.139 -0.78 0.01 
Crafts 0.061 0.72 0.24 
Semi-skilled 0.081 0.91 0.13 
Unit >50&<500 0.279 5.52 0.23 
Unit >500 0.452 9.91 0.39 
Outsider -0.086 -1.38 0.24 
Insider -0.011 -0.22 0.58 
Agriculture -0.353 -2.78 0.03 
Industry -0.015 -0.36 0.46 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.865 




Rest. Log-lîke. -1018.4 
Durbin-Watson 1.9 
lxxvii 
United Kingdom - Male 
United Kingdom - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.034 8.06 
Expérience 0.007 0.86 21.15 
Expérience2 -0.00001 -0.07 585.66 
Higher Educ. 0.412 4.84 0.21 
Secondary Ed. 0.177 3.08 0.43 
Public Sector 0.057 0.58 0.08 
Married -0.042 -0.82 0.58 
Manager 0.089 0.79 0.12 
Professional 0.199 1.59 0.13 
Associate Prof. -0.017 -0.13 0.07 
Clerks 0.090 0.94 0.37 
Service -0.105 -0.95 0.13 
Skilled Agric. -1.025 -1.99 0.00 
Crafts -0.072 -0.50 0.04 
Semi-skilled 0.056 0.43 0.06 
Unit >50&<500 0.337 5.27 0.24 
Unit >500 0.480 8.10 0.38 
Outsider 0.037 0.49 0.32 
Insider 0.013 0.20 0.48 
Agriculture -0.301 -0.83 0.00 
Industry -0.045 -0.73 0.28 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.64 




Rest. Log-like. -411.6 
Durbin-Watson 1.9 
lxxviii 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - UK 
Variat i le F e m . Coeff. F e m . M e a n Male Coeff . Ma le M e a n Expla ined Unexp la ined 
Constant 1.0338 1.0000 1.0971 1.0000 0.0000 0.0633 
Experience 0.0070 21.1507 0.0249 23.8481 0.0671 0.3781 
Experience 2 -0.00001 585.6561 -0.0004 708.9708 -0.0547 -0.2521 
HED 0.4125 0.2102 0.2205 0.2958 0.0189 -0.0404 
SED 0.1766 0.4289 0.0241 0.3521 -0.0019 -0.0654 
Public Sector 0.0571 0.0786 -0.0292 0.0433 0.0010 -0.0068 
Married -0.0420 0.5754 0.0755 0.7183 0.0108 0.0676 
Manager 0.0887 0.1168 0.4152 0.1992 0.0342 0.0381 
Professional 0.1985 0.1338 0.2406 0.1398 0.0015 0.0056 
Associate Professional -0.0169 0.0722 0.2870 0.0704 -0.0005 0.0219 
Clerks 0.0903 0.3694 0.0910 0.0875 -0.0257 0.0003 
Service -0.1053 0.1253 0.0185 0.0503 -0.0014 0.0155 
Skilled Agricu[turai -1.0251 0.0021 -0.1390 0.0141 -0.0017 0.0019 
Crafts -0.0715 0.0425 0.0614 0.2354 0.0119 0.0056 
Semi-skilled 0.0562 0.0616 0.0815 0.1328 0.0058 0.0016 
Unit >50 but <500 0.3368 0.2378 0.2795 0.2254 -0.0035 -0.0136 
Unit >500 0.4799 0.3843 0.4518 0.3883 0.0018 -0.0108 
Outsider 0.0366 0.3206 -0.0860 0.2394 0.0070 -0.0393 
Insider 0.0126 0.4820 -0.0114 0.5825 -0.0011 -0.0116 
Agriculture -0.3010 0.0042 -0.3532 0.0292 -0.0088 -0.0002 
Industry -0.0452 0.2781 -0.0149 0.4628 -0.0027 0.0084 
Tota l 0 .0580 0.1677 0.2258 
The insider and outsider dummies are insignificant in both cases. There are higher returns 
for female éducation as well as higher returns for women in large and medium sized firm 
employment. However ali of these are overwhelmed by the impact of more favourable 
returns for men from marriage and experience, the male marriage coefficient is positive 
whilst the female one is negative and the male experience returns are significantly higher. 
This translates to two thirds of the unexplained differential being due to experience and 
one third to marriage. 
lxxix 
Appendix 7.9 Irei und 
Ireland - Male 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.109 16.68 
Experience 0.025 4.93 17.51 
Expérience2 -O.O0O4 -4.13 455.93 
Higher Educ. 0.209 4.24 0.20 
Secondary Ed. 0.133 4.13 0.40 
Public Sector 0.210 3.24 0.05 
Married 0.209 5.43 0.55 
Manager 0.310 4.91 0.11 
Professional 0.337 4.79 0.09 
Associate Prof. 0.340 5.32 0.10 
Clerks 0.124 1.72 0.05 
Service 0.041 0.62 0.07 
Skilled Agric. 0.093 0.85 0.02 
Crafts 0.120 2.43 0.24 
Semi-skilled 0.106 2.05 0.17 
Unit >50&<500 0.167 5.13 0.29 
Unit >500 0.252 5.33 0.10 
Outsider -0.185 -4.49 0.37 
Insider 0.078 1.87 0.47 
Agriculture -0.309 -4.39 0.06 
Industry 0.083 2.49 0.52 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.803 




Rest. Log-like. -793.3 
Durbin-Watson 1.94 
lxxx 
Ireland - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.107 9.66 
Experience 0.019 2.80 12.64 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -2.60 265.02 
Higher Educ. 0.267 3.93 0.26 
Secondary Ed. 0.093 1.70 0.54 
Public Sector 0.182 3.05 0.17 
Married 0.047 1.03 0.41 
Manager 0.231 1.99 0.05 
Professional 0.402 4.12 0.16 
Associate Prof. 0.279 2.88 0.12 
Clerks 0.244 2.79 0.22 
Service 0.033 0.37 0.22 
Skilled Agric. -0.361 -1.01 0.00 
Crafts -0.059 -0.46 0.03 
Semi-skilled -0.057 -0.62 0.14 
Unit >50&<500 0.091 2.07 0.35 
Unit >500 0.228 3.73 0.13 
Outsider -0.188 -3.52 0.49 
Insider 0.184 3.08 0.34 
Agriculture -0.028 -0.08 0.00 
Industry 0.126 2.04 0.27 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.631 




Rest. Log-like. -395.1 
Durbin-Watson 1.76 
lxxxi 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - Ireland 
Var iab le F e m . Coeff . F e m . M e a n Maie Coeff . Ma ie M e a n Expla ined Unexp la ined 
Constant 1.1069 1.0000 1.1091 1.0000 0.0000 0.0022 
Experience 0.0191 12.6442 0.0248 17.5121 0.1208 0.0718 
Expérience 2 -0.0004 265.0212 -O.00O4 455.9297 -0.0775 0.0036 
H E D 0.2666 0.2635 0.2088 0.1983 -0.0136 -0.0153 
SED 0.0933 0.5385 0.1330 0.4019 -0.0182 0.0214 
Public Sector 0.1819 0.1654 0.2100 0.0504 -0.0242 0.0046 
Married 0.0472 0.4077 0.2085 0.5498 0.0296 0.0657 
Manager 0.2310 0.0481 0.3102 0.1112 0.0196 0.0038 
Professional 0.4024 0.1635 0.3369 0.0934 -0.0236 -0.0107 
Associate Professional 0.2785 0.1154 0.3405 0.0976 -0.0061 0.0071 
Clerks 0.2441 0.2173 0.1240 0.0535 -0.0203 -0.0261 
Service 0.0330 0.2173 0.0411 0.0745 -0.0059 0.0018 
Skilled Agricultural -0.3613 0.0038 0.0928 0.0189 0.0014 0.0017 
Crafts -0.0568 0.0327 0.1198 0.2445 0.0254 0.0058 
Semi-skilled -0.0571 0.1385 0.1064 0.1658 0.0029 0.0226 
Unit >50 but <500 0.0907 0.3500 0.1675 0.2865 -0.0106 0.0269 
Unit >500 0.2284 0.1288 0.2518 0.1039 -0.0063 0.0030 
Outsider -0.1880 0.4904 -0.1845 0.3683 0.0225 0.0017 
Insider 0.1838 0.3404 0.0784 0.4722 0.0103 -0.0359 
Agriculture -0.0279 0.0038 -0.3090 0.0619 -0.0179 -0.0011 
Industry 0.1255 0.2731 0.0826 0.5194 0.0203 -0.0117 
Tota l 0 .0287 0.1431 0 .1718 
Greater retums for female higher éducation as well female insiders, compared to better 
returns for men from medium and large sized firm employaient. The unexplained 
differential is dominated by a combination of experience and marriage, higher retums for 
men from marriage and experience, this both make up about 50% of the total. 
lxxxii 
Juhn et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Ireland 
Var iab le Male m e a n 
UK 
F e m . 
m e a n 
UK 
B m a l e U K 8 ma le 
Ireland 
Male m e a n 
I re land 
F e m . 
m e a n 
Ireland 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.11 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Experience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.02 17.51 12.64 -0.054 0.000 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 455.93 265.02 0.027 0.000 
HED 0.30 0.21 0 2 2 1 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.031 0.001 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.13 0.40 0.54 0.008 0.008 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.017 0.008 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.21 0.55 0.41 0.000 -0.019 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.31 0.11 0.05 0.006 0.009 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.09 0.16 0.026 -0.001 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.34 0.10 0.12 0.005 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.22 -0.015 0.009 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.003 0.002 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.000 -0.003 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.03 -0.002 -0.011 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.005 -0.002 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.29 0.35 0.009 -0.001 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.25 0.10 0.13 0.007 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.18 0.37 0.49 -0.008 -0.008 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.08 0.47 0.34 -0.002 -0.009 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.31 0.06 0.00 0.010 -0.001 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0,01 0.08 0.52 0.27 -0.005 -0.018 
Lambda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Tota l 0.068 -0 .034 
Temi 1 = ( 5 Z j - 5 Z k ) p k 
Terni 2 = 5 Z j ( P j - P k ) 
Terni 3 = (Syfj- ôy/kjcTk-= ( .289-.348).4U =-0.024 
Terni 4 = Ôy/j (oj - orf = .289(.581 - .411) = 0.049 
lxxxiii 
A p p e n d i x 7 .10 l t a l y 
I t a l y - M a i e 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.305 29.23 
Experience 0.030 8.61 18.50 
Expérience2 -0.001 -7.25 477.06 
Higher Educ. 0.309 6.26 0.07 
Secondary Ed. 0.090 3.70 0.40 
Public Sector 0.051 1.15 0.06 
Married 0.069 2.68 0.68 
Manager 0.367 5.76 0.03 
Professional 0.203 2.79 O.03 
Associate Prof. 0.193 4.32 0.10 
Clerks 0.229 5.85 0.17 
Service -0.029 -0.63 0.07 
Skilled Agric. 0.057 0.73 0.03 
Crafts 0.024 0.71 0.34 
Semi-skilled 0.100 2.43 0.10 
Unit >50&<500 0.099 4.16 0.25 
Unit >500 0.192 5.85 0.11 
Outsider -0.309 -9.59 0.26 
Insider 0.014 0.47 0.59 
Agriculture -0.274 -4.78 0.05 
Industry -0.010 -0.41 0.56 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.76 




Rest. Log-like. -1512.4 
Durbin-Watson 1.98 
l x x x i V 
Italy - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.063 16.55 
Experience 0.036 6.85 14.35 
Expérience2 -0.001 -5.62 317.02 
Higher Educ. 0.231 3.05 0.06 
Secondary Ed. 0.112 3.02 0.47 
Public Sector 0.047 0.89 0.09 
Married 0.002 0.05 0.56 
Manager 0.130 0.72 0.01 
Professional 0.332 3.92 0.06 
Associate Prof. 0.272 4.09 0.09 
Clerks 0.351 6.93 0.30 
Service 0.091 1.63 0.14 
Skilled Agric. -0.147 -0.93 0.01 
Crafts 0.081 1.55 0.20 
Semi-skilled 0.168 2.16 0.05 
Unit >50&<500 0.145 4.13 0.23 
Unit >500 0.251 5.02 0.10 
Outsider -0.239 -5.39 0.33 
Insider -0.015 -0.34 0.52 
Agriculture -0.390 -4.16 0.04 
Industry 0.015 0.40 0.40 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.564 




Rest. Log-like. -697.9 
Durbin-Watson 1.92 
l x x x v 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - Italy 
Var iab le F e m . Coeff. Fem. M e a n Maie Coeff. M a i e M e a n Expla lned Unexp la ined 
Constant 1.0628 1.0000 1.3050 1.0000 0.0000 0.2422 
Experience 0.0356 14.3532 0.0304 18.4974 0.1261 -0.0738 
Expérience 1 -0.0007 317.0228 -0.0005 477.0554 -0.0875 0.0574 
HED 0.2312 0.0628 0.3090 0.0657 0.0009 0.0049 
SED 0.1121 0.4713 0.0898 0.3991 -0.0065 -0.0105 
Public Sector 0.0474 0.0943 0.0509 0.0569 -0.0019 0.0003 
Married 0.0016 0.5569 0.0694 0.6760 0.0083 0.0377 
Manager 0.1301 0.0065 0.3671 0.0326 0.0096 0.0015 
Professional 0.3325 0.0563 0.2032 0.0259 -0.0062 -0.0073 
Associate Professional 0.2721 0.0867 0.1926 0.0973 0.0020 -0.0069 
Clerks 0.3509 0.3023 0.2291 0.1713 -0.0300 -0.0368 
Service 0.0913 0.1419 -0.0288 0.0740 0.0020 -0.0170 
Skilled Agricultural -0.1469 0.0108 0.0569 0.0254 0.0008 0.0022 
Crafts 0.0813 0.1983 0.0236 0.3354 0.0032 -0.0114 
Semi-skilled 0.1681 0.0477 0.0999 0.0999 0.0052 -0.0033 
Unit >50 but <500 0.1452 0.2319 0.0994 0.2479 0.0016 -0.0106 
Unit >500 0.2506 0.0964 0.1924 0.1139 0.0034 -0.0056 
Outsider -0.2385 0.3261 -0.3088 0.2624 0.0197 -0.0229 
Insider -0.0146 0.5190 0.0145 0.5947 0.0011 0.0151 
Agriculture -0.3898 0.0368 -0.2743 0.0512 -0.0040 0.0043 
Industry 0.0151 0.4041 -0.0097 0.5606 -0.0015 -0.0101 
Tota l 0 .0463 0 .1495 0.1958 
There are higher retums to men from marriage and higher éducation, but women perform 
better in terms of their payments for large and medium sized firm employaient, there is 
also a smaller penalty for female outsiders. In terms of the unexplained differential it is 
overwhelmed by the différence between the two intercept terms, the gap between the two 
is significantly wider than the overall gender wage gap. Differential intercept coefficients 
are generally interpreted as différences in factors unobserved by the model, these appear 
to be far more prévalent in Italy than in any of the other countries. 
lxxxvi 
Juhn et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Italy 
Var iab le Male m e a n 
UK 
F e m . 
m e a n 
UK 
p m a l e U K B m a l e Italy Ma le m e a n 
Italy 
F e m . 
m e a n Italy 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.31 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Experience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.03 18.50 14.35 -0.044 -0.015 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 477.06 317.02 0.018 0.012 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.31 0.07 0.06 0.026 -0.008 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.09 0.40 0.47 0.000 0.005 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.000 0.003 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.07 0.68 0.56 0.002 0.001 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.37 0.03 0.01 0.021 0.004 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.20 0.03 0.06 0.007 0.000 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.19 0.10 0.09 -0.002 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.23 0.17 0.30 -0.035 0.039 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.000 -0.004 
Skilled Agrìcultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.000 -0.002 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.34 0.20 0.001 0.007 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.002 -0.001 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.10 0.25 0.23 -0.003 -0.002 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.19 0.11 0.10 -0.003 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.31 0.26 0.33 0.005 -0.018 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.01 0.59 0.52 0.000 -0.003 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.27 0.05 0.04 -0.003 -0.002 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 -0.01 0.56 0.40 0.000 -0.001 
Lambda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Tota l 
-0.007 0 .017 
Term l = (ôZj - 8Z k )p\ 
Term2 = ÔZj(pj-p k) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - ôy*)rjk = (.289 - .352).425 = -0.027 
Term 4 = ôy/j ( 0 7 - a*) = .289(.581 - .425) = 0.045 
lxxxvii 
A p p e n d i x 7,11 G r e e c e 
G r e e c e - M a i e 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 0.967 11.23 
Experience 0.028 4.89 18.20 
Expérience2 -0.0005 -3.70 473.60 
Higher Educ. 0.424 7.10 0.21 
Secondary Ed. 0.203 4.70 0.32 
Public Sector 0.137 1.99 0.08 
Married 0.082 1.88 0.71 
Manager -0.128 -1.36 0.05 
Professional 0.210 2.25 0.10 
Associate Prof. 0.181 1.89 0.05 
Clerks 0.168 2.07 0.09 
Service 0.023 0.29 0.10 
Skilled Agric. -0.119 -0.77 0.04 
Crafts -0.003 -0.05 0.31 
Semi-skilled 0.060 0.87 0.16 
Unit >50&<500 0.145 2.52 0.09 
Unit >500 0.316 2.50 0.02 
Outsider -0.294 -5.88 0.35 
Insider 0.025 0.49 0.49 
Agriculture -0.348 -2.43 0.05 
Industry 0.069 1.62 0.49 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.482 




Rest. Log-like. -901.6 
Durbin-Watson 1.78 
lxxxviii 
Greece - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 0.768 9.23 
Experience 0.017 2.49 12.31 
Expérience2 -0.0002 -1.23 243.65 
Higher Educ. 0.309 4.99 0.36 
Secondary Ed. 0.201 3.75 0.32 
Public Sector 0.112 1.72 0.10 
Married 0.064 1.63 0.59 
Manager 0.028 0.18 0.02 
Professional 0.439 4.83 0.13 
Associate Prof. 0.332 3.64 0.08 
Clerks 0.220 2.88 0.27 
Service 0.160 2.14 0.20 
Skilled Agric. 0.249 0.61 0.02 
Crafts 0.043 0.56 0.13 
Semi-skilled 0.075 0.73 0.05 
Unit >50&<500 0.056 1.03 0.13 
Unit >500 -0.034 -0.23 0.01 
Outsider -0.226 -4.34 0.36 
Insider 0.176 3.56 0.44 
Agriculture -0.657 -1.70 0.02 
Industry 0.169 3.09 0.30 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.372 




Rest. Log-like. -328.9 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 
Ixxxix 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - Greece 
Var iable F e m . Coeff. F e m . M e a n Maie Coeff. Ma ie M e a n Expla ined Unexp la ined 
Constant 0.7679 1.0000 0.9674 1.0000 0.0000 0.1994 
Expérience 0.0167 12.3149 0.0283 18.1980 0.1668 0.1439 
Expérience 1 -0.0002 243.6511 -0.0005 473.6031 -0.1036 -0.0540 
HED 0.3090 0.3553 0.4237 0.2102 -0.0615 0.0407 
SED 0.2013 0.3191 0.2027 0.3178 -0.0003 0.0004 
Public Sector 0.1119 0.1043 0.1368 0.0772 -0.0037 0.0026 
Married 0.0640 0.5872 0.0822 0.7117 0.0102 0.0107 
Manager 0.0276 0.0170 -0.1280 0.0497 -0.0042 -0.0026 
Professional 0.4386 0.1319 0.2103 0.0954 -0.0077 -0.0301 
Associate Professional 0.3321 0.0787 0.1807 0.0528 -0.0047 -0.0119 
Clerks 0.2200 0.2681 0.1683 0.0914 -0.0297 -0.0139 
Service 0.1605 0.2000 0.0233 0.1015 -0.0023 -0.0274 
Skilled Agricultural 0.2487 0.0170 -0.1185 0.0447 -0.0033 -0.0063 
Crafts 0.0434 0.1319 -0.0035 0.3117 -0.0006 -0.0062 
Semi-skilled 0.0754 0.0489 0.0599 0.1645 0.0069 -0.0008 
Unit >50 but <500 0.0565 0.1277 0.1446 0.0934 -0.0050 0.0113 
Unit >50D -0.0339 0.0149 0.3163 0.0173 0.0007 0.0052 
Outsider -0.2263 0.3574 -0.2936 0.3482 0.0027 -0.0241 
Insider 0.1764 0.4426 0.0248 0.4904 0.0012 -0.0671 
Agriculture -0.6575 0.0191 -0.3479 0.0508 -0.0110 0.0059 
Industry 0.1692 0.2979 0.0688 0.4893 0.0132 -0.0299 
Tota l -0 .0358 0 .1459 0 .1102 
Greater retums for mcn from higher éducation, marriage and large and medium sized 
fïrm employment, whilst there are lower returns for male insiders. Again the impact of 
thèse is dwarfed by the intercept coefficients, with the gap between the two being much 
larger than the overall wage gap. The cffects of differential returns to experience are also 
important, thèse making up almost two thirds of the unexplained wage gap. Clearly the 
unexplained differential is then reduced by a large proportion of fairly small, negative 
factors. 
J u h n et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Greece 
Var iable Male m e a n 
U K 
F e m . 
m e a n 
U K 
6 m a l e U K B ma le 
Greece 
Male m e a n 
G r e e c e 
F e m . 
m e a n 
Greece 
T e r m 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.03 18.20 12.31 -0.090 -0.009 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 473.60 243.65 0D53 0 0 1 2 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.42 0.21 0.36 0.096 -0.017 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.20 0.32 0.32 -0.015 0.014 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.14 0.08 0.10 -0.001 0.006 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.08 0.71 0.59 0.002 -0.001 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 -0.13 0.05 0.02 -0.006 0.045 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.21 0.10 0.13 0.009 0.000 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.004 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.27 -0.018 0.022 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.20 0.001 0.000 
SkJHed Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.12 0.04 0.02 0.002 0.000 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.000 0.013 
Semi-skìlled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.05 -0.003 0.002 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.003 -0.002 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.001 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.29 0.35 0.36 0.021 -0.017 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.02 0.49 0.44 0.001 -0.004 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.35 0.05 0.02 0.002 0.000 
Industry 0.46 0,28 -0.01 0.07 0.49 0.30 0.000 -0.015 
Lambda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Tota l 0.063 0 .048 
Term 1 = ( 5 Z r 8 Z k ) P k 
Term 2 = S Z j ( | J r p k ) 
Term 3 = (S\ffj- oV/Jofc = = ( .289- .286).510 = 0.001 
Term 4 = Ôif/f (<jj - a*) - .2890581 - . 510) -0 .020 
xci 
Appendi* 7.12 Spain 
Spain - Male 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 1.092 21.92 
Expérience 0.027 8.30 21.29 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -7.27 614.80 
Higher Educ. 0.209 6.63 0.20 
Secondary Ed. 0.122 4.46 0.19 
Public Sector 0.053 1.19 0.05 
Married 0.107 4.15 0.71 
Manager 0.526 9.28 0.04 
Professional 0.411 7.76 0.07 
Associate Prof. 0.200 4.53 0.10 
Clerks 0.164 3.61 0.08 
Service -0.070 -1.69 0.11 
Ski lied Agric. 0.147 1.99 0.03 
Crafts 0.038 1.15 0.31 
Semi-skilled 0.047 1.24 0.13 
Unit >50&<500 0.169 6.85 0.21 
Unit >500 0.342 11.96 0.17 
Outsider -0.284 -8.30 0.36 
Insider 0.070 2.03 0.54 
Agriculture -0.330 -5.80 0.06 
Industry 0.049 2.02 0.50 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.665 
Stan. Dev. 0.593 
Observations 2042 
R-squared 0.487 
Log-I ike. -1150.5 
Rest. Log-I ike. -1831.5 
Du rbin-Watson 1.91 
Spain - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-rat io Mean 
Constant 0.948 14.26 
Expérience 0.023 4.83 15.26 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -3.88 359.40 
Higher Educ. 0.129 2.54 0.31 
Secondary Ed. 0.017 0.41 0.26 
Public Sector 0.152 2.81 0.12 
Married 0.133 4.11 0.53 
Manager 0.188 1.73 0.02 
Professional 0.636 8.70 0.14 
Associate Prof. 0.418 6.26 0.12 
Clerks 0.289 5.02 0.22 
Service 0.140 2.58 0.21 
Skilled Agric. 0.261 1.21 0.01 
Crafts -0.087 -1.12 0.09 
Semi-skilled -0.091 -0.90 0.03 
Unit >50&<500 0.088 2.30 0.23 
Unit >500 0.238 4.85 0.12 
Outsider -0.369 -7.92 0.42 
Insider 0.113 2.30 0.43 
Agriculture -0.319 -2.46 0.02 
Industry 0.125 2.41 0.22 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.478 




Rest. Log-like. -706.7 
Durbin-Watson 1.99 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - Spain 
Var iab le F e m . Coeff. F e m . M e a n Maie Coeff. Ma ie M e a n Expiai ned Unexp la ined 
Constant 0.9484 1.0000 1.0923 1.0000 0.0000 0.1439 
Expérience 0.0234 15.2611 0.0267 21.2919 0.1608 0.0503 
Expérience 2 -0.0004 359.4013 -0.0004 614.8041 -0.1115 -0.0053 
HED 0.1286 0.3108 0.2087 0.2013 -0.0229 0.0249 
SÉO 0.0174 0.2586 0.1223 0.1871 -0.0087 0.0271 
Public Sector 0.1516 0.1159 0.0526 0.0548 -0.0032 -0.0115 
Married 0.1326 0.5261 0.1075 0.7120 0.0200 -0.0132 
Manager 0.1884 0.0242 0.5259 0.0426 0.0097 0.0082 
Professional 0.6362 0.1401 0.4112 0.0656 -0.0306 -0.0315 
Associate Professional 0.4179 0.1185 0.2003 0.0960 -0.0045 -0.0258 
Clerks 0.2888 0.2217 0.1641 0.0798 -0.0233 -0.0276 
Service 0.1396 0.2115 -0.0702 0.1058 0.0074 -0.0444 
Skilled Agricuttural 0.2613 0.0064 0.1470 0.0294 0.0034 -0.0007 
Crafts -0.0874 0.0917 0.0379 0.3056 0.0061 0.0115 
Semi-ski lied -0.0913 0.0344 0.0468 0.1317 0.0046 0.0047 
Unit >50 but <500 0.0878 0.2293 0.1691 0.2120 -0.0029 0.0186 
Unit >500 0.2382 0.1236 0.3422 0.1665 0.0147 0.0129 
Outsider -0.3687 0.4178 -0.2837 0.3634 0.0155 0.0355 
Insider 0.1129 0.4331 0.0699 0.5367 0.0072 -0.0186 
Agriculture -0.3194 0.0191 -0.3299 0.0583 -0.0129 -0.0002 
Industry 0.1253 0.2153 0.0487 0.4985 0.0138 -0.0165 
Tota l 0 .0446 0.1423 0 .1869 
There are higher returns for men from medium and large sized firm employment as well 
as a smaller penalty for maie outsiders. However there are positive and significant returns 
for women in the public sector and a larger premium for female insiders. The most 
significant factor for the unexplained wage gap is the différence between the intercept 
coefficients, ali of the unexplained differential can be assigned to this factor. 
xciv 
Juhn et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Spain 
Var iab le Maie m e a n 
U K 
F e m . 
m e a n 
U K 
P m a l e U K 8 ma ie Spain Maie m e a n 
Spa in 
F e m . 
m e a n 
Spa in 
Tern i 1 T e r m 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.09 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.03 21.29 15.26 -0.089 -0.005 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 614.80 359.40 0.053 0.000 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.21 0.20 0.31 0.041 0.001 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.12 0.19 0.26 -0.001 0.008 
Public Sector 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.001 0.003 
Married 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.11 0.71 0.53 -0.005 -0.005 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.53 0.04 0.02 0.034 -0.009 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.41 0.07 0.14 0.033 -0.001 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.004 0.000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.22 -0.023 0.021 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 -0.07 0.11 0.21 -0.002 -0.007 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.002 -0.003 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.31 0.09 -0.001 0.005 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.03 -0.001 0.002 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.001 -0.001 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.34 0.17 0.12 -0.013 0.000 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.28 0.36 0.42 0.008 -0.016 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.07 0.54 0.43 0.000 -0.008 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.33 0.06 0.02 0.005 -0.001 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 0.05 0.50 0.22 -0.005 -0.012 
Lambda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 
Total 0.038 -0 .028 
Term 1 = (ÔZj - ÔZ k )p k 
Term 2 = 5 Z j ( P r p k ) 
Term 3 = (ôy/j - ôy/^Uk = (.289 - .333).427 = -0.019 
Term 4 - ôy/j ( 0 7 - o*) = .289(.581 - .427) = 0.044 
xcv 
Appendix 7.13 Portugal 
Por tugal - Male 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 0.579 6.26 
Expérience 0.019 6.81 21.16 
Expérience2 -0.0005 -6.98 639.31 
Higher Educ. 0.380 4.77 0.04 
Secondary Ed. 0.105 2.50 0.09 
Public Sector 0.067 1.50 0.05 
Married 0.072 3.03 0.66 
Manager 0.728 10.86 0.03 
Professional 0.698 7.79 0.03 
Associate Prof. 0.443 8.93 0.06 
Clerks 0.323 7.37 0.08 
Service 0.060 1.47 0.11 
Skilled Agric. 0.051 0.92 0.06 
Crafts 0.079 2.54 0.36 
Semi-skilled 0.163 4.49 0.14 
Unit >50&<500 0.156 6.38 0.20 
Unit >500 0.283 6.89 0.06 
Outsider -0.135 ^.54 0.28 
Insider 0.056 2.01 0.56 
Agriculture -0.274 -5.67 0.10 
Industry -0.026 -1.07 0.51 
Lambda 0.459 3.13 0.74 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.257 




Rest. Log-like. -1392.4 
Durbin-Watson 1.81 
xcvi 
Por tuga l - Female 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
Constant 0.489 6.37 
Expérience 0.018 5.95 17.28 
Expérience2 -0.0004 -6.71 456.20 
Higher Educ. 0.670 10.68 0.06 
Secondary Ed. 0.190 5.08 0.15 
Public Sector 0.141 3.24 0.08 
Married -0.001 -0.03 0.66 
Manager 0.244 2.44 0.01 
Professional 0.262 3.20 0.03 
Assocîate Prof. 0.326 5.76 0.07 
Clerks 0.336 7.91 0.16 
Service 0.016 0.46 0.27 
Skilled Agric. -0.051 -0.55 0.02 
Crafts -0.018 -0.39 0.18 
Semi-skilled -0.106 -1.82 0.07 
Unit >50&<500 0.120 4.39 0.26 
Unit >500 0.291 6.36 0.07 
Outsider -0.180 -5.55 0.29 
Insider 0.070 2.30 0.51 
Agriculture -0.039 -0.60 0.05 
Industry 0.041 1.06 0.33 
Lambda 0.307 3.61 0.88 
Dep. Var. ECU Wage 
Mean 1.087 




Rest. Log-like. -742.1 
Durbin-Watson 1.92 
xcvii 
Oaxaca (1973) Décomposition - Portugal 
V a r i a b l e F e m . Coeff . F e m . M e a n M a i e Coef f . M a i e M e a n Exp la ined U n e x p l a i n e d 
Constant 0.4894 1 .0000 0.5794 1.0000 0.0000 0.0900 
Expérience 0.0184 17.2802 0.0191 21.1585 0.0742 0.0126 
Expérience 2 -0.0004 456.1984 -0.0005 639 .3108 -0.0845 -0.0097 
HED 0.6698 0.0632 0.3804 0.0370 -0.0100 -0.0183 
SED 0.1896 0.1488 0.1054 0.0929 -0.0059 -0.0125 
Public Sector 0.1414 0.0837 0.0666 0.0526 -0.0021 -0.0063 
Married -0.0007 0.6556 0.0723 0.6646 0.0006 0.0479 
Manager 0.2441 0.0126 0.7278 0.0258 0.0095 0.0061 
Professional 0.2620 0.0321 0.6982 0.0274 -0.0033 0.0140 
Associate Professional 0.3262 0.0739 0.4427 0.0610 -0.0057 0.0086 
Clerks 0.3358 0.1576 0.3225 0.0812 -0.0246 -0.0021 
Service 0.0161 0.2704 0.0599 0.1086 -0.0097 0.0119 
Skilled Agricultural -0.0513 0.0224 0.0508 0.0610 0.0020 0.0023 
Crafts -0.0185 0.1819 0.0788 0.3567 0.0138 0.0177 
Semi-skilled -0.1059 0.0691 0.1634 0.1394 0.0115 0.0186 
Unit >50 but <500 0.1204 0.2597 0.1563 0.1988 -0.0095 0.0093 
Unit >500 0.2910 0.0671 0.2830 0.0594 -0.0022 -0.0005 
Outsider -0.1798 0.2870 -0.1351 0.2772 0.0013 0.0128 
Insider 0.0699 0.5117 0.0560 0.5649 0.0030 -0.0071 
Agriculture -0.0387 0 .0545 -0.2740 0.0985 -0.0121 -0.0128 
Industry 0.0413 0.3317 -0.0260 0.5146 -0.0047 -0.0223 
Tota l -0 .0584 0 .1601 0 .1017 
Lambda 0.3072 0.8829 0.4586 0.7399 -0.0655 0.1336 0 .0681 
T o t a l •0 .1239 0 .2937 0 .1698 
XCVIII 
Décomposition of Wage Differentials with Selectivity Correction. 
Portugal 1996 
Estimâtes of average lambdas and associated coefficients. 












log w m - log w f Explained Unexplained Selectivity 
Oaxaca 0.1698 -0.124 (-73.0%) 0.294 (173.0%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
Option 1 0.067 (39.7%) 0.102 (60.3%) 0.000 (0.0%) 
Option 2 -0.066 (-39.0%) 0.236(139.0%) 0.000(0.0%) 
Option 3 -0.066 (-39.0%) 0.102 (60.3%) 0.134 
(78.7%) 
Unusually, for this study at least, there are very similar retums from expérience for 
men and women. There is a smaller penalty for male outsiders, but women insiders 
enjoy a greater premium as well as receiving a better return from higher éducation. 
Selectivity différences and the intercept coefficients are the crucial factors behind the 
unexplained wage gap, with over 30% of it being due to the intercept terms. 
XC1X 
J u h n et al (1991) Décomposition - UK vs. Por tuga l 
V a r i a b l e M a l e m e a n 
U K 
F e m . 
m e a n 
U K 
B m a l e U K 8 m a l e 
P o r t u g a l 
M a l e m e a n 
P o r t u g a l 
F e m . 
m e a n 
P o r t u g a l 
T e r n i 1 Te rn i 2 
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.10 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Expérience 23.85 21.15 0.02 0.02 21.16 17.28 -0.023 0.016 
Experience2 708.97 585.66 -0.0004 0.00 639.31 456.20 0.030 0.012 
HED 0.30 0.21 0.221 0.38 0.04 0.06 0 .043 -0.014 
SED 0.35 0.43 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.15 -0.002 0.006 
Public S e d a r 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.08 0 .000 0.003 
Marri ed 0.72 0.58 0.08 0.07 0.66 0.66 0 .010 0.000 
Manager 0.20 0.12 0.42 0.73 0.03 0O1 0.050 -0.026 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.70 0.03 0.03 0.007 -0.003 
Associate Professional 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.44 0.06 0.07 0 .005 0 .000 
Clerks 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.32 0.08 0.16 -0.066 0.065 
Service 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.27 0 .005 0.003 
Skilled Agricultural 0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.001 -0.002 
Crafts 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.36 0.18 0.001 -0 .003 
Semi-skilled 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.07 0 .000 -0.006 
Unit >50 but <500 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.008 -0.002 
Unit >500 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.28 0.06 0.07 0.003 0.001 
Outsider 0.24 0.32 -0.09 -0.14 0.28 0.29 0 .010 -0.004 
Insider 0.58 0.48 -0.01 0.06 0.56 0.51 0.003 -0.007 
Agriculture 0.03 0.00 -0.35 -0.27 0.10 0.05 0.005 -0.002 
Industry 0.46 0.28 -0.01 -0.03 0.51 0.33 0 .000 0.002 
Lambda 0 0 0 0.46 0.74 0.88 0.066 0.000 
T o t a l 0 . 1 5 3 0 .042 
Terni I = (5Zj - ÔZ k )p k 
T c r m 2 = 5 Z j ( p J - p k ) 
Terni 3 = (ò>y - ótyijo* = (.289 - .755).389 = -0.181 
Terni 4 = ó>y (aj - oj j = .289(.581 - .389) - 0.055 
c 
